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Abstract 
Researchers are now beginning to question whether socially anxious behaviours (behavioural 
inhibition, social withdrawal, shyness), commonly observed in early childhood, are distinct 
from social anxiety (disorder), which is widely believed to have an onset in adolescence. The 
thesis argues that there is a qualitative difference in these constructs, with developments in 
social perspective-taking being the cognitive-developmental mechanism that underlies the 
emergence of social anxiety in middle to late childhood. Further, it proposes that self-
monitoring predicts social anxiety via self-efficacy, and that these relationships vary across 
levels of perspective-taking development and social integration (e.g., high, moderate and 
low). Utilising interview and questionnaire measures these relationships were evaluated in a 
sample of 171 Australian youth aged between 8 and 15 years. Overall, the findings support 
the hypotheses that developments in social perspective-taking underlie the emergence of 
social anxiety, and that self-monitoring is mediated by self-efficacy beliefs in the prediction 
of social anxiety. Cognitive developments also moderated the prediction of social anxiety. 
Moreover, the relationships between self-monitoring, self-efficacy beliefs and social anxiety 
were significant at both low and moderate, but not high, levels of social integration. The 
findings suggest that social anxiety can be distinguished developmentally in terms of the 
cognitive-developmental and psychosocial mechanisms involved, and that even children who 
are relatively well integrated will experience social anxiety when engaging in self-monitoring 
and doubting their social abilities. These findings, areas for future research, and study 
limitations are discussed. 
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Chapter 1 
Introduction  
       Social anxiety (i.e., anxiety in social situations) has been of interest to researchers from 
various, and often disparate, disciplines (see Leitenberg, 1990; McNeil, 2010). Indeed, 
researchers are now beginning to question whether socially anxious behaviours (behavioural 
inhibition, social withdrawal, shyness), described by developmental researchers in early 
childhood, are distinct from social anxiety (disorder), that is widely believed to have an onset 
in adolescence. Gazelle and Rubin (2010) have argued, for example, that the research findings 
to date suggest that social anxiety disorder, typically studied in adolescence, is a continuation 
of early temperament behavioural inhibition, rather than a qualitatively distinct phenomenon. 
Similarly, Rapee and Spence (2004) argued that fearful temperament and social anxiety may 
be the same phenomena but the former may be renamed social anxiety in light of the social 
evaluative situations in which these fearful reactions occur (e.g., in public, at school). Schmidt 
and Buss (2010) and others (Angold & Costello, 2009) suggest that social anxiety may be the 
same as behavioural inhibition and shyness in terms of its basic cognitive, emotional and 
behavioural phenomenology.  
       Thus, researchers are beginning to raise questions regarding the developmental 
continuity/discontinuity of these socially anxious constructs, and are asking ‘whether social 
anxiety diagnosed in adolescence differs qualitatively from that which appears, emotionally, 
behaviourally, and cognitively, in earlier years of childhood’ (Gazelle & Rubin, 2010, p. 9). 
The definition and resolution of these issues sets the scope of aetiological research by 
determining the specific timing and nature of factors (e.g., biological, social, psychological) 
that are of aetiological significance. Given that different research areas link these constructs 
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temporally these constructs must be qualitatively distinct in their biological, social and 
psychological underpinnings.  
       In furthering our understanding of these issues, this thesis advances the argument that 
specific forms of social anxiety can be differentiated at different times during development in 
terms of their quality and basic biological, psychological and social underpinnings. 
Specifically, spontaneously taking another’s perspective on the self is proposed as a core 
cognitive feature of social anxiety in middle childhood and adolescence. With perspective-
taking as a central feature of social anxiety, links can be made to existing sociocognitive-
developmental theory. In particular, Selman’s (1980) structural theory of sociocognitive 
development proposes that development proceeds from relative egocentricity towards an 
increasing ability to consider others’ perspectives. It is proposed in this thesis that the ability 
to take another’s perspective on the self, emerging between approximately 7 to 12 years of 
age, may be a developmental requisite for the experience of mature forms of social anxiety, 
that is, social anxiety characterised by a spontaneous consideration of other’s (negative) 
perspectives on the self. If this is the case social anxiety in middle childhood may be 
distinguished from social anxiety appearing earlier in development in terms of the cognitive 
mechanisms involved.  
       In addition to considering differences in perspective-taking as a mechanism underlying 
the emergence of social anxiety, social and motivational dynamics are also argued to predict 
social anxiety as an individual difference. Specifically, individuals are expected to differ in 
the degree to which they think about self and others even with requisite cognitive capacities. 
Considered here are differences in individuals’ engagement in motivated forms of self-
monitoring, and differences in their beliefs about their abilities to maintain social relations 
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with others. At the same time these psychological processes are contextualized within stages 
of social perspective-taking and levels of social integration. Briefly, a number of empirically 
informed but novel moderating and mediating hypotheses will be put forward  regarding the 
relationships  between perspective-taking, motivated forms of self-monitoring, self-efficacy, 
and social integration as predictors of social anxiety. 
       The above arguments will be developed in the following order. Given that questions are 
being raised about the distinctions between social anxiety constructs based on existing 
prevalence data, these data are reviewed in Chapter 2. The aim of reviewing this literature is 
to clarify when social anxiety first emerges as a clinical disorder and, secondly, to evaluate 
the degree to which available studies can actually answer this question. Regarding the latter, 
there are a number of methodological confounds which make conclusions about the onset of 
social anxiety (disorder) difficult, and the conclusion reached is that current research does not 
allow a definitive conclusion. 
       In Chapter 3 a cognitive-phenomenological approach is used to evaluate similarities and 
differences between social anxiety constructs studied at different times in development. This 
analysis begins with a review of the features of social anxiety disorder outlined by the APA 
(2000), and those related to other childhood constructs. The conclusion drawn here is that 
despite their temporal distinctions, their description and proposed aetiology are basically the 
same. However, in Chapter 4, it is argued that developmental variations in the cognitive, 
behavioural and social qualities of shyness, embarrassment and self-presentation can be 
observed. This provides an empirical basis for making qualitative distinctions between these 
constructs and social anxiety based, specifically, on their apparent cognitive bases.  
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       In Chapters 5 and 6 perspective-taking is argued to be a core cognitive feature of social 
anxiety, and developments in perspective-taking are hypothesized to be a cognitive-
developmental requisite for the emergence of social anxiety. A theoretical model including 
these mechanisms and, more specific, cognitive-affective appraisals explaining the experience 
of social anxiety in childhood and adolescence is also proposed, and hypotheses outlined. In 
Chapter 7 the study testing these hypotheses is presented and in Chapter 8 these findings are 
discussed.   
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Chapter 2: The Prevalence of Social Anxiety (disorder) 
       It is widely reported that social anxiety disorder has an onset in adolescence. The APA 
(2000) and a large number of early studies report social anxiety disorder as having an onset in 
mid-adolescence (e.g., Davidson, Hughes, George, & Blazer, 1993; Kessler et al., 2005; Ost, 
1987; Schneier, Johnson, Hornig, Liebowitz, & Weissman, 1992; Thyer, Parrish, Curtis, 
Nesse, & Cameron, 1985). However, more recently, social anxiety disorder has been observed 
well before this time. This has led researchers to argue that social anxiety disorder may not be 
an adolescent phenomenon (as is believed), and that it may be a continuation of anxiety first 
observed in earlier childhood and even infancy. However, determining the prevalence of 
social anxiety disorder across childhood and adolescence is anything but straightforward. 
Studies differ in terms of which symptoms are used to define the disorder (e.g., impairment), 
who reports on the symptoms (e.g., parents or children), and from where the sample is drawn 
(e.g., community or clinical). These factors appear to influence the prevalence estimates and 
also confound their interpretation. This will be highlighted in the following sections, which 
focus on studies including those with the youngest participants.  
 
Community Studies and Age-Related Prevalence Data for Young Children   
       There are few representative community studies of the incidence of anxiety disorders in 
preschool age children (for review see Egger & Angold, 2006; Costello, Egger, & Angold, 
2005). It is only recently that interview schedules have been made available (e.g., the 
Preschool Age Psychiatric Assessment, [PAPA] Egger & Angold, 2004; Egger, Ascher, & 
Angold, 1999) and used to diagnose psychiatric disorder in preschoolers based on DSM-IV-TR 
criteria (Egger, Erkanli, Keeler, Potts, Walter, & Angold, 2006Bufferd, Dougherty, Carlson, 
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& Klein, 2011). Older and  smaller studies (N = ~ 100), utilised outdated diagnostic criteria 
(e.g., DSM-III and DSM-III-R) and a mixture of questionnaire (e.g., CBCL), observational and 
clinical consensus data to make diagnoses in this age group (Earls, 1982; Keenan et al., 1997; 
Lavigne et al., 1996). These studies, nevertheless, report evidence of social anxiety disorder 
(Social Phobia) in this age group, with prevalence estimates between .07% and 2.3%.  
       The more recent studies using the PAPA (Bufferd et al., 2011; Egger et al., 2006) are 
superior to these earlier studies in a number of ways. As noted, these are the only studies to 
utilise a clinical interview method based on DSM-IV-TR criteria and designed for preschoolers 
specifically (Egger et al., 2006; Bufferd et al., 2011). Diagnoses in the study by Egger et al. 
(2006) were made using the PAPA and included impairment criteria, which means they were 
less likely to capture normal variation in temperament (see Angold & Egger, 2004; Carter, 
Briggs-Gowan, & Davis, 2004). In this study, 1073 parents of children aged 2 to 5 years from 
a primary care clinic were surveyed over an 18 month period. Of these initial participants 307 
parents completed the PAPA based on initial high scores on the CBCL. The weighted 
prevalence of social anxiety disorder was 2.1%, which closely matches that reported in the 
studies above. The prevalence reported by Bufferd et al. (2011), sampling from 541 parents of 
3 year-olds only was higher (4.4%), perhaps due to not requiring impairment criteria for the 
diagnosis to be made.   
       There is also evidence that a range of clinical disorder symptoms, including anxiety 
disorder, can be differentiated in preschoolers. This runs counter to theoretical expectations 
that syndromal differentiation occurs with age (see Angold & Costello, 2009; Sterba et al., 
2010). Sterba, Egger, and Angold (2007) reported that a three factor, parent-reported, 
behavioural and anxiety/mood nosology, the latter consisting of social anxiety, separation 
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anxiety, and depression/generalized anxiety was a good fit for their sample of preschoolers. 
Strickland et al. (2011), however, in a study of 4 year-olds, who were not selected based on 
high CBCL scores, found the same anxiety disorder factors, although in this study mood and 
generalized anxiety disorder could be differentiated. These studies, while reporting that 
separate anxiety disorder factors better fit the data, found that factors were highly inter-
correlated and a single undifferentiated anxiety disorder model also fitted the data (discussed 
further below).  
       These findings are replicated in a number of large (N = ~ 700) community, factor 
analytic, studies focussing more exclusively on anxiety disorder symptoms using symptom 
checklists (Benga, Tincas, & Visu-Petra, 2010; Edwards, Rapee, Kennedy, & Spence, 2010; 
Eley et al., 2003). Spence, Rapee, McDonald, and Ingram (2001) studied a range of anxiety 
disorder symptoms in 755 3 to 5 year-old Australian preschoolers and found that five 
correlated factors could be identified, including symptoms of social anxiety, separation 
anxiety, generalized anxiety, obsessive–compulsive disorder and fears of physical injury.   
       The mere observation of social anxiety (disorder) symptoms in children this age suggests 
that it may have an onset much earlier than adolescence (Rapee, Schniering, & Hudson, 
2009). Indeed, large epidemiological studies illustrate either no change (Ford, Goodman, & 
Meltzer, 2003; ages 5-17) or small increases (Canino et al., 2004; ages 4-17) in social anxiety 
disorder between preschoolers and adolescents. These studies, although cross-sectional, 
suggest that social anxiety disorder may appear first in preschool and then continue into 
adolescence. This conclusion is supported indirectly by prospective consistency in social 
anxiety symptomology from childhood through adolescence (e.g., Bittner, Egger, Erkanli et 
al., 2007) and from child/adolescent epidemiological studies reporting prevalence estimates 
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on par with those reported in preschool, including the studies by Ford et al. (2003) and Canino 
et al. (2004) (for review see Costello et al., 2005). On the other hand, as discussed below, 
other studies including older children and adolescents, report much higher and increasing 
prevalence with age. 
 
Community Studies and Prevalence Data for Older Children and Adolescents   
       Studies including a larger proportion of older children, adolescents and/or adults report 
marked age differences in the prevalence of social anxiety compared to the preschool studies 
discussed above (see Wittchen & Fehm, 2003). An exception is Essau and colleagues’ (Essau, 
Conradt, & Pettersen, 1999) study which used a detailed and structured clinical interview 
method to attribute diagnoses to adolescents reporting on symptoms, their intensity, 
associated avoidance, and level of psychosocial impairment. This study included 1035 youth 
aged between 12 and 17 and reported a lifetime prevalence of 1.6% which is, interestingly, 
similar to those reported above (e.g., Egger et al., 2006). Notable, however, is that the 
prevalence increased twofold between the 12-13 and 14-15 year-old groups from 0.5 to 2.0%, 
with no further increase between the latter group and 16-17 year-olds.  
       In comparison, a number of large scale population studies using less stringent clinical 
assessment methods have reported much higher estimates (e.g., Ranta, Kaltiala-Heino, 
Rantanen, & Marttunen, 2009; Stein, Torgrud, & Walker, 2000; Van Roy, Kristensen, 
Groholt, & ClenchǦAas, 2009). Ranta et al. (2009), for example, report a higher and rising 
prevalence of 2.6% to 4.1% among 756 12-14 and 15-17 year-olds, respectively. Similarly, 
Wittchen, Stein, and Kessler’s (1999) study of over 3000 14 to 24 year-olds reported an 
overall 12 month prevalence rate of 7.3%, with prevalence increasing between 14-17 (4.0%) 
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and 18-24 (8.7%) years of age. Similarly, the National Comorbidity Survey Replication 
(Adolescent Supplement) face-to-face survey of 10,123 adolescents aged 13 to 18 years in the 
United States reported a total lifetime prevalence of 9.1%, with increases from 13 to 14 
(7.7%), 15 to 16 (9.7%) and 17 to 18 (10.1%) years of age (Merikangas et al., 2010).  
       Thus, it would appear that in samples of older children/adolescents the prevalence of 
social anxiety disorder increases with age, even when impairment criteria are applied (Essau 
et al., 1999). Mid-adolescence also appears to be a significant transition period for this 
increase in development which is consistent with retrospective studies (Kessler et al., 2005). 
There are a number of interpretations of these findings which bear on the nature of social 
anxiety (disorder) from preschool to adolescence.  
 
A Caveat: Age and Impairment in the Diagnosis of Social Anxiety (disorder) 
       A number of factors may influence these varying prevalence rates (see Wittchen & Fehm, 
2003). Yet, here what is of interest is the apparent relationship between impairment and 
prevalence of social anxiety disorder at different ages. Not yet noted is that the application of 
impairment criteria appears to decrease the prevalence of social anxiety disorder in younger 
children while increasing it in older children and adolescents. In the studies by Ford et al. 
(2003) and Canino et al. (2004) reviewed previously, application of impairment criteria 
significantly decreased the prevalence to almost half that without this criterion (see also 
Simonoff et al., 1997). In representative epidemiological studies of older children aged 9 to 
12, however, application of impairment criteria results in a greater number of older children 
meeting diagnostic criteria (cf. Costello, Mustillo, Erkanli, Keeler, & Angold, 2003; Roy et 
al., 2009).  
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       One interpretation of these findings is that age-related increases in prevalence are an 
indication of greater psychosocial impairment occurring with age rather than an increase or 
change in basic symptomology, per se (Rapee, Schniering, & Hudson, 2009; Rapee & Spence, 
2004). In the context of the other research reviewed, this means that social anxiety disorder 
symptoms (minus impairment) may be apparent first in preschool but only become disordered 
when the child is faced with greater challenges. The same reasoning can be applied to 
behavioural inhibition and shyness which may, for example, get renamed social anxiety 
disorder due to the situations in which symptoms present, and the level of distress experienced 
(Rapee & Spence, 2004). This interpretation appears to be borne out not only in the 
consistency of the prevalence data and changes as a function of impairment, but in clinic 
referred diagnoses increasing dramatically from preschool (0.9%) to mid-adolescence (16%) 
(e.g., Esbjørn, Hoeyer, Dryborg, Leth, & Kendall, 2010). It seems reasonable that treatment 
seeking may increase as a consequence of greater psychosocial impairment with age. Indeed, 
even in studies where children and adolescents are both participating and receiving treatment, 
the latter report greater overall distress and impairment (Beidel et al., 2007; Rao et al., 2007). 
      There are, however, other interpretations of these data and a number of caveats should be 
noted. In particular, the aforementioned studies are particularly limited in their ability to shed 
light on the continuity and/or invariance of social anxiety disorder phenomenology from 
preschool into childhood and adolescence. They are not longitudinal and, most important, is 
their reliance on parent-reported symptoms. This is problematic since social anxiety (e.g., 
worrying about looking stupid / feeling embarrassed in front of people) implies negative 
expectations, self-consciousness, worry and apprehension, and negative self-evaluations, and 
studies illustrate that parent and child report are poorly correlated (Choudhury, Pimentel, & 
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Kendall, 2003; Rapee, Barrett, Dadds, & Evans, 1994), especially for subjective symptoms 
(Comer & Kendall, 2004). This does not mean that parental inferences or reports are entirely 
wrong (e.g., they may ask or be told by their child); however, they may not cover the full 
range of the implied cognitive phenomenology described above.  
       Another caveat relates to the possibility that observations of social anxiety disorder in 
preschoolers actually reflect normal variation in temperament (see Angold & Egger, 2004; 
Carter et al., 2004; Emde, Bingham, & Harmon, 1993). This is supported indirectly by rates of 
social anxiety disorder decreasing, rather than increasing, when impairment criteria are 
applied. However, with the above criticism about access to subjective phenomena aside, it 
may still be that all major symptoms are present with the exception of significant impairment. 
This would rule out disorder in these cases, however, principal features would remain and, 
perhaps, these early ways of responding to self and others become problematic in the future. 
Yet, studies including preschoolers have generally failed to illustrate stability in social anxiety 
(disorder) over even relatively brief periods (e.g., Gadow, Sprafkin, & Nolan, 2001; Benga et 
al., 2010). Even in Egger et al.’s (2006) study, parent-report diagnoses based on the PAPA, 
representing the “gold standard” in diagnosis (Costello, Egger, & Angold, 2005), were not 
reliable (or stable) on retesting after only an average of 11 days, even with impairment criteria 
(Cohen’s Kappa Coefficient = .54 and .57, respectively). This, and the very high rates of 
‘disorder’ overall (e.g., 27%, Bufferd et al., 2011), raise serious doubts about the stability and 
validity of symptoms more generally at this young age.  
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An Integrative Developmental Interpretation  
      Parent-reported symptom reliability may vary for many different reasons (see De Los 
Reyes & Kazdin, 2005). In addition, not all studies report poor reliability (see Edwards et al., 
2010). Variability in reliability may also represent valid waxing and waning of social anxiety 
(disorder) during the preschool period. Social anxiety (disorder) may, for example, emerge 
and, perhaps re-emerge, at different times for different individuals for different reasons (e.g., 
transitions into day care). In this vein, a number of studies report that social anxiety disorder 
symptoms are more prevalent in 3 year-old children compared those aged 5 (Spence et al., 
2001) and 6 years (Benga et al., 2010). Still other studies illustrate that older children and 
adolescents are more likely to exhibit social fears compared to younger children (e.g., Weems 
& Costa, 2005). Westenberg, Gullone, Bokhorst, Heyne, and King’s (2007) reanalysis of 
Gullone and King’s (1997) study of Australian school children aged 8 to 17 years illustrated 
that cross-sectionally (N = 910), social fears increased with age and were moderately stable 
prospectively (r  = .33). Yet of even highly socially anxious individuals at time 1 (scoring 2 
SD above the mean, N = 8) only 1 maintained social fears at this level (i.e., the others scored 
within 1 SD of the mean). Thus, as suggested above, social anxiety may wax and wane at 
different times and be relatively unstable even at extremes (see also Prinstein & La Greca, 
2002).  
      One hypothesis that may account for some of this variation is that general disorder, and 
fearfulness in the context of anxiety disorder, is common in very early childhood. This 
general emotional and behavioural dysregulation may, however, differentiate into more 
specific symptom patterns, including specific fears and social anxieties. Both aspects of this 
hypothesis—i.e., general dysregulation/fearfulness, on the one hand, and differentiation, on 
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the other—may be supportable. Indeed, although the preschool factor analytic studies 
identified differentiated anxiety, mood and behavioural nosology, overlaps between and 
within disorder groups are high (Sterba et al., 2007; Strickland et al., 2011). In these studies 
however (also the only to include a range of behavioural emotional and anxiety disorders in 
preschoolers) an undifferentiated model, where all disorders are combined, also provided a 
“good” fit of the data according to various fit indices. Not surprisingly, correlations between 
social anxiety and other disorder groups, especially other anxiety disorder groups, were high: 
separation anxiety (.65/.83), mixed generalised anxiety/major depressive (.76) (Sterba et al., 
2007) ‘pure’ generalised anxiety disorder (.85) (Strickland et al., 2011). These high 
correlations are replicated in studies of anxiety disorder nosology which have also reported 
that a higher order ‘anxiety’ factor accounts for the high covariance between ‘differentiated’ 
anxiety disorder factors (Benga et al., 2010; Edwards et al., 2010; Spence et al., 2001). 
Importantly, studies of older children and adolescents report smaller correlations both 
between and within disorder groups (factors) (see Sterba et al., 2010). This may point to 
general emotional/behavioural dysregulation of preschoolers with greater differentiation 
between and within these disorder groups with age.  
       Other research has also indicated that anxiety disorder symptoms, including social fears, 
increase and differentiate with age. First, however, not all studies have found that social 
evaluation fears increase with age (Gullone, King, & Ollendick, 2001) and some have even 
found that they diminish with age (Gullone & Lane, 2002). In explaining these findings, 
researchers (e.g., Westenberg, Drewes, Goedhart, Siebelink, & Treffers, 2004; Westenberg, 
Gullone, Bokhorst, Heyne, & King, 2007) have highlighted the need to control for the overall 
decline in ‘general fearfulness’ that seems to occur with age (e.g., of loud noises, animals, 
14 
 
darkness etc., see Gullone, 2000 for a review). In this vein, Weems and Costa (2005) 
illustrated that fears of loud noises, strangers, separation, and physical injury were more likely 
in 6 to 9 year-olds, with 14 to 17 year-olds being likely to be concerned about negative 
evaluation and criticism. Similarly, Vasey Crnic, and Carter (1994), in a study well before its 
time, utilised an interview and vignette procedure to elicit worries that were most salient to 5 
to 12 year-olds. These authors found that worries about physical injury predominated over 
worries about behavioural competence and social evaluation at ages 5 to 6 years, while 
worries about  physical injury decreased significantly across ages 8 to 9 and, especially 11 to 
12, with concerns about behavioural competence and negative social evaluation 
predominating and increasing at these ages (see also Ost & Treffers, 2001).   
       Research is also beginning to highlight the importance of differentiating between specific 
kinds of social fears at different ages (e.g., Bokhorst, Westenberg, Oosterlaan, & Heyne, 
2008; Schaefer, Watkins, & Burnham, 2003; Westenberg et al., 2007). Westenberg et al. 
(2004) in a sample of 882 youth aged 8 to 18 years, found that fears of negative evaluation 
characterised by punishment (e.g., from parent or teacher) were characteristic of 8-11 year-
olds whereas fears associated with negative social/peer evaluation, as is typically used to 
define social anxiety, were relevant to 12 to14 year-olds and increasingly so for 15 to 18 year-
olds. Similarly, Bokhorst et al. (2008) found that, while a ‘general’ negative evaluation factor 
was the best fit for 6-9 year-olds; a three factor solution consisting of negative evaluation 
based on social (e.g., being publicly teased, criticized, scrutinized), academic (e.g., failing, 
doing a test) and punishment (e.g., called on by teacher, mother, principal) was the best fit for 
10-13 and 14-18 year-olds. There is even evidence for differentiation in parent-reported social 
fears among preschoolers. Spence et al.’s (2001) study reported earlier found, for instance, 
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that while some social fears were shared among 3 to 5 year-olds (e.g., meeting unfamiliar 
people), problems relating to fear of talking in front of the class or group and doing something 
stupid in front of others were in the top 10 issues for 4 and 5 year-olds only. 
       Other typologies have also been recently used to investigate the variation of social fears 
with age. Sumter, Bokhorst, and Westenberg (2009) investigated age-related differences in 
social fears based on Hofmann et al.’s (1999) typology in 260 9-17 year-olds. This typology 
distinguishes between situations or interactions that are formal (e.g., answering questions in 
class), informal (e.g., speaking over the telephone), or observational (e.g., being 
photographed, using public bathroom, eating in public). Sumter and colleagues found that, 
while distress and avoidance remained the same across age for informal situations, these 
indications of anxiety increased for formal and observational (girls only) situations, especially 
in terms of avoidance.  
 
Summary  
       A number of issues have been raised above regarding the appearance of social anxiety 
(disorder) at different times in development. Although not in the order they were presented, it 
appears that a) social anxiety (disorder) may be significant even in the preschool years (Sterba 
et al. 2007), b) it may wax and wane during these years (Benga et al., 2010; Spence et al., 
2001), c) it may ‘reappear’ and predominate over other fears in later childhood and 
adolescence (e.g., Weems & Costa, 2005) and d) its symptoms may increasingly differentiate 
from preschool into the later years of childhood (cf. Spence et al., 2001; Westenberg et al., 
2004), where e) it also waxes and wanes. A number of issues have also be raised regarding 
whether parent-reported social anxiety disorder in preschool years is reliable and/or valid 
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given f) poor short-term reliability (e.g., Egger et al., 2006), g) challenges in illustrating core 
subjective phenomenology in preschoolers, and h) the possibility that social anxiety (disorder) 
in preschoolers is more an indication of general emotional/behavioural dysregulation.  
       These issues relate to a key conceptual problem that has developmental implications. 
Social anxiety and disorder observed in adolescence may not be qualitatively different to that 
observed in the earlier years of childhood (Schmidt & Buss, 2010). The research just 
reviewed really cannot answer this question. It is possible that parental reports are valid and 
that with time subjective phenomena will be verified. It is also possible that preschoolers and 
teenagers differ only in their level of impairment. The research illustrating variability and 
differentiation of social anxiety may also be explained by changes in circumstances rather 
than differences in underlying processes. Social anxiety may first appear in preschool and 
then wax and wane with different developmental challenges while the basic underlying 
mechanisms are the same. Similarly, the shift from different kinds of fear toward social fears 
and their internal differentiation may simply represent various shifts in focus from parents and 
teachers to peers in light of salient developmental goals. This raises an important question 
regarding whether the core states associated with social anxiety and their underlying 
mechanisms are apparent well before adolescence, perhaps as early as infancy, represented in 
a capacity for shyness and behavioural inhibition (Angold & Costello, 2009). If this is the 
case, then the study of aetiological factors shaping these core states may be restricted to 
events occurring before the early years of childhood (e.g., genetics, biology, early parenting 
and so forth).  
       Given the complexity of these issues and the relative recency of their discussion, they are 
far from being resolved. One must, however, begin somewhere. It would appear at least that 
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anxiety in social situations appears at different times in development beginning in the 
preschool years and even before that time in behavioural inhibition. This is not to be confused 
with social anxiety as it is commonly understood to include particular subjective phenomena 
like embarrassment, humiliation, worry and so forth. Indeed, very little is known about what 
subjective form and quality social anxiety takes during the very early years of childhood. A 
thesis that may advance understanding is that the form or quality that social anxiety takes 
across development varies according to the biological, psychological and social aspects of 
development at a given time.  
       Given this thesis, attention will now be turned to detailing the quality and proposed 
aetiology of social anxiety and other pertinent constructs studied at different times in 
development. This discussion will begin with a statement regarding key definitional issues 
and will be followed with a critical analysis of criteria for social anxiety disorder and 
distinctions between this construct and other childhood-related constructs, particularly those 
associated with temperament(s).  
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Chapter 3: Differentiating Social Anxiety Constructs 
       One way to differentiate between similar constructs is to identify their core features or, 
rather, their associated biological, physiological, psychological (or cognitive), behavioural 
and social manifestations and precipitants. Identifying and, in turn, separating the core 
features of social anxiety is anything but straight forward given its study across many, 
insulated, research areas. As noted, social anxiety, or rather anxiety with social precipitants, is 
common to a number of constructs. Behavioural inhibition, shyness, social withdrawal and 
social anxiety (disorder) are just some which share common features of fear, anxiety, 
apprehension and/or inhibition that occur in response to social stimuli or situations (e.g., 
novelty, exposure, and scrutiny). A key area warranting further inquiry is the equivalence of 
these constructs in their core phenomenology.  
       As will be discussed, there are a number of potential ways that behavioural inhibition, 
shyness and social anxiety (disorder) may be differentiated developmentally with regards to 
their biological, psychological and social underpinnings. On the other hand, confounds in this 
same research mean that distinctions are ambiguous. These issues, and what this means for 
the conceptualisation of social anxiety as a developmental phenomena of late childhood in 
particular, will now be discussed. This discussion begins with a critical evaluation of the way 
that the DSM describes social anxiety disorder given that it provides the “accepted” definition 
of social anxiety and disorder used by both clinicians and researchers.    
 
Social Anxiety Disorder  
       Throughout the time that social anxiety has been studied it has been defined in numerous 
ways (see Leitenberg, 1990). As it has been researched in adults and children as a clinical 
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disorder, Social Anxiety Disorder (also Social Phobia), it is defined in operational terms 
including specific cognitive-affective, physiological and behavioural tendencies. The clinical 
features described in the Diagnostic and Statistical Manual for Mental Diseases (APA, 2000, 
DSM-IV-TR) are presented in Table 3.1. 
       These criteria will be critically evaluated in greater detail shortly. Here, however, it 
suffices to say that social anxiety disorder includes a range of cognitive, emotional and 
behavioural features including embarrassment, fear, humiliation, avoidance and panic 
symptoms, such as, heart palpitations, trembling and shakiness, flushes/chills, sweating, 
nausea, dizziness, shortness of breath, nervousness (e.g., butterflies) in social 
and/performance situations. This diagnosis can be made in both adults and children with some 
relatively minor adaptations for the latter (see Criteria A, B, C, F); however, as noted above, it 
is widely believed that social anxiety disorder has an onset in adolescence (APA, 2000).  
       Social anxiety disorder is a relatively new clinical entity, first appearing in the DSM-III 
(1980). Since then, the diagnosis has undergone frequent revisions. Some changes have been 
made in light of changes in the way we understand the disorder, while others in reaction to the 
overlaps social anxiety disorder has with other adult and childhood disorders. A brief 
historical sketch illustrates how changes to criteria have both enhanced and obfuscated our 
understanding of this feature of adult and child behaviour. This is followed by an analysis of 
the core states associated with social anxiety as defined by current criteria. The similarities 
between these features and other childhood constructs such as behavioural inhibition, shyness 
and embarrassment in terms of core qualitative features and aetiology are then discussed.  
20 
 
Table 3.1  
DSM-IV-TR Diagnostic Criteria for Social Phobia (Social Anxiety Disorder) 
A. A marked and persistent fear of one or more social or performance situations in which the 
person is exposed to unfamiliar people or to possible scrutiny by others. The individual fears 
that he or she will act in a way (or show anxiety symptoms) that will be humiliating or 
embarrassing.     Note:     In children, there must be evidence of the capacity for age-
appropriate social relationships with familiar people and the anxiety must occur in peer 
settings, not just in interactions with adults. 
B. Exposure to the feared social situation almost invariably provokes anxiety, which may take the 
form of a situationally bound or situationally predisposed Panic Attack.  Note:     In children, 
the anxiety may be expressed by crying, tantrums, freezing, or shrinking from social situations 
with unfamiliar people.  
C. The person recognizes that the fear is excessive or unreasonable. Note: In children, this 
feature may be absent. 
D. The feared social or performance situations are avoided or else are endured with intense 
anxiety or distress.  
E. The avoidance, anxious anticipation, or distress in the feared social or performance 
situation(s) interferes significantly with the person's normal routine, occupational (academic) 
functioning, or social activities or relationships, or there is marked distress about having the 
phobia.  
F. In individuals under age 18 years, the duration is at least 6 months. 
G. The fear or avoidance is not due to the direct physiological effects of a substance (e.g., a drug 
of abuse, a medication) or a general medical condition and is not better accounted for by 
another mental disorder (e.g., Panic Disorder With or Without Agoraphobia, Separation 
Anxiety Disorder, Body Dysmorphic Disorder, a Pervasive Developmental Disorder, 
or Schizoid Personality Disorder).  
H. If a general medical condition or another mental disorder is present, the fear in Criterion A is 
unrelated to it, e.g., the fear is not of Stuttering, trembling in Parkinson's dsease, or exhibiting 
abnormal eating behavior in Anorexia Nervosa or Bulimia Nervosa.  
      Specify if:      
            Generalized: if the fears include most social situations (also consider the additional    
            diagnosis of Avoidant Personality Disorder) 
 
Brief History of Diagnostic Criteria 
       As noted, the criteria for social anxiety disorder have undergone frequent revisions. 
Indeed, the term, ‘Social Anxiety Disorder’, did not appear in parentheses until the DSM-IV 
(1994). Before this time Social Phobia was used exclusively. The term social anxiety disorder 
is used here and throughout as it better describes the disorder as more than a phobic reaction 
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to limited stimuli. However, Social Phobia will be used selectively when referring to its 
historical usage.  
       Historically, Social Phobia was used to describe individuals who feared a single and, 
predominately performance, situation (e.g., public speaking) (Barlow, 2002). This contrasts 
with current criteria which describes social anxiety disorder as occurring in both situationally-
circumscribed as well as more general subtypes. In the 1980s, however, individuals who 
feared multiple social situations were diagnosed with other disorders. Avoidant Personality 
Disorder, for example, described anxiety across a range of interpersonal situations and at this 
time an additional diagnosis of Social Phobia could not be made. In later revisions of the DSM 
(1987) exclusionary criteria between Social Phobia and Avoidant Personality Disorder were 
dropped. Ramsawh, Chavira, and Stein (2009) note that this was prompted by the recognition 
that individuals diagnosed with Avoidant PD were not receiving pharmacotherapy that was 
demonstrated to be effective in treating Social Phobia.  
       Unfortunately, decisions to drop exclusion criteria have led to a new set of problems and 
responses obfuscating our understanding of these disorders. Dropping exclusionary criteria, 
for example, resulted in a heterogeneous group meeting criteria for social anxiety disorder 
(Ramsawh et al., 2009). This, in turn, prompted the creation of a ‘generalised subtype’ of 
social anxiety disorder to separate individuals who feared only performance situations from 
those who feared both performance as well ‘most’ social interactions. This ‘generalised’ 
subtype is current in the DSM-IV-TR, however, it does little to really clarify criteria. 
Individuals with social anxiety disorder (generalised) are a heterogeneous group “that 
includes persons who fear a single performance situation as well as those who fear several, 
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but not most, social situations” (DSM-IV-TR p. 452). Individuals without this specifier may, 
however, exhibit fears for both performance and social situations.  
       Given these changes, social anxiety disorder may be used to describe or diagnose any 
individual who illustrates anxiety in social and/or performance situations due to concerns 
about ‘embarrassment’, ‘humiliation’ and ‘scrutiny’ that are not better explained by an 
alternate disorder (e.g., eating disorder). It is not clear, however, when social anxiety disorder 
is generalised (or not), or when a diagnosis of avoidant personality disorder is warranted 
(Bögels et al., 2010). It suffices to say that criteria have changed significantly in terms of the 
breadth and nature of the anxiety-eliciting circumstances, and have not enjoyed a term of 
stability. This is also true regarding the diagnosis of social anxiety disorder in children.  
       The diagnosis of Social Phobia could be made in children when it was first described in 
the 1980s. However, Avoidant Disorder of Childhood and Overanxious Disorder, were 
perhaps more applicable since they appeared under Anxiety Disorders of Childhood and 
Adolescence and included features of social anxiety. Avoidant Disorder of Childhood is more 
or less analogous to the construct social withdrawal (e.g., Rubin, Le Mare, & Lollis1990) and 
was defined in the DSM-III as a: “persistent and excessive shrinking from contact with 
strangers of sufficient severity so as to interfere with social functioning in peer relationships, 
coupled with a clear desire for affection and acceptance, and relationships with family 
members and other familiar figures that are warm and satisfying” (pp. 53–54). Both this 
disorder and Social Phobia could be diagnosed together in the DSM-III. With the advent of 
the DSM-III-R, however, children could not be diagnosed with both disorders on the basis that 
criteria for Social Phobia were subsumed under Avoidant Disorder, and that Avoidant 
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Disorder also remained useful in describing children who withdrew from social situations for 
reasons other than concerns about negative evaluation or scrutiny.  
        Overanxious Disorder of Childhood and Adolescence was another disorder that included 
aspects of social anxiety disorder which changed frequently in description. In the DSM-III 
overanxious disorder was defined by “excessive worrying and fearful behavior” including 
worry about future and past events, injury, personal competence, peer group activities, and 
meeting the expectations of others (APA, 1980, p. 55). In the DSM-III-R, the essential feature 
of this disorder was altered to “excessive or unrealistic anxiety or worry” (APA, 1987, p. 63) 
without specific reference to the situations in which this occurred. Nevertheless, in both 
versions, self-consciousness and susceptibility to embarrassment or humiliation (p. 57) were 
key features. These are the core features of social anxiety disorder as currently described (see 
Table 1).  
       Ultimately, both Avoidant Disorder and Over Anxious Disorder of Childhood and 
Adolescence were criticised for a lack of discrimination from other anxiety disorders, 
including social anxiety disorder (Beidel, 1991; Kashani & Orvaschel, 1990; Klein & Last, 
1989; Silverman & Eisen, 1993). In turn, they were deleted and merged with social anxiety 
disorder in the DSM-IV (APA, 1994) and DSM-IV-TR (APA, 2000). Given these revisions it is 
fair to say that there has been relatively little agreement about, and study of, childhood 
presentations of social anxiety disorder. More importantly, although social anxiety disorder 
has enjoyed sustained study, there are a number of questions relating to the distinction 
between social anxiety (disorder) and other constructs in terms of basic features and 
aetiology. It is to these areas which we now turn.  
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Dismantling the Definition of Social Anxiety Disorder  
       As noted, researchers are beginning to question distinctions between social anxiety and 
other childhood constructs such as behavioural inhibition and shyness. Schmidt and Buss 
(2010) suggest that one reason for this lack of discrimination lies with social anxiety being too 
broad a construct. Indeed, the history briefly reviewed points to social anxiety disorder being 
an evolving construct with diffuse boundaries. The current discussion, in the same vein, 
focuses on how social anxiety disorder is defined and measured, and its overlaps with shyness 
and embarrassment in terms of core features, precipitants and aetiology will be described.   
        The core feature of social anxiety disorder provided by the APA (2000) overlaps 
significantly with the above constructs and, adding to confusion, it is defined inconsistently. 
Criteria A is first defined as ‘a marked or persistent fear of social or performance situations 
where embarrassment may occur’ (p.450). Then, when criteria are summarised, Criteria A is 
defined (p.456):  
 
A marked and persistent fear of one more social or performance 
situations in which the person is exposed to unfamiliar people or 
to possible scrutiny by others. The individual fears that he or she 
will act in a way (or show anxiety symptoms) that will be 
humiliating or embarrassing (p. 456, italics added). 
 
      Thus, the latter definition states explicitly where anxiety occurs; specifically, it is in 
performance and social situations where the person is ‘exposed’ to ‘unfamiliar people’ and is 
the object of ‘scrutiny’. Second, it states why these situations precipitate anxiety; specifically, 
it is because the person fears that they may ‘act in a way (or show symptoms) that will be 
humiliating or embarrassing’. In further description, individuals are said to be concerned that 
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others might see their hands shake or tremble, or they may ‘appear inarticulate’ and so be 
judged as ‘anxious, weak, “crazy”, or stupid’ (pp. 450-451). These precipitants (e.g., 
exposure, scrutiny, unfamiliar people, performance) and cognitive-evaluative phenomena 
(e.g., concerns about negative evaluation, negative self-evaluation) are both broad and 
equivalent to constructs of behavioural inhibition, shyness and embarrassment to be discussed 
below. 
       Immediately apparent is that criteria focus on unfamiliar people (exposure and scrutiny) 
which overlap significantly with social anxiety constructs associated with uncertainty and 
wariness (e.g., behavioural inhibition) and those less cognitively defined (e.g., fearful/anxious 
shyness). This emphasis on unfamiliarity has been criticised by Gazelle and Rubin (2010) 
who argue that it underestimates the negative self-evaluative processes implied when social 
anxiety occurs in familiar settings (i.e., suggested are concerns about reputation). Measures of 
social anxiety take this additional emphasis for granted as they include anxiety for interaction 
with both familiar and unfamiliar peers, sample general social interactions (e.g., parties, 
assertiveness) and include more general concerns about negative social evaluation. For 
example, the Social Phobia and Anxiety Inventory (Beidel, Turner, & Morris, 1995), designed 
to screen for social anxiety disorder, includes a range of these social and performance 
situations (reading aloud, performing in a play, and eating in the school cafeteria) as well as 
associated cognitions and behaviours (e.g., avoidance). The Social Anxiety Scale for Children 
(La Greca & Stone, 1993), derived from a more normative framework, includes three 
subscales indicating distress and avoidance for new/novel and familiar interactions and more 
general concerns about negative evaluation. This latter subscale includes items such as: “I 
worry about being teased...what other kids say about me... that other kids don’t like me”. The 
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scales, although predating current criteria, are the most widely used self-report measures of 
social anxiety (Letamendi, Denise, Chavira, & Stein, 2009). Importantly, while highlighting 
the evaluative processes more explicitly, these additions also make the constructs analogous 
to shyness (Schmidt & Buss, 2010).   
       The heterogeneity of social anxiety disorder as a construct is further increased by its 
subtyping by the APA (2000). The generalised subtype is defined by fears of numerous 
general social interaction situations (e.g., conversation) and is compared to a heterogeneous 
group “that includes persons who fear a single performance situation as well as those who fear 
several, but not most, social situations” (DSM-IV-TR p. 452). Children and adolescents with a 
diagnosis of social anxiety disorder typically illustrate ‘generalised’ social anxieties. In an 
interview study of 50 youth aged 7 to 13 years Biedel et al. (1999) reported that they feared 
reading to the class (71%), musical or athletic performances (61%), joining (59%) and starting 
(58%) -conversations, speaking to adults (59%), writing on the blackboard (51%), ordering 
food (50%), and attending dance or activity nights (50%). These findings have been replicated 
in studies of disordered adolescents, however, this age group endorses situations at a much 
higher rate (e.g., between 70-90% depending on the situation), and they also report more 
overall distress (Rao et al., 2007; Beidel et al., 2007).  
      A caveat to the clinical typing of social anxiety symptoms is that they are highly prevalent 
in ‘normal’ individuals. Indeed, anxiety for public speaking is so prevalent it may not qualify 
as a symptom of disorder at all (e.g., Essau et al., 1999), except when it leads to impairment in 
role function. The prevalence rates of other specific fears in non-disordered groups are in line 
with estimates of shyness (Zimbardo, 1977). In one study, for example, 47% of youth aged 14 
to 17 (N=486) endorsed fear of public speaking without meeting diagnostic criteria (Essau et 
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al., 1999). Essau et al. (1999) further found that large numbers of ‘normal’ adolescents also 
experienced anxiety over performance/tests (31.1%) and social talk (9.2%). Of the 489 
participants who indicated a feared response when exposed to the anxiety eliciting situation 
many were concerned with experiencing embarrassment (39.1%), getting red (38.9%), being 
judged as stupid/weak (31.5%) and feeling ashamed (27%). Similarly, in an Australian study, 
34% of adolescents (aged 13 and 14 years, N=875) endorsed at least moderate “worry [about] 
what other people think of me”. This was closely followed by other social evaluative 
situations: “I worry that I will do badly at my school work” (30.5%), “I feel afraid if I have to 
talk in front of my class” (25.8%) and “I feel afraid that I will make a fool of myself in front 
of people” (24.3%) (Spence, Barrett, & Turner, 2003). Thus, it is difficult to differentiate 
social anxiety disorder and ‘normative’, so-called ‘subclinical’ (Hazen & Stein, 1995), social 
anxiety based on key cognitive-affective and behavioural phenomenology.   
      In fact, an analysis of the broad range of social and performance situations used to identify 
social anxiety disorder highlights heterogeneity in the precipitating circumstances and implied 
subjective phenomenology. Situations include those where ‘exposure’, ‘scrutiny’ and 
‘evaluation’ are objective aspects of the situation for both the individual and the audience 
(e.g., public speaking, musical or athletic performance). In contrast, exposure and scrutiny 
could be primarily psychological phenomena, for example, when the person ‘feels’ 
conspicuous when waiting in line or while eating in front of others. In typologies of shyness 
and embarrassment discussed below, these differences are highlighted in terms of changing 
cognitive mechanisms. This highlights the possibility that different social anxiety subtypes 
(e.g., speaking, self-disclosure, fear of showing symptoms) exist with varying prevalence, 
underlying aetiological and immediate cognitive, behavioural and physiological mechanisms, 
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developmental timing and significance (e.g., effect on functioning). Current developmental 
research is however confounded by numerous overlaps and insular research programs that 
have not been integrated.     
 
Behavioural Inhibition and Social Anxiety Disorder  
      Behavioural inhibition is argued to be observable in infancy, characterised by fearful 
behaviours (crying, withdrawal, hyper-aroused) in the presence of novel social (e.g., 
strangers) and non-social (e.g., unfamiliar toys) stimuli (García-Coll, Kagan, & Reznick, 
1984; Kagan, Reznick, Clarke, Snidman, & García-Coll, 1984; Kagan, Reznick, & Snidman, 
1987; Kagan, Reznick, Snidman, Gibbons, & Johnson, 1988). Kagan, Reznick, and Snidman 
(1985) defined behavioural inhibition (to the unfamiliar) by “the child’s initial behavioural 
reactions to unfamiliar people, objects, and contexts, or challenging situations” (p. 53). It is 
widely believed that behavioural inhibition is an early constitutional risk factor for the 
development of social anxiety disorder (e.g., Beidel & Turner, 2007; Ollendick & Hirshfeld-
Becker, 2002; Rapee & Spence, 2004). Indeed, a number of prospective studies have found 
that behaviourally-inhibited children go on to develop social anxiety disorder (Biederman et 
al., 2001; Hayward, Killen, Kraemer, & Taylor, 1998; Hirshfeld-Becker et al., 2007; 
Schwartz, Snidman, & Kagan, 1999) and there are a number of qualitative differences 
between social anxiety (disorder) and behavioural inhibition which may justify this temporal 
distinction.  
       Behavioural inhibition, for example, as an aspect of temperament, is argued to be 
biologically-based, observable from birth, largely inherited and resistant to change (Rapee & 
Coplan, 2010). Social anxiety disorder, on the other hand, is argued to develop in light of 
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combined biological, social and psychological factors which, depending on their quality, 
timing, chronicity, and so forth, lead an individual toward and away from social anxiety 
disorder overtime (e.g., Beidel & Turner, 1998; Crozier & Alden, 2005; Morris & March, 
2004; Rapee & Spence, 2004; Vasey & Dadds, 2001). Social anxiety disorder and behavioural 
inhibition are also argued to differ in that anxious responses in the former are argued to stem 
from automatic neurobiological reactions (e.g., negative emotions and arousal) (Rothbart, 
2007), particularly in response to novelty (Buss, Davidson, Kalin, & Goldsmith, 2004), 
whereas the latter is associated with active cognitive systems (e.g., worry, apprehension) in 
the context of social evaluation (e.g., Kowalski & Leary, 1995).  
        Despite these apparent differences there are a number of confounding overlaps which 
mean the separation of these constructs is not assured. First, despite expectations, 
temperament (e.g., behavioural inhibition) illustrates only moderate consistency overtime 
(Asendorpf, 1990, 1994). Studies have also illustrated that it is this consistency, perhaps as an 
indication of severity, that is associated with social anxiety disorder prospectively (e.g., 
Schwartz et al. 1999). Interestingly, factors believed to account for consistency in behavioural 
inhibition and, in turn, the development of social anxiety disorder, are one and the same. 
Stability in behavioural inhibition, for example, is moderated by insensitive and critical 
parenting (Rubin, Burgess, & Hastings, 2002), social competence (Asendorpf, 1994), peer 
experiences (e.g., Gazelle & Rudolph, 2004; Laursen, Bukowski, Aunola, & Nurmi, 2007), 
socialisation (e.g., being in day care, Fox, Henderson, Rubin, Calkins, & Schmidt, 2001), and 
attentional control (Crockenberg & Leerkes, 2006; Muris & Dietvorst, 2006). This is 
consistent with associations between social anxiety disorder and recall of parents failing to 
provide sources of socialisation (Bruch, Heimberg, Berger, & Collins, 1989; Rapee & 
30 
 
Melville, 1997), observations of encouragement of avoidant coping (Barrett, Rapee, Dadds, & 
Ryan, 1996; Cheron, Ehrenreich, & Pincus, 2009; Chorpita, Albano, & Barlow, 1996; Dadds, 
Barrett, Rapee, & Ryan, 1996), and observations of high parental control/intrusiveness, 
criticism and low warmth (e.g., Bögels & Brechman-Toussaint, 2006; DiBartolo & Helt, 
2007; McLeod, Wood, & Weisz, 2007; Wood, McLeod, Sigman, Hwang, & Chu, 2003). The 
fact that behavioural inhibition and social anxiety are affected by the same psychological and 
social factors may not be coincidental, and may indicate that these constructs are basically the 
same.  
       Indeed, Rapee and Coplan (2010) suggest that where measures of behavioural inhibition  
and social anxiety converge most strongly is their emphasis on social fears. Both behavioural 
inhibition and social anxiety also share an emphasis on anxiety occurring in response to 
novelty. The eliciting circumstance according to the APA (2000) definition of social anxiety 
disorder is “exposure” to or “scrutiny” by “unfamiliar people” (p.456). Youth diagnosed with 
social anxiety disorder also illustrate many of the behavioural features of behavioural 
inhibition (e.g., verbal and non-verbal latency or hesitancy and gaze aversion) in laboratory 
studies (e.g., Spence, Donovan, & Brechman-Toussaint, 1999). Further, although measures of 
social anxiety emphasise social interaction  and social evaluation, as causes of anxiety more 
than measures of behavioural inhibition, most studies group social and non-social behavioural 
inhibition (for review see, Dyson, Klein, Orlino, Dougherty, & Durbin, 2011). It follows that 
current temporal links between these constructs may be due to the overlap between them 
rather than a true developmental process where behavioural inhibition leads to social anxiety 
(disorder).  
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       This does not mean that a developmental relationship does not exist between these 
constructs. However, because researchers have used overlapping constructs we cannot say 
that early aspects of temperament (e.g., behavioural inhibition) are a risk factor for later, and 
qualitatively distinct, social anxiety (disorder). Only a few studies have examined associations 
between non-social (e.g., hesitancy in encountering novel objects) and social (e.g., hesitancy 
interacting with a stranger) behavioural inhibition, and correlations are zero (Kochanska, 
1991; Talge, Donzella, & Gunnar, 2008) to negligible (e.g., r = .12) (Rubin, Hastings, 
Stewart, Henderson, & Chen, 1997). This suggests that social and non-social behavioural 
inhibition are different constructs and that they should be studied separately. Of course studies 
which provide evidence that non-social behavioural inhibition leads to social anxiety would 
provide the most convincing evidence that these are separate constructs and that they are 
associated causally (Rapee et al., 2009).   
         One potential difference between behavioural inhibition and social anxiety (disorder) is 
the differing emphasis placed on cognition. In the context of social anxiety and shyness, 
researchers have suggested that through various learning and associative transactions with the 
self (e.g., arousal, beliefs) and others (e.g., parents, peers), social anxiety develops due to 
perceptions and expectations that the world is beyond one’s control and competence, and, as 
such, fears of negative evaluation and humiliation arise (Chorpita, Brown, & Barlow, 1998; 
Rapee, 1997). It seems reasonable to suggest that toddlers do not exhibit these cognitions; 
however, this cannot be ruled out given that the measurement of temperament typically relies 
on parent and teacher observations of overt behaviour rather than the subjective phenomena 
used to define social anxiety (e.g., worry, concerns about evaluation). It is also possible that 
these cognitions are consequences of behavioural inhibition and associated problems in 
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adjustment rather than features of, or causal in the development of, a qualitatively distinct 
social anxiety disorder (Alfano, Beidel, & Turner, 2001). In summary, in many ways 
aetiological factors and proximal eliciting circumstances, behavioural responses and cognitive 
phenomenology fail to differentiate behavioural inhibition and social anxiety disorder at this 
point in time.  
 
Shyness, Embarrassment and Social Anxiety (disorder) 
       There are similar issues regarding the construct shyness. Shyness has been conceptualised 
as an aspect of temperament or as a personality trait (Thomas & Chess, 1977) characterised 
by reticence and withdrawal stemming from the child’s concerns or worries about evaluations 
from others (Rubin & Asendorpf, 1993; Zimbardo, 1982). While researchers generally accept 
the distinctions between social anxiety and behavioural inhibition, the distinctions between 
shyness and social anxiety and disorder have been the subject of more critical inquiry. 
Shyness and social anxiety (disorder) have been argued, for example, to differ only along a 
continuum of severity with shyness at one end and social anxiety and disorder at the other 
(e.g., McNeil, 2010). Indeed, studies have illustrated that the factor differentiating those who 
are ‘extremely shy’ from those with social anxiety disorder is the degree of impairment and 
overt avoidance (Chavira, Stein, & Malcarne, 2002; Heiser, Turner, & Beidel, 2003;  Heiser, 
Turner, Beidel, & Roberson-Nay, 2009). Measures of childhood shyness (Children’s Shyness 
Questionnaire, Crozier, 1995) and social anxiety (Social Anxiety Scale-Children, La Greca & 
Stone, 1993) also overlap significantly (e.g., r = .61, Findlay, Coplan, & Bowker, 2009). 
Interestingly, the aetiological factors argued to lead to shyness (e.g., Rubin, Burgess, 
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Kennedy, & Stewart, 2003; Rubin, Coplan, & Bowker, 2009) are equivalent to those proposed 
for social anxiety disorder, as was observed in the case of behavioural inhibition. 
       As noted in the context of behavioural inhibition there is potential for cognition to 
separate shyness as a form of social anxiety along developmental lines. In the study of 
shyness, distinctions have been made between fearful/anxious and self-conscious shyness 
(Buss, 1986). Specifically, fearful or anxious shyness is conceptually similar to behavioural 
inhibition, defined by wariness to novelty, while self-conscious shyness may be compatible 
with social anxiety as it is characterised by evaluative anxiety (Crozier, 2010). Buss (1986) 
also argued that these forms of shyness emerge at different times in development in light of 
developments in cognitive ability. Specifically, fearful shyness is argued to require no special 
or advanced cognitive apparatus, to be observable by 7 to 9 months of age, and to be 
characterised by emotions of fear and distress in situations involving novelty (e.g., being 
confronted with strangers, a novel social role), social evaluation and foolish actions. Self-
conscious shyness, on the other hand, was argued to depend on the development of ‘public 
self-consciousness’ or awareness of the self as a social object, which Buss argued developed 
at 3 to 4 years of age. This form of shyness was argued to involve embarrassment as the 
primary emotion and to be elicited by novel settings, being the focus of attention, 
conspicuousness, breaches of privacy, teasing and ridicule, and excessive praise (see Schmidt 
& Buss, 2010).   
       A similar, although not entirely overlapping account, has been proposed between 
‘exposure’ and ‘evaluative’ embarrassment which are argued to develop in light of cognitive 
developments at 15 to 18 months and 3 years of age, and to be precipitated by different 
conditions (respectively). Specifically, Lewis (2001) argues that children experience exposure 
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embarrassment when they are exposed, as might occur, for example, when being observed 
performing in front of an audience, receiving compliments, and viewing their reflection in a 
mirror. He further argued that exposure embarrassment requires only a ‘rudimentary’ form of 
self-awareness or an idea of “Me”. In contrast, evaluative (or self-conscious) embarrassment 
is argued to depend on the development of a complex self-concept based on internalised rules 
and standards; with embarrassment occurring when the person makes attributions that have 
failed to meet these standards (e.g., when failing a task in front of an audience and committing 
a faux pass) (see also Modigliani & Blumenfeld, 1979).    
        The differences proposed between these forms of shyness and embarrassment hold 
promise for establishing differences between forms of social anxiety developmentally—i.e., 
between temperament, shyness and social anxiety disorder, at a cognitive level in particular. 
Specifically, these forms of shyness and embarrassment can be demarcated temporally in that 
development of more complex forms of shyness and embarrassment are argued to depend on 
maturational changes, in particular regarding whether or not they involve self-consciousness 
(Buss, 1986) or negative self-evaluation (Lewis, 2001). Unfortunately, as Asendorpf (1998) 
remarks, the way these constructs have been conceptualised blur these distinctions. Buss’ 
(1986) theory, for example, is not internally consistent given fearful shyness includes self-
evaluative cognition (e.g., ridicule, fear of social rejection) which, according to Lewis (2001) 
is also not available until complex self-representational abilities develop. Also, the situational 
precipitants believed to lead to more cognitively complex self-conscious shyness (e.g., being 
observed, performance) are argued by Lewis (2001) to precipitate embarrassment in children 
earlier at 18 months old. This challenges Buss’ theory that embarrassment relies on the 
development of complex cognition given children of 18 months are believed to only have a 
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rudimentary form of self-awareness (see Lewis, 2001). Thus, again, in terms of aetiology, 
precipitants and core features there may be little that differentiates social anxiety (disorder) 
from other forms of social anxiety appearing earlier in life.   
 
Summary  
       The above analysis suggests that behavioural inhibition and forms of shyness and 
embarrassment all appear early in development and share many of the same features of social 
anxiety disorder. This challenges their differentiation from a developmental perspective. So 
far discussed have been the incidence of social anxiety and disorder across development. 
Noted has been a rise in fears of negative evaluation and diagnosis of social anxiety disorder 
with adolescence. It is, however, unclear whether this represents a different cognitive-
affective experience or whether already available cognitive-affective phenomena or behaviour 
intensify. This is important from a causal and developmental (aetiological) perspective: a 
distinction between these experiences in terms of underlying biopsychosocial mechanisms 
justifies their individual study. However, the fecundity in definition and measurement, and the 
existing overlaps between social anxiety constructs makes such study difficult and, on the 
balance, challenges temporal and other distinctions between them. In furthering this area of 
inquiry, research into social anxiety (disorder) will likely benefit from greater specificity in 
delineating typologies, perhaps based on eliciting circumstances and associated cognitive-
affective processes. These may have distinct developmental timing and underlying 
biopsychosocial mechanisms.  
       In this vein, the research illustrating that social fears differentiate and change in 
significance with age provides suggestive evidence of a developmental hypothesis. So too do 
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the distinctions made between forms of shyness and embarrassment (above). In the latter 
instance there is also well-developed theory and research suggesting that shyness and 
embarrassment, but also self-presentation understanding, may differentiate with cognitive 
development, in particular with regards to the degree of self-reflexivity of these experiences. 
A number of cognitive-developmental hypotheses have also been proposed to explain such 
differentiation yet they remain untested. Thus, the first aim of the next chapter is to provide an 
overview and integration of research on embarrassment, shyness and self-presentation which 
provides a reasonable basis for proposing cognitive-developmental differentiation of social 
anxiety constructs.   
       A second aim, however, is to highlight that, while much of this research proposes 
cognitive mechanisms (e.g., self-awareness), it is also readily situated within the social 
domain in which cognitive developments are shaped and cognitive processes (e.g., appraisals) 
take place. Thus, part of the purpose of the subsequent analysis is to not only review literature 
relating to cognitive differentiation but to also highlight the social mechanisms of this process 
(e.g., social interaction and goals). This research and findings from studies where cognitive-
developmental hypotheses have been tested (e.g., embarrassment and self-presentation) 
provide theoretical and empirical direction for identifying those sociocognitive developmental 
mechanisms that may underlie qualitative differentiation in social anxiety phenomena at 
different times during development.  
       This research will be reviewed, beginning with theory and research relating to qualitative 
differences in embarrassment, which belongs to a group of ‘self-conscious emotions’. Then, 
research relating to qualitative changes in shyness and self-presentation understanding will be 
discussed. Finally, studies which have tested cognitive-developmental hypotheses and the 
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meaning of their findings for the study of social anxiety disorder will be discussed, and a 
sociocognitive model of social anxiety proposed.  
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Chapter 4: Developmental Variation in Self-Conscious Emotions  
 Self-Conscious Emotions  
        The conceptualisation of self-conscious emotions (embarrassment, shame, guilt and 
pride) is multifaceted. Complex relations are proposed between cognitive and affective 
processes. Tracy, Robins, and Tangney (2007) provide a comprehensive overview of these 
relations and suggest an emerging consensus among emotion researchers regarding the precise 
processes involved. In brief, as summarised by Crozier (2010), self-conscious emotions:  
 
require the child’s sense of self-awareness and self-
representation; recognition of external standards against 
which the child can be evaluated; adoption  by  the  child  
of  these  standards;  the  capacity  to  assess  congruence  
or incongruence between behavior or personal 
characteristics and these standards; and the capacity to 
make attributions about the reasons for congruence or 
incongruence (p. 44). 
 
        The experience of self-conscious emotions, including embarrassment, shame, guilt, or 
pride, are also believed to entail an appraisal, representation and attention on the self (Tracy & 
Robins, 2004) and many argue that the experience of embarrassment in particular involves a 
representation of others views of the self (see Crozier, 2010). Given these self-other appraisal 
processes, a central assumption is that self-conscious emotions emerge with maturation and, 
although specific developmental frameworks are lacking, a number of developmental 
hypotheses have been proposed. Of greatest interest is an analysis of developmental 
differences—i.e., age related findings—in the qualities of embarrassment given it is a core 
feature of social anxiety (disorder) (APA, 2000; see also Miller, 2010 for a detailed 
comparison of these constructs).  These developmental differences may point to a similar 
schema differentiating forms of social anxiety at different developmental periods (e.g., 
infancy, preschool, middle childhood, adolescence). Indeed, a literature exists detailing 
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developmental differences in forms of shyness—i.e., fearful and self-consciousness shyness—
the latter of which Crozier (2010) conceptualises as a self-conscious emotion dependent on 
the same kinds of self-reflexive process as embarrassment. This research, as well as that 
conducted in developments of self-presentation understanding, which is conceptually related 
to social anxiety, provide an empirical base for considering that a common cognitive 
mechanism that may underlie the appearance of qualitatively distinct forms of self-conscious 
experiences—embarrassment, shyness and self-presentation—but is applied to constructs 
associated directly with social anxiety (e.g., fear of negative evaluation). These areas are 
discussed in turn.   
 
Development and Embarrassment  
Infancy to Preschool 
       As noted earlier, Lewis (2001) distinguishes between two types of embarrassment–
exposure and evaluative–based on their precipitants, cognitive-affective quality, 
developmental timing and mechanisms. Importantly, Lewis (2001), taking all self-conscious 
emotions together, argues that early forms of these emotions (e.g., exposure embarrassment) 
only require the conception or meta-representation of “me” and the ability to recognise the 
attentions of others (Lewis, 1995, 2001). This “idea of me” is argued to develop at two and 
half years of age (Borke, 1971; Lewis & Brooks-Gunn, 1979; Stipek, 1983; Stipek, Recchia, 
& McClintic, 1992). These authors therefore propose a connection between developing self-
awareness and the emergence of exposure embarrassment in young children. Indirect support 
for this linkage comes from studies cataloguing the overt affective responses of children under 
conditions of exposure and scrutiny (e.g., being pointed at, asked to dance, receiving 
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excessive praise). These studies illustrate that the majority of children as young as 22-months 
show signs of embarrassment (e.g., smiling while averting their gaze, touching their face or 
body) when exposed to the attention of others (e.g., Lewis, Stanger, Sullivan, & Barone, 
1991). In support of the contention that a subjective idea of me is a requisite for exposure 
embarrassment, Lewis, Sullivan, Stranger, and Weiss (1989)  also illustrated that these 
behavioural displays were evident only in children who had illustrated visual self-recognition 
prior to the evaluative situation (i.e., they had a subjective idea or concept of “me” in the 
world). The development of a subjective idea or concept of “me in the world” is thus taken as 
an ontogenic requisite for these experiences.  
       There are, however, challenges to the idea that self-representation is needed for the 
experience of embarrassment described above. Reddy (1997; 2000) have identified what adult 
observers describe as behavioural signs of coyness (e.g., smiling coupled with gaze aversion) 
in infants 2 months old. This research challenges the idea that a subjective idea of “me” is 
necessary for self-conscious displays; however, their early appearance suggests that they arise 
with little cognitive processing or self-reflection. Instead, these early self-conscious displays 
have been argued to be largely elicited in response to social, as opposed to psychological (or 
self) interaction (Newen & Vogeley, 2003; Reddy, 2003; Reddy, 2005). 
       More precisely, situated within a developmental framework, the self (or subjective idea of 
“me”) is argued to be distinguishable from others primarily at the level of action or activity 
and not yet at the level of thinking (Piaget, 1936; 1963; Hobson, 2002). Thus, all that may be 
needed for these affective responses to occur is exposure or, more broadly, social interaction. 
This can be contrasted with more cognitively-based forms of self-consciousness (e.g., 
negative self-critique) that seem likely to rely on a language-based self-concept (Harter, 1999, 
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2006). These early behavioural signs of self-consciousness may be “performs” to the “full-
blown” self-conscious emotions that may require the development of more complex self-other 
appraisal facilities (Zinck, 2008).  
       In this vein, Lewis proposed that “exposure embarrassment” includes only a rudimentary 
form of self-awareness when compared to “evaluative embarrassment” which he suggests 
arises in light of an individual’s negative evaluation of their own behaviour relative to a given 
standard, rule, or goal (e.g., Lewis & Ramsey, 2002). Children are argued to exhibit the 
capacity for this self-evaluative emotion at 3.5 years as indicated by affective responses 
indicative of embarrassment when having failed a task in the allotted time (Barrett, 2005). 
Here, it is assumed that embarrassment occurs not because of self-exposure, but negative self-
evaluation at having failed an internalised rule or goal (i.e., a negative self-evaluation). Lewis 
does not speculate on the maturational factors that might explain these changes although 
multiple suggestions have been made. Harter (2006) suggests, for example, developments in 
self-understanding (e.g., self-concept), perspective-taking (Selman, 1980) and social 
comparison (Moretti & Higgins, 1990). It may be that multiple complementary developments 
are needed. Compared to exposure embarrassment, for instance, evaluative embarrassment 
represents a complex set of appraisals including, for example, a concept of the self, a 
cognitive evaluation of a situation, beliefs about concrete social relations to individuals, as 
well as general social norms, and expectations or hopes concerning outcomes (Zinck, 2008). 
 
 
Middle Childhood  
       The research above points to the early age at which many of the complex cognitive-
affective processes, outlined at the beginning of this chapter (Crozier, 2010) and by Zinck 
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(2008) above, appear to underlie embarrassment in young children. Still other research, using 
varied experimental methodology, suggests more finite developments overtime. Older 
children have been asked, for example, to self-report whether they would feel embarrassed in 
a social scenario (e.g., knocking over a supermarket display) with the degree of personal 
responsibility and the nature of audience feedback (e.g., positive, negative, neutral) being 
varied. These studies suggest that there may be further developmental differences in 
manifestations of embarrassment. Specifically, in a series of studies Bennett and colleagues 
(Bennett, 1989; Bennett & Cormack, 1996a; Bennett & Gillingham, 1991; Bennett, Yuill, 
Banerjee, & Thomson, 1998) illustrated that, with age, attributions of embarrassment become 
less dependent on social environmental cues in the form of direct responsibility and explicit 
negative feedback, and become more self-reflexive and reliant on the child’s psychological 
reflections and evaluations.  
       Regarding variation in level of direct responsibility (or ‘extended identity’), Bennett et al. 
(1998) illustrate that 5 year-old children are less likely, compared to 8- or 11 year-old 
children, to become embarrassed, or to experience negative affect, as a consequence of an 
associate’s rule violation (see also Bennett & Cormack, 1996b). Similarly, in a study by 
Seidner, Stipek, and Feshbach (1988), children’s self-reported embarrassing experiences were 
associated with unfavourable comparisons to others only with increasing age—specifically 
from 5 to 11 years of age. Similarly, regarding variation in audience feedback, Bennett and 
colleagues illustrated that 5 year-old children indicate embarrassment only when the audience 
is overtly negative in stories of social scrutiny (e.g., knocking over a store display) (Bennet, 
1989; Bennett & Gillingham, 1991), while 8 year-olds indicate that they would feel 
embarrassed in both critical and supportive conditions (Bennett & Gillingham, 1991). Bennett 
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(1989) also found that only 11 to 13 year-olds indicate that they would experience similar 
levels of embarrassment in both passive (neutral) and critical audience conditions.  
       Together these findings suggest that at approximately 8 years of age attributions of 
embarrassment become increasingly self-reflexive—i.e., less dependent on direct association 
and direct social and/or cognitive affective feedback from others and more so dependent on 
the individuals’ self-reflections and evaluations. Modigliani and Blumenfeld (1979) term the 
latter “mature” embarrassment, which is akin to formulations of social emotions occurring 
when an individual perceives/makes the evaluation that the public self-image has failed/is 
discrepant from an internalised rule. These findings extend the conceptualisation of Lewis 
(e.g., Lewis, 1993; Lewis & Ramsey, 2002), above, given that here evaluative or self-
conscious forms of embarrassment are further differentiated by the degree to which concrete 
cognitive-affective feedback is required.  
       A number of cognitive-developmental hypotheses have been put forward to explain these 
trends. Bennnett and Gillingham (1991) suggest that 8 year-old children may have developed 
second-order reasoning not yet available in 5 year-olds. This is argued to allow 8 year-olds to 
consider others’ views of them without explicit negative feedback—i.e., in supportive 
conditions. Five year-olds, on the other hand, who are without these skills, only attribute 
embarrassment when they are not required to think about others’ negative views of them—
i.e., in situations in which they receive direct negative feedback (e.g., being laughed at, 
ridiculed). This claim has only recently been evaluated in a small study (N = 30) by Bennett 
and Matthews (2000) (see also, Banerjee, 2002a). These authors found that, independent of 
age, 4 to 11 year-old children (SD = 11.67) who had passed a second-order reasoning task 
(Sullivan, Zaitchik, & Tager-Flusberg, 1994) were significantly more likely to attribute social 
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emotions (embarrassment, humiliation, shame, guilt) to stories depicting social rule violations 
(e.g., accidently wearing pyjamas to the supermarket). In this study, audience reactions were 
not described and, as such, if none were present, one may conclude that second-order 
reasoning is a developmental precursor to spontaneous and self-reflexive attributions of 
embarrassment—i.e., occurring without feedback.   
      A caveat to the above conclusion is that only 7 of the 15 children who had passed the 
second-order reasoning task made the expected attribution of a social emotion in the study by 
Bennett and Matthews (2000) (see also Banerjee, 2002a). It is possible then that further 
developments are required before children routinely attribute embarrassment in these 
conditions. In this vein, Bennett and Matthews (2000) suggested that the development of 
public self-consciousness may be an additive precursor making children more likely to 
spontaneously consider these reactions in others. A similar conclusion was reached by 
Bennett and Gillingham (1991) who noted instead the failure of 8 year-olds in Bennett’s 
(1989) study to consider embarrassment in situations where there is no audience feedback 
(i.e., in passive conditions). Specifically, they surmised that even though 8 year-olds illustrate 
a capacity for second-order reasoning (i.e., to have a belief about a belief), their emotional 
reaction—embarrassment—is still dependent on audience reactions, in this case supportive 
ones. They further proposed that this may be linked to the emergence of public self-
consciousness (Fenigstein, Schieir, & Buss, 1975) which they suggest prompts older children 
(11 to 13; Bennett, 1989) and adults (Semin & Manstead, 1981, 1982) to spontaneously 
reflect on and appreciate, the effect of self on others, regardless of social feedback. 
       However, aside from some limited research illustrating that public self-consciousness 
increases with age (Abrams, 1998), there is no direct support for the idea that public self-
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consciousness, along with second-order reasoning, prompts spontaneous attributions of 
embarrassment. In addition, Colonnesi et al. (2010), using similar methodology to the 
aforementioned studies, found that although children aged 4 to 5 years failed to attribute 
embarrassment in all conditions—i.e., negative, positive, neutral—children aged 8 to 9 years 
made significantly more attributions in both negative and neutral, but not positive, conditions. 
This study, although not interested in testing the aforementioned hypothesis, only partially 
replicates Bennett and colleagues (1989; Bennett & Gillingham, 1991) findings while also 
suggesting a younger age for spontaneous attributions.  
        The study by Colonnesi et al. (2010) also produced one other noteworthy finding. 
Specifically, in addition to asking for verbal attributions of embarrassment they also presented 
children with pictures of characters experiencing fear, sadness and embarrassment, and asked 
them to indicate which emotion the character would be feeling on a scale 0 (no 
embarrassment) to 3 (very embarrassed). Using this non-verbal procedure they found no age 
effects across any of the conditions—i.e., negative, positive, neutral. Although the children in 
this sample were aged between 4 and 9 years the authors concluded that ‘children aged 6 can 
already attribute embarrassment in non-negative [i.e., positive, neutral] situations when a non-
verbal method is used’ (p. 519) (i.e., regardless of audience feedback). It is not clear why 4 
and 5 year-olds are not included, however, the researchers appear to rightfully conclude that 
their research illustrates that ‘younger children are able to recognise the emotion of 
embarrassment even if they seem unlikely to produce the term spontaneously’; however, it is 
less clear that ‘differences in language development, rather than emotional development, are 
[all that is] being measured with verbal methods’ (p. 519). 
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       In particular, of greatest interest is whether these findings challenge the idea that 
children’s references to embarrassment become more self-reflexive with age. It may be, as 
Colonnesi et al. (2010) suggest, that young children simply cannot verbalise these emotions, 
although they can understand and experience them. Their study does not, however, provide a 
very good test of the self-reflexivity hypothesis and, indeed, they neglect it in their discussion. 
Critical here is that their non-verbal pictorial representation of embarrassment provided 
younger individuals with an affective cue, without which they did not make spontaneous 
(verbal) attributions. Given this, younger children were actually never challenged to make 
spontaneous reference to these emotions, even in non-negative conditions, because they were 
given a cue1.  
       Instead, what these findings perhaps illustrate is that even young children, aged 6 years, 
have an established understanding of embarrassment across varying conditions. In addition, 
we might even deem this understanding a ‘sophisticated’ one given that they can discriminate 
between this emotion and others that also commonly cause negative affect (i.e., sadness, fear). 
This suggests that young children appreciate the significance of embarrassment as an emotion 
tied specifically to social evaluation. It is not clear, however, that young children will make 
spontaneous reference to these emotions. Overall, and in so far as second-order reasoning is a 
requisite for these spontaneous attributions, it is also true that children vary in making 
spontaneous attributions even with precursor abilities (e.g., Banerjee, 2002a; Bennett & 
Matthews, 2000). There is no direct support for the idea that the development of public self-
consciousness accounts for this variability. There is, on the other hand, some indication that 
some other social and psychological factors come into play.  
                                                 
1 A better non-verbal test of this hypothesis would be to ask younger children to draw what they believe the other person would be feeling 
while also varying initial cognitive-affective feedback.  
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       Specifically, there some evidence that shyness propensity (Colonessi et al., 2010) and 
self-presentation understanding (e.g., Banerjee, 2002a), which have also been argued to 
depend on second-order reasoning (see Crozier, 2010), explain attributions of embarrassment 
in social evaluative situations. Interestingly, Banerjee (2002ab) conceptualised self-
presentation understanding as a social motive explaining why children who have requisite 
skills still do not routinely and spontaneously refer to embarrassment until years later, 
specifically at the age of 8 years. In other words, it is suggested that, unlike 8 year-olds who 
are more engaged in peer group dynamics and concerned about acceptance, for example, 5 
year-olds do not use these reasoning skills and spontaneously refer to embarrassment because 
self-presentation / social evaluation is not yet salient for them.  
       In support of this idea, Banerjee (2002a) (N = 48) found that 7 to 11 year-olds’ 
spontaneous references to stories priming self-presentation motives (e.g., hiding being hurt in 
front of peers) were related to spontaneous attributions of embarrassment, especially in 
passive conditions (r =  .32, p < .05). Social motives also accounted for some of the 
variability in individuals’ attributions of embarrassment that was not explained by second-
order reasoning ability (partial correlation, controlling for age, = .31, p < .05). This study 
provides a compelling account of the differentiation of embarrassment toward greater self-
reflexivity including both cognitive and social motivational prerequisites. This sociocognitive 
account will be discussed in greater detail when the literature on self-presentation 
understanding is reviewed in a separate section below.  
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Developmental Differences in Shyness 
       Buss (1980) distinguished between fearful and self-conscious shyness and suggested that 
these depend on cognitive developments. The former “requires no special, advanced sense of 
self….[whereas] self-conscious shyness involves public self-awareness, which requires an 
advanced cognitive self, and is therefore, present only in older human children and adults” 
(p.43). Importantly, the former is proposed to involve distinct states of fearfulness and 
anxiousness whereas the latter is associated with heightened awareness of the self as a social 
object in the form of public self-consciousness (see Fenigstein et al., 1975). Developmentally, 
Buss, Iscoe, and Buss (1979) suggested that fearful shyness was apparent in the first year and 
elicited in response to meeting strangers and novelty; while self-conscious shyness was 
argued to appear at 4 to 5 years of age, indicated by a sense of embarrassment in response to 
social evaluation. This argument was made on the basis of parents’ recollection of increasing 
examples of self-conscious shyness in their children beginning at this time. It was at this age, 
Buss (1980) suggested, that children have developed a sense of themselves as a social object 
or the object of social scrutiny and evaluation.  
       As noted earlier, these findings contrast with those of Lewis (2001) who suggested that 
embarrassment appears under conditions of social scrutiny much earlier, at 3.5 years of age 
(e.g., when singing in front of the class). It is not clear, however, that children exhibiting 
exposure embarrassment are conscious of the self in the sense that Buss (1980) means, which 
includes self-conscious self-evaluation. By the same token it is not clear how self-conscious 5 
year-olds were in the study by Buss et al. (1979), given parents were reporting on subjective 
phenomena. Age 5 years is, on the other hand, consistent with the research above showing 
that this is when children will make a conscious attribution of embarrassment in response to 
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negative social scrutiny (e.g., Colonessi et al., 2010). It may be that self-conscious shyness, 
like self-conscious embarrassment, is first tied to concrete cognitive-affective feedback to 
later become more self-reflexive with age.  
       Indeed, the research on fearful and self-conscious shyness points to a strikingly similar 
differentiation as observed in embarrassment above. Given the similarity of this research to 
that already reviewed, it will be reviewed only selectively to highlight particular issues. 
Methodologically, these studies are similar to those reviewed earlier in that they are based on 
children’s descriptions of these forms of shyness, and they also vary in the degree to which 
they require the child to spontaneously reflect and verbalise shyness as a quality in self and 
others.  
         In brief, Crozier and Burnham (1990) (N = 60) reported that 5-6 year-old children’s 
verbal descriptions were of fearful shyness, described in contexts of strangers and novel 
situations  and characterised by fearful reactions. These 5-6 year-olds also made very few 
reference to self-conscious shyness. Self-conscious shyness, described by children as being 
elicited by being observed or being conspicuous (speaking in front of a class or group) and 
“feeling” embarrassed (feeling foolish, going red, being embarrassed), was, on the other hand, 
much more prevalent at older ages, increasingly from 7-8 and 10-11, although it did not 
replace fearful shyness.  In addition, when children were asked to select from two alternatives, 
67% of 5-6 year-olds indicated meeting a stranger as eliciting the most shyness, while only 
17% selected being ‘asked a question in front of the whole class or in front of a lot of people’. 
The respective percentages increase for 7-8 year-olds (37% and 58%) and 10-11 year-olds 
(25% and 65%), suggesting greater relevance of self-conscious forms of shyness with age.  
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       These findings are basically replicated in other studies, although there is some variation 
in the ages at which these developmental differences are observed. Yuill and Banerjee (2001), 
for example, also using a forced choice method, revealed that when the situation was more 
relevant to 6 year-olds—singing in front of the class—self-conscious shyness predominated 
over fearful shyness (see also Yuill & Banerjee, 1997). Yet, Younger, Schneider, and 
Guirguis-Younger (2003) appear to replicate Crozier and Burnham’s (1990) finding that 
children’s verbal, self-generated, descriptions of self-conscious shyness are increasingly 
relevant beginning age 9-10 (5th grade) years and through to age 11-12 (7th grade) years. 
These disparities, which appear to reflect differences between using forced choice versus free 
recall, mirror the finding that spontaneous attributions of embarrassment are not abundant 
until after 8 years of age. Thus again, as was observed in attributions of embarrassment, it 
appears that self-reflexive references to shyness become increasingly prevalent with age.  
       Surprisingly, compared to embarrassment and other self-conscious emotions, there is only 
limited research and theorising regarding specific cognitive mechanisms underlying these 
developmental differences. Crozier and Burnham (1990, p. 183) suggest that “changes in 
children’s capacities for self-reflection and taking others' perspectives upon the self” detailed 
by Selman and colleagues (1980; Selman & Byrne, 1974) may underlie the emergence of self-
conscious shyness in 7 to 8 year-olds. This account is at odds with the earlier salience of self-
conscious, over fearful, shyness in 6 year-olds identified by Yuill and Banerjee (2001) who 
echo others in suggesting second-order reasoning as a potential requisite.  
       However, as is discussed in the context of self-presentation understanding, it is not clear 
that all that underlies differences between studies are confounds in measurement which, 
unless remedied, obfuscate the “actual” and earlier appearance of self-reflexive self-conscious 
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emotions. That is, age-related findings of self-conscious experiences—embarrassment and 
shyness—may reflect something more meaningful than simply differences in methodology. 
This will be discussed in greater detail later in suggesting that developments beyond second-
order reasoning, embedded within a particular sociocognitive context, may underlie particular 
forms of social anxiety. 
 
Cognitive Development and Self-Presentation  
       Self-presentation is conceptualised as “strategic behaviour designed to control others’ 
evaluations of the self…motivated by a concern about the way one is seen by other people 
(i.e. a social evaluation concern)” (Banerjee, 2002b, p. 238). This motivational behaviour has 
direct relevance to a consideration of qualitative developments in social anxiety as researchers 
propose these are functionally related. Schlenker and Leary (1982) argued, for example, that 
social anxiety arises when an individual perceives that they will be unable to maintain 
favourable social evaluations (impressions) (see also Carver & Scheier, 1981). Developments 
in self-presentation, like shyness, have also been conceptualised as depending on the ability to 
conceptualise others’ views of the self. In this vein, researchers have more recently suggested 
that self-presentation understanding may require only second-order representation (e.g. 
understanding a belief about a belief) (Banerjee & Yuill, 1999b) or, more broadly a ‘‘theory 
of mind”  in which second-order representation is presupposed, allowing children to consider 
the impact of their own behaviour on the opinions that others have about them (Crozier 2002). 
In a series of studies, Banerjee and colleagues (Banerjee & Yuill, 1999 a & b; Banerjee, 2002 
a & b) have considered the association between self-presentation understanding and 
developments in these second-order representational abilities.  
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       Banerjee and Yuill (1999a) asked 60 4 to 6 year-old children to predict and justify story 
characters’ facial expressions in situations in which a reason for self-presentation display was 
evident (i.e., children were told that characters did not want to appear stupid or silly). In 
support of their cognitive-developmental hypothesis they found that the ability to identify and 
justify self-presentation motives was significantly related to success on Sullivan et al.’s 
(1994) second-order false belief task. Age, however, did not predict this understanding. This 
study illustrates more explicitly the role of cognitive development in the appreciation of social 
evaluative phenomena.  
       A second study by Banerjee and Yuill (1999b) that included children aged 6 to 11 years 
illustrates that appreciation of implicit self-presentational motives may depend on further 
maturation. In this study, whereas only  5 of 16 children aged 6-7 years identified self-
presentational motives in the story, 12 and 15 children did by ages 8-9 and 10-11 years, 
respectively (N = 16 in each group). This is consistent with the findings above that children 
will spontaneously make reference to embarrassment as a reaction (e.g., in supportive and 
passive conditions) only once they reach age 8 to 11 years (see also Aloise-Young, 1993; 
Banerjee, 2002b). Similar findings have been found in children’s explanations of ingratiation 
in stories. In brief, it becomes more sophisticated at age 11 years to include reference to the 
desire to manipulate others’ perspectives on the self (e.g., he wanted him to like him) as 
opposed to simply referring to the person’s prosocial intentions (e.g., he was being nice) 
(Bennett & Yeeles, 1990). Thus, increasing developments may again be observed from 8 to 
11 years in the understanding of self-presentation and, the related, understanding of 
ingratiation strategies.  
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       In explaining the developments taking place between ages 5 to 6 years, when this 
understanding first appears, to 8 to 11 years, where these are referred to spontaneously, 
Banerjee (2002b) suggested a social motivational, rather than a cognitive, developmental 
mechanism. Specifically, he argued that social motivational factors may explain why older 
participants of 8 to 11 years do not make spontaneous reference to these motivations in story 
characters, despite having the requisite cognitive ability (i.e., second-order reasoning). 
Banerjee (2002b) suggested evidence for this hypothesis in light of between and within group 
age-differences in spontaneous self-presentation understanding being accounted for by teacher 
ratings of self-monitoring (Eder & Jones, 1989, Experiment 1) and self-reported public self-
consciousness (Banerjee & Smith, 1999, Experiment 2).  
       The hypothesis put forward by Banerjee (2002b) is important because it is argued that no 
further cognitive developments are necessary for this understanding of, and spontaneous 
reference to, self-presentation strategies. Instead, suggested is that individual differences in 
social experiences and motivation explain both individual and between group age-related 
(developmental) differences in self-presentation understanding and embarrassment 
attributions. This view contrasts with those of other researchers (e.g., Asendorpf, 1989; 
Crozier & Burhnam, 1990) who argue that further developments, such as being able to take 
another’s perspective on the self, may be needed for more complex self-presentation (e.g., 
Schlenker & Leary, 1982). Asendorpf (1989) perceptively highlighted how components of 
self-presentational understanding are likely to be related to separate but complementary 
cognitive developments: 
Young children below the age of 4 years seem incapable of the complex 
cognitive processes involved in Schlenker and Leary's (1982) approach 
to self-presentational behavior. The ability to take others' perspective 
and, more generally, to represent the relation between two people's 
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views, emerges between the ages of 4-6 years (Flavell, Botkin, Fry, 
Wright, & Jarvis, 1968; Wimmer & Perner, 1983), and it is rather likely 
that looking at oneself from the perspective of others is an even more 
complex cognitive task that perhaps emerges even later (hard data 
concerning this issue are apparently lacking) (p. 483).  
 
        Interestingly, the study by Banerjee (2002b) may actually provide some indirect support 
this idea. Specifically, public self-consciousness, which Banerjee (2002b) uses as a measure 
of motives, may tap individual differences in perspective-taking as outlined by Selman (1980) 
(see Chapter 6). Items (e.g., I never worry about what other people think of me; I wonder 
what other people think about me) appear to require an appreciation of the perspective of 
others on the self which is associated with Stage 2 perspective-taking in Selman’s theory, 
developing between ages 7 to 12 years. Stage 2 perspective-taking may facilitate the 
spontaneous reference to these motives in others as individuals at this stage appreciate the 
reciprocity of psychological interaction (i.e., the self as subject to other) and so interpret and 
orientate to situations with others’ perspectives in mind (e.g., understanding that others hide 
subjective experience to avoid negative social evaluation). Thus, as was proposed in the 
context of embarrassment and shyness, specific cognitive developments may be associated 
with the emergence of qualitatively distinct forms of self-presentational behaviour (e.g., that 
which is cued versus spontaneous). These are proposed as additional requisites for the 
experience of social anxiety below.  
 
Summary 
         Overall, the studies reviewed illustrate that forms of embarrassment and shyness differ 
in quality and relevance with age. The ages at which changes are observed appear to depend 
on the situations sampled and the methods used to quantify constructs (e.g., observation, 
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verbal/non-verbal self-report, forced choice and open-ended). Embarrassment and shyness, 
can be observed even in infancy; yet, with development, these also appear to differentiate in 
both kind (e.g., becoming more self-reflexive / spontaneous) and type (e.g., in terms of 
eliciting circumstances). In the context of social anxiety (disorder), owing to the dearth of 
research investigating its quality across the lifespan, only the latter kind of differentiation has 
been investigated. That is, social anxiety (disorder) has been identified in preschoolers, 
children and adolescents and it appears to shift in social emphasis (e.g., from parents to 
peers); yet, it is not clear if the quality of social anxiety differs across these contexts.  
       The aforementioned research provides some clues as to the kinds of social and 
psychological changes that may result in qualitative developmental changes in social anxiety. 
Before considering what these may be, it is first important to consider methodological issues 
as they are closely linked to the developmental findings. Crucial is that age-related differences 
vary according to the specific situations sampled and the method used to assess children’s 
understanding and knowledge of a given self-evaluative emotion or behaviour. This suggests 
that situationally, typologies of social anxiety, embarrassment and shyness are not unitary. 
This has both conceptual and developmental implications given that conceptual and 
developmental issues are intimately related. Operational definitions of constructs, based on 
specific situations, are more relevant to some groups than others. For example, self-conscious 
shyness defined by feeling shy when asked to answer a question in class is less relevant to 4 
and 5 year-olds compared to 8 and 9 year-olds. As such, care needs to be taken in selecting 
measures that capture the situations and precipitants most important to a particular group of 
individuals based on their developmental issues. This will increase the power of explanatory 
models as well as their specificity. As will be discussed later this is even more essential in the 
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context of social anxiety as constructs are defined by a whole range of social situations and so 
there is greater opportunity for developmental variability. 
       Methodology is also linked to researchers’ beliefs about the emergence and change in 
quality of these experiences with age, or sociocognitive development more broadly. Using 
different methods (e.g., observations, parent report), for example, reveals that self-conscious 
experiences—social anxiety, embarrassment, shyness, self-presentation—are observable in 
many, and increasingly earlier, developmental periods. . Yet, it does not mean that these are 
equivalent in quality across the lifespan. As noted in the context of social anxiety, many of the 
core subjective features are either unlikely or have not been verified in infants and 
preschoolers.  This is less true in the other research contexts since preschoolers and older 
children are asked directly about their understanding using various verbal and non-verbal 
measures. This research provides insight into the possible psychological differences that may 
occur in these constructs with age. There are, however, a number of critical questions relating 
to how these developmental findings should be interpreted from a qualitative (psychological) 
and developmental perspective.  
       Importantly, in all of the studies reviewed relating to self-conscious emotions, including 
shyness and self-presentation, it is the child’s understanding that is evaluated not their 
subjective experience. The story vignettes and interviewer questions do not ask the child 
whether they experience a sense of “exposure”, “scrutiny” or “self-consciousness”, or whether 
they actually think about managing their own or others’ impressions in the situations 
surveyed. Instead they evaluate whether the child has developed an understanding of the 
concept or the behaviour under investigation2. Often it is the experience of social anxiety, or 
                                                 
2 Understanding and/or conceptual development is indicated by a) their verbal descriptions and non-verbal indications, or b) their ability to 
ascribe the ‘appropriate’ feelings to another person. Also evaluated is whether this understanding varies according to story information (e.g., 
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self-conscious emotions, that is of greatest pragmatic and social importance. It is the 
individual’s experience of these self-conscious “feelings” that are associated with 
developmental outcomes, both “good” (e.g., observation of social norms, Keltner & Busswell, 
1997; Keltner & Kring, 1998) and “bad” (e.g., anxiety, poor social integration). At the same 
time, it is clear that cognitive abilities, such as theory of mind, are associated with knowledge 
of these kinds of social processes; however, the link between cognitive developments and the 
experience of them is largely unknown and where research has been conducted, findings are 
counterintuitive. An established theory of mind, as an index of social maturity and 
understanding, has positive implications for social functioning (see Repacholi, Slaughter, 
Pritchard, & Gibbs, 2003); however, it also bestows greater risk for negative experiences such 
as sensitivity to criticism (Cutting & Dunn, 2002) and is predictive of problematic 
behavioural and emotional outcomes coupled with challenging social contexts (e.g., peer 
neglect and rejection) (Hoglund, Lalonde, & Leadbeater, 2008). Thus, the relationship 
between cognitive developments, social understanding and experience is a complicated one 
that needs to take into consideration various other individual and contextual factors.    
       Given these complexities, it is critical that we do not assume that a child’s conceptual 
understanding is the same as their cognitive-affective experience. In the same vein, it is not 
clear that the same social and psychological mechanisms involved in understanding emotions, 
motives and intentions are the same as those involved in experiencing them. Yet, if we are to 
consider current interpretations and theories relating to developments in the understanding of 
self-conscious experience only a single cognitive mechanism—second-order reasoning—has 
been explored and, in turn, this has been married with changes in social and motivational 
                                                                                                                                                        
audience feedback; implicit/explicit reference) which can be interpreted as a variation in cognitive-affective feedback required to activate the 
child’s understanding and appropriate attribution. 
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dynamics to explain variability in spontaneous reference to these emotions in others (e.g., 
Banerjee, 2002ab). Banerjee (2002a) concluded thus:   
 
second-order reasoning about mental states is necessary but not 
sufficient for an awareness of the self-conscious concerns about 
social evaluation that underlie both the spontaneous identification of 
self-presentational motives and the attribution of embarrassment. One 
possible explanation is that young children are in general not highly 
concerned about social evaluation, although they have the cognitive 
equipment to understand such concerns when specifically prompted 
(p. 381).  
 
       As noted, Banerjee (2002b) provides the only study of this sociocognitive hypothesis, 
illustrating that teacher-reported self-monitoring and self-reported public self-consciousness 
account for further variability in children’s understanding of embarrassment and self-
presentation motives above that explained by second-order reasoning ability. As Banerjee 
(2002a) argued, a ‘key task is identifying the origins of the variability in understanding social 
evaluation concerns that remains after controlling for the relevant mental-state-reasoning 
skills’ (p. 398, italics added). Here, and in the excerpt above, Banerjee is clearly referring to 
the subjective experience of social evaluation; yet, there are few studies (exceptions are Vasey 
et al., 1994; Westenberg et al., 2004) relating sociocognitive developments to the actual 
subjective experience of social evaluative concerns.  
       This is an important issue given a consideration of the cognitive-affective and social 
processes associated with the subjective experience of social anxiety in middle childhood and 
beyond. It is here that the subjective experience of social anxiety has been studied and an 
analysis of this research reveals it to be a complex cognitive-affective process that may 
involve alternative mechanisms to those so far explored (i.e., second-order reasoning). 
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Specifically, there is reason to believe that when social anxiety is considered from an 
experiential perspective, additional cognitive-requisites may also be required beyond second-
order reasoning ability. 
        Highlighted in particular are various forms of self-other representation and also 
perspective-taking as a cognitive experiential process involved in social anxiety. The ability to 
take others’ perspectives, particularly on the self, may not be necessary in emotion 
understanding and it may not be assumed in tests of second-order reasoning ability. As noted 
by Asendorpf (1989) taking another’s perspective on the self is a more complex task than 
being able to represent others’ beliefs or intentions. It is the former that is assumed to be 
required for reflexive self-conscious experiences such as embarrassment and self-presentation 
(Banerjee, 2002ab; Bennett & Matthews, 2000) and, although this form of representation has 
not been assessed, it is often assumed to be occurring based on second-order reasoning ability 
and/or emotion understanding apparent at age 4 or 5 years. There is, however, established 
research illustrating that the ability to take another’s perspective on self emerges later in 
development due to maturational processes. According to Selman’s (1980) theory of social 
perspective-taking it is between the ages 7 and 12 years that individuals acquire the ability to 
take others’ perspectives on the self. The ages at which these perspective-taking developments 
occur are consistent with the ages at which children begin to make spontaneous references to 
social emotions and with the increasing salience of social evaluative concerns—i.e., between 
8 and 12 years.  
          It is argued in the following two chapters that an analysis of the cognitive-affective 
aspects of social anxiety provides an empirical basis for the argument that the subjective 
experience of social anxiety emerges in development as a consequences these later 
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perspective-taking abilities (i.e., beyond second-order reasoning). These changes are further 
conceptualised as occurring within social and motivational dynamics that nevertheless predict 
the experience of social anxiety as an individual difference. As suggested by Banerjee 
(2002ab), individuals are expected to differ in the degree to which they think about self and 
others even with requisite cognitive capacities. Considered here are differences in individuals’ 
engagement in motivated forms of self-monitoring and differences in their beliefs about their 
abilities to maintain social relations with others as predictors of social anxiety. These 
additional cognitive-affective processes, including self-focused attention and self-evaluative 
judgments, are central to the experience of social anxiety and so are highlighted within this 
discussion. At the same time these processes are contextualized within forms of self-other 
representation (social perspective-taking) and levels of social integration. Thus, a number of 
empirically informed but novel moderating and mediating hypotheses will be regarding the 
relations between perspective-taking, social motives, self-efficacy and social integration as 
predictors of particular forms of social anxiety.      
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
61 
 
Chapter 5: An Experiential Analysis of Social Anxiety  
Cognitive Features of Social Anxiety 
       One cognitive-affective feature of social anxiety not associated with the other constructs 
reviewed so far is anticipation and apprehension. Specifically, social anxiety, as a form of 
anxiety, is characterised by anticipation of social evaluation that includes the person’s 
reflexive consideration of others’ potential reactions to the self before the social interaction. 
This anticipatory aspect of social anxiety, and anxiety more broadly, can be contrasted with 
embarrassment, and also shame, which are typically conceptualised as a consequence of a 
(perceived) breakdown of the social interaction as it occurs (see Miller, 2010). In this vein, 
Buss (1980) suggested that embarrassment and shame occur when one has failed to behave 
appropriately, while shyness and social anxiety are precipitated by anticipation and dread of 
interpersonal evaluation by others. Similarly, Schlenker and Leary (1982) define social 
anxiety as “anxiety resulting from the prospect or presence of interpersonal evaluation in real 
or imagined social settings” (p. 642). Social anxiety is, therefore, future-oriented, and it is the 
subjective experience of anxiety about failure, rejection, humiliation and/or negative 
evaluation from others, that characterise social anxiety. 
       Indeed, the core feature of social anxiety (disorder) is fear of negative evaluation (Rapee 
& Heimberg, 1997). Thus, worry as a feature of social anxiety, may best be conceptualised as 
the person’s representation of the possibility and/or expectation of negative evaluation from 
others. Worry then is only one component of a more central process of thinking about others’ 
perceptions of the self. It is this central process of thinking about the self and others, and, 
more importantly, imagined other’s perceptions on the self, that highlights the 
representational aspects of social anxiety that may be conceptualised as emerging from 
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specific cognitive developments. These self-other processes are evident in various theoretical 
and empirical conceptualisations of social anxiety at different levels of analysis.  
       Self-other processes are evident at the level of specific beliefs (e.g., they will/do think 
that I am odd/stupid/incompetent) but also more abstractly in processes of self-awareness 
and/or self-focus (cf. Clark & Wells, 1995; Rapee & Heimberg, 1997). Typically these two 
processes are linked to form a complete explanatory model of the experience of social 
anxiety. In the aforementioned models, self-focussed attention is typically tied to appraisals of 
self (e.g., physiology, personality, social skills), others (e.g., their reactions and beliefs to the 
self), and predictions about outcomes (e.g., failure, humiliation, rejection, negative 
evaluation). A number of conceptual models that share these features are briefly reviewed to 
illustrate how the core subjective quality of social anxiety includes reflexive cognition that 
may lie beyond developments in second-order reasoning or theory of mind more broadly.  
         The APA (2000), guided by a desire to provide concrete operational definitions of 
behaviours, describes numerous features of social anxiety that include the individual’s 
considerations of others’ view of the self. According to the APA’s description, when the 
socially anxious person is ‘exposed’ to ‘unfamiliar people’ and/or is the object of ‘scrutiny’ 
they are concerned that they may ‘act in a way (or show symptoms) that will be humiliating or 
embarrassing’ (p. 456). In particular, they are concerned that others might see their hands 
shake or tremble, or they may ‘appear inarticulate’ and so be judged as ‘anxious, weak, 
“crazy”, or stupid’ (pp. 450-451). These cognitions are clearly associated with a recursive 
consideration of others’ views of the self, and are central to cognitive behavioural models of 
social anxiety (e.g., Clark & Wells, 1995; Rapee & Heimberg, 1997). 
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       Cognitive behavioural models of social anxiety (Clark & Wells, 1995; Rapee & 
Heimberg, 1997) and models of self-regulation (Carver & Scheier, 1981; Duval & Wicklund, 
1972), although developed separately, offer similar propositions that link cognitions with 
meta-cognitive processes to explain negative affect and social anxiety specifically. Central to 
these models is that social anxiety arises in the context of the person’s ability to have 
themselves as the object of their own attention which, in turn, leads to other appraisals and 
cognitive affective experiences such as social anxiety. These models use different terms to 
describe the person being the object of their own attention—objective self-awareness (Duval 
& Wicklund, 1972), public self-consciousness (Carver & Scheier, 1981), self-focused 
attention (Clark & Well, 1995)—yet, they all describe the individual giving attention to the 
self in social situations. In order to simplify the discussion, this quality of attention will be 
referred to as ‘self-focused attention’.    
      These models, while describing self-focused attention similarly, differ regarding how it 
relates to social anxiety. Notably the models by Duval and Wicklund (1972) and Carver and 
Scheier (1981) were developed to explain how self-awareness works as a mechanism in 
people’s engagement in goal directed behaviour and also in their appraisals of personal and 
social success. The former authors argued that self-focused attention is inherently 
uncomfortable because it leads the person to evaluate their behaviour as discrepant from their 
own ideal standards of performance. Carver and Scheier (1981) disagreed, however, and 
suggested that self-focused attention may be an adaptive form of self-motoring (e.g., Snyder, 
1972, 1974) that is aversive, and associated with social anxiety, only when the individual also 
perceives that they will be unable to perform to a particular standard (e.g., Bandura, 1991) 
(see also Schlenker & Leary, 1982). In addition, Carver and Scheier (1981) argued that when 
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self-focused attention is triggered socially, it is not personal standards that are important but 
the perceived standards held by others that are used in self- (discrepancy) evaluations.  
       Therefore, these theories offer different accounts of the standards (own vs. others’) that 
are used as sources of negative subjective experience and of goal attainment more broadly.  
Researchers in self-conscious emotions also differ in their stance regarding the source of these 
discrepancy evaluations—i.e., self or generalised others (cf. Tracy & Robins, 2004 and 
associated commentaries by Baldwin & Baccus, 2004; Leary, 2004). These theoretical 
differences are important in that they suggest differences in the role that a focus on self and/or 
other have in generating social anxiety. It is likely that social anxiety that is elicited through 
self- versus other-focussed processes differs in cognitive complexity and, in turn, when they 
are associated with the emergence of social emotions developmentally. In the context of 
social anxiety, however, a number of theorists (e.g., Buss, 1980; Fenigstein et al., 1975; 
Schlenker & Leary, 1982) have suggested that it is public self-consciousness, as opposed to 
an egocentric preoccupation with the self’s private thoughts and feelings (‘private self-
consciousness’), that is required for social anxiety to arise experientially (i.e., in state terms) 
and developmentally. Similarly, Tracy and Robins (2007) argued that embarrassment 
“require[s] that attentional focus be directed towards the public self, activating corresponding 
public self-representations” (p. 193). 
       A consideration of information processing models of social anxiety also suggests that a 
consideration of how the self is performing “in the eyes of others” is core to the subjective 
experience of social anxiety. Indeed, Rapee and Hiemberg’s (1997) influential model suggests 
that social anxiety arises in the context of “the degree of discrepancy between the presumed 
appearance or behavior as perceived by the audience and the audience’s assumed standards 
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for evaluating this appearance/behavior” (p. 748). Rapee and Hiemberg (1997) also suggested 
that the socially-anxious individual “simultaneously focuses his/her attentional resources onto 
both this internal representation and….any perceived threat in the social 
environment…Attentional resources are allocated to the salient aspects of the self-image 
(generally those features which are relevant to the situation and potentially negative) and also 
to monitoring of potential external threat” (pp. 742-743). Importantly, the socially-anxious 
person is argued to construct an image of the self as a social object or as they ‘must’ appear to 
the audience (see also Clark & Wells, 1995).   
      These cognitive-behavioural models have generated a fecund of research supporting their 
key propositions (see Bögels & Mansell, 2004; Schultz & Heimberg, 2008). Research 
consistently links social anxiety with appraisals of the self as a social object as measured by 
public self-consciousness, memory for performance ‘as if’ through the eyes of the audience, a 
preoccupation with behaviours that might be observable to others, a concern with negative 
evaluation and, finally, negative self and other-focussed cognitions (see Shultz & Heimberg, 
2008; Spurr & Stopa, 2002, for excellent reviews). Important from a developmental 
perspective is that contention exists regarding whether these cognitive models are applicable 
to youth.  Specifically, there is disagreement as to whether children and early adolescents 
have the prerequisite cognitive abilities required for these phenomena (Alfano et al., 2002, 
2006; Kearney, 2005). This is important in light of the argument to be detailed below that 
developments in self-other representation (perspective-taking) are associated with the 
emergence of social anxiety in childhood and early adolescence. That is, if developments in 
perspective-taking are of aetiological significance then their associated cognitive phenomena 
should be observable in youth.  
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Self-Other Representation in Socially Anxious Youth  
 
       An appraisal of this fairly limited literature suggests that, using certain paradigms, certain 
cognitive phenomena are less than apparent in youth. A number of clinical studies 
consistently report, for example, that children and adolescents report very few negative 
cognitions during role-play or read aloud tasks (Alfano et al., 2006; Bögels & Zigterman, 
2000; Chansky & Kendall, 1997; Kendall & Chansky, 1991; Spence et al., 1999). These 
studies have led to arguments that the negative self-cognitions central to cognitive-
behavioural models of social anxiety (e.g., Clark & Wells, 1995), may be epiphenomena and 
not causal in the development of social anxiety (disorder). Negative self-related cognitions, 
that is, may not emerge until later in the course of the disorder perhaps as a function of later 
cognitive developments (e.g., Alfano et al., 2006). Nevertheless, there are other ways that 
cognition has been defined and measured in youth, and findings point to complex cognitive 
processes such as those reported in the adult literature. 
       Children and adolescents will, for example, self-report concerns about appearing 
anxious, stupid, weak and crazy (Essau et al., 1999). The core concern in social anxiety, 
regardless of age, is fear of negative evaluation (FNE). It is suggested here that FNE provides 
a direct measure of the child’s concern with how others perceive them or are likely to react to 
and evaluate them. The Social Anxiety Scale for Children-Revised (SASC-R) (La Greca & 
Stone, 1993) includes an FNE subscale, and is perhaps the most widely used self-report scale 
of social anxiety in youth (e.g., Cartwright-Hatton, Tschernitz, & Gomersall, 2005; Ginsburg, 
La Greca, & Silverman, 1998; Inderbitzen-Nolan & Walters, 2000; Kristensen & Torgersen, 
2006; La Greca & Lopez, 1998; La Greca, Dandes, Wick, Shaw, & Stone, 1998; Sanna et al., 
2009). It has also been used in children as young as 7 years and has illustrated strong 
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reliability and convergent validity (La Greca & Stone, 1993). The FNE subscale asks children 
to report their level of fear / concern / worry about being evaluated negatively by peers (e.g., 
anticipating or assuming that one is or will be teased, made fun of, not liked). These concerns 
are also predictive of the child’s psychological and social functioning at a young age (e.g., see 
studies above). 
       Socially anxious children/adolescents also display self-other focused attention as 
described in the models above. Public self-consciousness, for example, defined as the 
frequency with which one becomes cognizant of the self “as a social object that can be 
observed and evaluated by others” and is contrasted by a focus on private thoughts and 
feelings (Fenigstein, 1979, p.75). In adults the former is more strongly correlated with social 
anxiety (see Bögels & Mansell, 2004; Mor & Winquist, 2002). Surprisingly, it is only recently 
that self-consciousness has been studied as a correlate of social anxiety in youth (Higa, 
Phillips, Chorpita, & Daleiden, 2008). Specifically, Higa et al. (2008) reported a study of 175 
children aged between 9.8 to 14.3 years (mean = 11.5 years, SD = 1.0) finding higher 
correlations between the social anxiety measured by the SPAI-C (Beidel et al., 1995) and 
public (r = .57) compared to private (r = .32) self-consciousness. Surprisingly, age-effects 
were not reported despite the centrality noted in the study. Nevertheless, these findings 
converge with adult studies and suggest that social anxiety is likewise associated with a 
consideration of aspects of the self that are perceived and evaluated by others even in 
preadolescents.  
       Another construct similar to public self-consciousness is the ‘observer perspective’ (e.g., 
Wells, Clark, & Ahmad, 1998). This construct is notable for its specificity in capturing 
perspective-taking given participants are instructed to indicate whether they recall their 
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performance from their own, or field, perspective, or from an audience, or observer’s 
perspective (e.g., Coles, Turk, Heimberg, & Fresco, 2001; Wells et al., 1998). Consistently 
found is that socially-anxious adults memory for their performances is “as if” through the 
eyes of the audience—the audience looking back on them (see Shultz & Heimberg, 2008). 
Hignett and Cartwright-Hatton (2008) recently extend these findings to youth aged between 
12-14 years (N = 124). In this study participants were asked to indicate whether they 
remember their performance from a field or an observer perspective (see Wells et al., 1998) 
following a 3 minute speech. An observer perspective was positively correlated with state (r = 
.18) and two measures of trait social anxiety, the SPAI-C (r = .20) and the FNE subscale of 
the SASC-R (r = .29), and, contrary to the authors expectation, age did not moderate these 
effects. These findings, although not surprising considering that by age 12 these perspective-
taking abilities are argued to emerge (Selman, 1980), suggest that social anxiety is associated 
with perspective-taking in otherwise normal developing youth.  
        A number of recent community studies have also provided evidence that children and 
adolescents engage in self-focussed attention, and that other aspects of the cognitive-
behavioural models are also relevant to children of a young age. In a sample of 175 youth 
(mean age 11.5 years), Higa and Daleiden (2008) reported that the SPAI-C (Beidel et al., 
1995) total score was a significant and unique predictor of self-focused attention (β = .39), 
directed towards, for example, subjective anxiety, what to say or do next and on the 
impression that others are likely to have, as measured by Woody, Chambless, and Glass 
(1997) instrument designed for adults. These findings were robust, remaining significant, after 
controlling for negative affect. Hodson, McManus, Clark, and Doll (2008) reported very 
similar findings in a sample of 175 12.5 year-olds, while controlling for depression. These 
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findings were also replicated by Fernandez, Davis, & Higa (2007) who measured these 
aspects of attention during a live video-taped performance. Self- (r = .85) and -other 
(externally) focused attention (i.e., toward the experimenter) (r = .69) were highly correlated 
with social anxiety. In this study social anxiety was predictive of lower recall for non-social 
objects (e.g., experimenter’s clothes), a finding that was unique to social anxiety compared to 
other disorder symptoms.  
       The above findings are consistent with the proposition that even in early adolescence 
social anxiety is associated with self-focussed attention that is directed towards aspects of 
experience—both internal and external—that are likely to contribute to the perceptions that 
others are likely to have of them. There is also research suggesting that socially anxious 
children engage in self-focussed attention and use this information to construct a negative 
self-image. Cartwright-Hatton et al. (2005), found that children aged 10 and 12 years (mean = 
11) were more likely to rate their performances as appearing nervous (e.g., they blushed and 
stuttered more) compared to observer-ratings after a role-play task. Notably, these perceptions 
were biased, a finding interpreted in the adult literature (Clark & Wells, 1995) as indicative of 
a focus on introceptive information in the construction of a negative self-image. Indeed, 
Cartwright-Hatton, Hodges, and Porter (2003) reported a study in which 8 to 11 year-old 
children’s self-ratings of their micro social skills (e.g., loudness, clarity of voice), global 
impression (e.g., how friendly/clever) and nervousness (e.g., whether they stumbled over their 
words) following their speeches were all inversely correlated with how scared/worried they 
reported they were immediately prior to engaging in the task. Miers, Blöte, Bokhorst, and 
Westenberg (2009) similarly reported that highly socially anxious adolescents rated 
themselves as looking significantly more nervous (Cohen’s d = 0.52) following a recorded 
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speech than adolescents low in social anxiety. These self-rating were not, however, supported 
by observers who did not report any differences in nervousness between the two groups, 
leading the authors to conclude there is a “negative bias” due to self-focused attention (see 
also Inderbitzen-Nolan et al., 2007).  
       One final area relevant to self-focused attention relates to perceptions of social self-
efficacy. One might argue that apprehension and worry prior to performance (reviewed 
above) might indicate negative perceptions of social self-efficacy. These perceptions have, 
however, been measured more directly. Importantly, Carver and Scheier (1981) argued that 
perceptions of self-efficacy predict whether self-focus (public self-consciousness) is 
associated with social anxiety. No study has tested this mediating hypothesis; however, 
Schlenker and Leary’s (1982) argument that social anxiety arises in light of the expectation 
that one may fail to make a desired impression on others has generated considerable 
supporting evidence (Alden, Bieling, & Wallace, 1994; Alden & Wallace, 1991, 1995; 
Kocovski & Endler, 2000; Wallace & Alden, 1991, 1995). Similarly, across a large number of 
studies, socially-anxious children and adolescents exhibit negative expectations regarding 
their ability to control and hide anxiety symptoms, think of things to say, perform well, and 
otherwise receive positive evaluations from peers and research confederates in anticipation of 
role-play or reading tasks (Alfano et al., 2006; Beidel et al. 2006; Cartwright-Hatton et al., 
2003; Cartwright-Hatton et al., 2005; Erath, Flanagan, & Bierman, 2007; Inderbitzen-Nolan, 
Anderson, & Johnson, 2007; Morgan & Banerjee, 2006; Gaudiano & Herbert, 2006). These 
findings extend to children as young as 7 years (e.g., Epkins, 1996; Muris, Merckelbach, & 
Damsma, 2000; Spence et al., 1999; Turner, Beidel, Cooley, & Woody, 1994).  
71 
 
       Children as young as 7 years of age with social anxiety disorder also predict that they are 
less likely, compared to non-anxious peers, to experience positive social events (Spence et al., 
1999) and more likely to experience negative social events (Magnúsdótir & Smári, 1999), 
even after controlling for depressive symptoms (Rheingold, Herbert, & Franklin, 2003). 
Bögels and Zigterman (2000) reported a study illustrating that social anxiety-disordered 
children are also more likely to indicate that they will be unable to cope with and have less 
social influence in response to brief social stories read to them (e.g., a description of a child 
meeting a group of peers for the first time) (see also Waters, Wharton, Zimmer-Gembeck, & 
Craske, 2008). Socially anxious children and adolescents therefore seem to exhibit a 
generalised negative schema about themselves that is particular to their social interactions and 
how they believe they are likely to be evaluated by others even outside of challenging social 
circumstances (i.e., in social role-play and reading tasks).  
        Importantly, these efficacy expectations also suggest that self-other representations are 
activated in children. Specifically, it is argued here that negative expectations require that the 
child has in mind conditions (or contingencies) that others (the proposed audience) hold 
regarding what is required for positive evaluations—with the expectation being held that one 
may fail in some way. The anticipated consequence of failing to meet social demands is often 
humiliation or social rejection. These expectancies suggest that the child is cognizant of 
perceived negative reactions of others and the meaning this has for ongoing experience (e.g., 
rejection). Arguably, this anticipation of how one might behave and how others may, in turn, 
respond necessarily involves a reflexive consideration of self and others, and others’ 
perceived or imagined perceptions of the self.  
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Summary 
       In summary, experientially social anxiety is associated with complex cognitions 
involving appraisals of self and others. A number of constructs can be argued to capture a 
similar process by which the individual (child or adult) makes an evaluation of their current 
psychosocial situation (self) and compares it to a representation / thought / idea / perception 
that is anticipated to be held by the evaluating audience. Here then, the socially-anxious 
individual is comparing a self-representation and evaluating it in terms of, or constructing it 
based on, what they believe others are likely to perceive about them or how these others will 
behave toward them. Socially-anxious individuals do this via a number of means, comparing 
how they may appear or will be evaluated by others on various levels, including images of 
self and of audience, observable behaviours, and their skills and traits. Thus, social anxiety 
involves a form of perspective-taking whereby the individual considers how they appear or 
are likely to be evaluated by others based on these appraisals.  
       This conceptualisation is largely consistent with those in the area of embarrassment 
(Tracy & Robins, 2007) and shyness (Crozier, 2010). These research areas also propose that 
cognitive-affective experience of this complexity is likely to require developments in the 
ability to think about the views and perspectives of others on the self. Typically, these 
developments are believed to be complete by age 3.5 to 5 years of age. Lewis (2007) 
emphasises the child’s sense of “me in the world” and internalisation, and affective response 
to, standards, rules and goals. Bennett (1998) and others (Banerjee, 2002a; Bennett & 
Matthews, 2000), on the other hand, emphasise developments in second-order reasoning or 
theory of mind and public self-consciousness. Yet, this research relates to observations of 
overt behaviour (the former) or to the developments in the understanding of these self-
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conscious phenomena (the latter) not the subjective experience on them. Indeed, there is a 
paucity of research linking cognitive development with the subjective experience of these 
social evaluative phenomena, including social anxiety.  
       Only one study has investigated a cognitive developmental hypothesis for subjective 
concerns about social evaluation. In that study Westenberg et al. (2004) investigated the links 
between ego maturity, as measured by Loevinger’s (1976) model of ego development, and 
social evaluative concerns in a sample of 882 children and adolescents in the community. This 
study found that social evaluative concerns increased with age and that this age-effect was 
entirely mediated by developmental differences in ego maturity, especially conformist and 
self-aware levels. Interestingly, these ego levels centre on garnering approval from the social 
reference group in terms of correct opinions, behaviour and appearance, on the one hand, and, 
on the other, an internal orientation “toward personal feelings, thoughts, and opinions” that 
does not replace the need for the psychological approval, or alignment, from, and with, others 
(p. 484). These sociocognitive developments therefore relate to developments in the child’s 
consideration of others’ perspectives on the self in the context of concerns with integration 
with others.   
       With this exception, researchers have otherwise hypothesised that social anxiety may be 
associated with various sociocognitive developments. Gullone and King (1997) have 
hypothesised that social anxiety may be associated with abstract reasoning since “adolescents 
are more likely to evaluate themselves against ideal standards and to believe that others are 
also evaluating them the same way” (p. 107). Bruch (1989) and others (Bokhorst et al., 2008) 
suggest that enhanced self-reflection and the ability to take numerous others’ perspectives on 
the self (e.g., parents, peers) may explain social anxiety. Inderbitzen-Nolan and Walters 
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(2002) suggest that this may result in an “awareness of discrepancies between the perceptions 
of oneself by one’s peers and one’s self-perceptions” (p. 367). These hypotheses are 
equivalent to those suggested in the context of shyness and embarrassment (see Harter, 2006; 
Bennett & Gillingham, 1991). In both areas these mechanisms are broad in that they 
encapsulate social anxiety of many different types with potentially different sociocognitive 
mechanisms, and at a pragmatic level they simply have not been empirically evaluated. 
       The current thesis expands on this research and suggests that the ability to engage with 
the perspectives of others, as they relate to the self, as well as consider (e.g., cognitively 
represent) and experience (e.g., fear, arousal) the implications of these cognitive processes 
develops uniquely in late childhood and adolescence as a consequence of cognitive and social 
developments. Specifically, consistent with proposals in the area of embarrassment, shyness 
and social anxiety above, developments in perspective-taking established by Selman’s (1980) 
are hypothesised to be cognitive requisites for the experience of social anxiety phenomena 
characterised by the kinds of self-other representations above. The timing of these 
developments coincides with the salience of these concerns in these individuals’ lives, and the 
increasing self-reflexivity of these experiences between age 8 to 12 years. This may be more 
than a coincidence. 
       Specifically, Selman (1980) described various changes in the quality of perspective-
taking beginning at age 3 years and continuing into adolescence and adulthood. Martin, 
Sokol, and Elfers (2008) recently expanded this theory to include pre-reflective, action-
orientated, forms of perspective taking during infancy (e.g., rolling a ball). Interestingly, these 
considerations converge with a conceptualisation of early, non-reflective, forms of 
embarrassment as based in social, as opposed to psychological, interaction (e.g., Coyness, 
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Reddy, 2003). Selman (1980) and Martin et al. (2008), the latter with greater emphasis on 
social interaction, describe the ability to take others’ perspectives as further developing and 
being less contingent on particular social interaction and cognitive-affective sequences. These 
developments converge with greater self-reflexivity and subjective salience of these concerns 
in middle childhood and early adolescence—i.e., at 8 and 12 years. Therefore, it may be here 
that the capacities underlying the self-reflexive experience of social anxiety and associated 
constructs reviewed emerge.  
       These efforts at perspective-taking are, however, highly social in nature. In other words, 
they are not just egocentric phenomena but are tied to the person’s achievement of social 
goals. In this vein, and given the challenges of psychosocial development, perspective-taking 
may be described as facilitating the child’s attempt to integrate and adapt to an expanding set 
of increasingly diverse social situations and challenges (e.g., imagining how one might fare 
within a variety of social, interpersonal situations that involve the broader social group) 
(Martin & Sokol, 2010). Social anxiety, on the other hand, given the experiential analysis 
above and the associated models of self-regulation and social anxiety, may result from the 
person engaging in this social cognition and, in turn, perceiving that that are not able to 
manage these demands.  
       Important, however, is that individuals during this time of development are expected to 
differ in the degree to which they do engage in these forms of social cognition. Relevant here 
are the constructs public self-consciousness (Fenigstein et al., 1975) and self-monitoring 
(Snyder, 1974). In this context they are conceptualised as psychological orientations  that 
place individuals on two related continuums of self-monitoring behaviour. These continuums 
describe whether one cares (not at all to very much) about the public self-image projected to 
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others, on the one hand, and the extent to which one monitors and/or intends to modify their 
behaviour in light of perceived demands from the social reference group (see Banerjee, 
2002a). Consistent with Carver and Scheier’s (1981) expectation, these forms of self-
monitoring are expected to result in social anxiety only when the individual also perceives 
that they will be unable to engage in behaviours that ensure positive appraisals from others. 
At the same time these relations are further contextualized within stages of perspective-taking 
and levels of social integration which are believed to moderate the relevance (strength, 
significance) of the processes.  Thus, a number of empirically informed but novel moderating 
and mediating hypotheses are made regarding the relations between and with perspective-
taking stages and across levels of social integration as predictors of social anxiety. The stages 
of social perspective-taking are now outlined in detail along with a more detailed outline of 
the proposed relationships between social motives, perceptions of efficacy and social anxiety 
as a function of perspective-taking and social integration.          
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Chapter 6: Social Anxiety and Social Perspective-Taking Development   
 
Selman’s Developmental Theory of Social Perspective-Taking   
 
     Selman (1971ab, 1973, 1980) and colleagues’ (Selman & Byrne, 1974) theory of social 
perspective-taking begins with many of the same assumptions as Piaget’s (1936; 1963). For 
one, development is believed to begin with a lack of self-other differentiation and to then 
progress through a series of stages marked by qualitative shifts. These shifts represent 
fundamental changes in children's understanding that occur in an invariant sequence. 
Although environmental or physiological factors may affect the rate of progression, they do 
not change the sequence. Each stage also represents a ‘structured whole’, meaning that a 
particular response is reflective of more than just factors specific to the task. Rather, it is 
representative of an “underlying cognitive logic that characterizes thought at that stage” 
(Selman, Jaquette, & Bruss-Saunders, 1979, p. 16). Finally, the stages of perspective taking 
are hierarchical integrations. In other words, children build on the conceptions developed in 
previous stages and will occasionally respond to interpersonal problems using lower-level 
conceptions. Children at lower stages, however, cannot employ higher stage solutions. 
       Selman’s work is also a direct derivative and expansion on the work on visual-perceptual 
perspective-taking which he applied to the construct of conceptual-mental perspective-taking. 
However, Selman (1971a, p. 1722) theorized that conceptual perspective-taking requires “the 
ability to infer another's capabilities, attributes, expectations, feelings, and potential 
reactions”, thus moving perspective taking into the social-cognitive domain, as opposed to the 
visual domain as in the three-mountains task3. Importantly, Selman describes the development 
of social perspective-taking as “a developing understanding of how human points of view are 
                                                 
3 In the three mountains task children are challenged to conceptualize the view of a model (a mountain) from 
another’s (a doll’s) perspective, the failure of which was attributed to egocentricism, or a failure at visual 
perspective-taking.  
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related and coordinated with one another and not simply what social or psychological 
information may appear to be like from an alternative individual’s perspectives as in the 
construct of role taking” (Selman, 1980, p.22). It is the related and coordinated nature of 
perspective taking, that is, from self to others and back again (i.e., recursive cognition), that 
makes this account different from current takes on these skills which may be described more 
as tests of whether the individual can infer correctly the thoughts and desires of others (e.g., 
theory of mind / false belief understanding).  
       Social perspective-taking is, however, quantified by the individual’s understanding of 
concepts that are argued to require certain subjective understanding and psychological 
complexity representing the thoughts and intentions of self and other (e.g., from a first person 
to a third-person perspective). Selman (1973) argued, in other words, that as one passes 
through the levels of social perspective-taking one develops a more complex understanding of 
human relationships and perspectives (perspective-taking structure), and better understands 
the processes and motives which inhabit the minds of self and others (perspective-taking 
concepts). In this vein, social perspective-taking can be described as the co-ordination of 
psychological perspectives within a socially motivated context as individuals attempt to 
negotiate their social relationships (Martin & Sokol, 2010). It is this social psychological 
combination that is argued here to be a central developmental and experiential mechanism in 
social anxiety.  
       Both the structure and content, or the concepts associated with these relations, of 
Selman’s five levels of social perspective-taking will be described, as will the ‘prereflective’ 
forms of perspective-taking that were argued to precede these developments by Martin et al. 
(2008). While these earlier, prereflective stages are not relevant to the subjective forms of 
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social anxiety of interest here, their inclusion helps characterise social perspective-taking as 
inherently interactive and as involving both the ‘self’ (psychological) and ‘other’ (social) as 
mechanisms of ontogenesis and the development of social subjectivity or personhood. These 
earlier interactional patterns set the stage, as such, for the individual’s thinking about 
themselves and others at increasing levels of psychological abstraction within an increasingly 
complex social environment beginning with their understanding of the self as part of dyadic 
social interactional systems to broader social systems and interactional patterns.  
 
Prereflective Perspective-Taking (Martin et al., 2008) 
     Pre-reflective forms of social perspective-taking, as they name suggests, occur without 
conceptual thought or thinking. The infant does not, for example, have a concept of self or 
‘me’.  Martin et al. (2008) conceptualise two levels. The first is termed 
‘perceptual/experiential repetition and resistance’. At this stage there is no self-world 
distinction and the world consists primarily of undifferentiated objects. The infant instead 
‘experiences different kinds of resistance [sic]...and has the ability to alter perceptual inputs 
so as to recreate experiences (usually by reorienting to a previously experienced location and 
object – e.g., mother’s breast, animated crib mobile)’ (p. 310). Here then, the child 
repetitively positions itself in relation to objects in order to recreate experiences. This 
positioning, although suggesting some reflection, is argued to be grounded in early instinctive 
learning of patterns of inputs and their responses (i.e., contingencies, Bigelow, 1999). Thus, at 
this stage there may be at least some limited stimulus-dependent self-other or self-object 
differentiation that, as Zinck (2008) suggests, occurs within ‘action possibilities’ of the 
cognitive system.  
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       The second level Martin et al. (2008) term ‘positional possibilities’, which follows from 
theorising from Martin (2005, 2006, 2007, 2008) and Gillespie (2005, 2006). At this level, 
orientation to situations is extended to the actions of self and others that commonly take place 
within routinised social interaction. Specifically, the child is at first assisted in engagement in 
conventional social interactions that include both others and objects (e.g., rolling a ball, 
receiving gifts, playing hide and seek) and through repetition comes to more independently 
appreciate, prelingustically, the emotional and behavioural correspondents associated with 
these interactions. According to Gillespie (2005), the child can now occupy two or more 
complimentary positions simultaneously—one actually and others imaginatively (i.e., in 
anticipation). According to Martin et al. (2008), this represents a ‘primitive’ coordination of 
perspectives that includes self-other differentiation, but it is still largely dependent on specific 
action and, arguably affective, sequences (see also Moretti & Higgins, 1999).  
       These prereflective forms of perspective-taking provide the foundations for increasingly 
differentiated forms of self-other representation and coordination of perspectives described by 
Selman (1973, 1980). Consistent with increasing reflective capacity these occur less at the 
level of action and more at the level of the individual’s psychological representations of 
experience. In particular, the individual begins to be able to represent both self and others 
from abstract positions that are not dependent on (although not independent from) specific or 
actual cognitive, affective and behavioural sequences/interactions. In this sense the individual 
achieves the ability to truly anticipate and imagine the perspectives of self and others – 
conceptualising their relation to others outside of the actual social interaction itself.  
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Reflective Perspective-Taking (Selman, 1973, 1980)  
         The reflective levels of Selman’s theory increase from a focus on the physical, 
observable actions of self and others to greater appreciation of the psychological life of self 
and others. In Selman’s theory these developments are represented by changes in the 
individual’s conceptions and explanations of others’ actions, intentions, motives, subjectivity 
and personality, as well as its growth.  
       Level 0, undifferentiated and egocentric perspective-taking, occurs in children between 
approximately 3 to 6 years of age.  
       At the structural level, the child realises that others exist separately as distinct entities, 
but no distinction is made between perspectives at a psychological level: the individual 
believes that others have the same orientation that they do (e.g., believes that others like 
sports because they do). In other words, the child is still unable to “make a distinction 
between a personal interpretation of social action (either by self or other) and what he 
considers the true or correct perspective. Therefore, although the child can differentiate self 
and other as entities, he does not differentiate their points of view” (Selman & Byrne, 1974, p. 
804).  
       At the level of content, the individual is able to predict others’ emotions when they know 
how they would feel, but these interpretations are physicalistic. When asked to explain the 
reasons for others behaviours, for instance, the child does not refer to unobservable feeling 
states or motives as causes because the reason for action is seen to be equivalent to the action 
itself. At this stage there is no distinction made between the physical and psychological world 
of others–everything occurs and can be explained at the level of action and observation. In 
terms of social interactions the child differentiates between people, however, “the child’s own 
action orientations predominate exchanges; e.g., engaging in ‘monologic’ conversations and 
82 
 
actions (unadjusted to partner’s understanding or position in the dialogue), such as pointing or 
showing objects of interest to someone on the telephone” (Martin et al., 2008, p. 308).  
       Stage 1, subjective or differentiated perspectives, children ranging in age from around 5 
to 9 years, are aware that others have subjective and psychological perspectives. At a 
structural level they understand that others may have different ideas or perspectives, 
particularly when the situation contributing to these perspectives is in some way different as 
might be the case, for example, when all actors are not privy to the same information (i.e., 
false belief understanding). However:  
 
The child is still unable to maintain his own perspective and simultaneously put 
himself in the place of others in attempting to judge their actions. Nor can he judge 
his own actions from their viewpoint. He has yet to see reciprocity between 
perspectives, to consider that his view of other is influenced by his understanding of 
other's view of him (Stage 2). He understands the subjectivity of persons but does 
not understand that persons consider each other as subjects rather than only as social 
objects (Selman & Byrne, 1974, p.804). 
 
       Similarly, at the conceptual level, the individual understands that others may have 
idiosyncratic reasons for behaving and feeling the way they do; however, their understanding 
of persons is somewhat one-dimensional since they cannot yet appreciate that someone can 
have conflicting emotions towards the same event (e.g., be happy and sad). Selman noted that 
the most defining feature of this stage is the child’s newly developed concern with the covert 
psychological lives of others. Interactively, children may approach situations with knowledge 
that interacting partners have different informational, motivational and behavioural 
orientations to the situation, yet these are not yet co-ordinated with one’s own. Indeed, the age 
at which these abilities emerge correspond with the age that children can make reference to 
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embarrassment and self-presentation as emotions in others when the reason for them in 
behavioural and motivational terms is made explicit (e.g., hiding feelings because not wanting 
to appear silly).   
       Stage 2, self-reflective or reciprocal perspectives, occurs in children aged between 
approximately 7 to 12 years, and now have the ability to reflect on their own thoughts and 
feelings from another’s perspective, and can understand that one may have multiple subjective 
attitudes toward a social event.  
 
A major development at Stage 2 is the ability to reflect on the self’s behavior and 
motivation as seen from outside the self, from the other's point of view. The child 
recognizes that the other, too, can put himself in the child's shoes, so the child is able 
to anticipate other's reactions to his own motives or purposes.  However, these 
reflections do not occur simultaneously or mutually. They only occur sequentially. 
The child cannot "get outside" the two-person situation and view it from a third-
person perspective (Selman & Byrne, 1974, p. 804). 
 
       In other words, the child is able to take a second-person perspective which leads to an 
awareness of a new form of reciprocity, a reciprocity of thoughts and feelings (I know that he 
likes me; he knows that I like him) rather than a reciprocity of action (he does for me; I do for 
him). At the same time, even though the individual can form a ‘co-ordinated chain of 
perspectives’, it is still the case at Stage 2 that these self-reflections remain isolated. This 
means that the individual rarely considers their own and others’ perspectives simultaneously 
from a third or generalised perspective.  
       The conceptual understanding resulting within this stage has direct relevance to 
developments in reflexive evaluative phenomena. Specifically, it is here that individuals 
appreciate the reciprocity of action and also the evaluative nature of their interactions. As 
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such, they will anticipate and orientate to situations with others’ perspectives in mind (e.g., 
understanding that others hide subjective experience to keep face). The potential affective 
significance of these perspective-taking efforts was briefly considered by Selman (1980) who 
noted that self-presentation (e.g., covering up one’s feelings to protect social reputation) and 
embarrassment are markers of this stage. These developments also correspond with the time 
when children begin to make spontaneous references to social evaluative emotions and 
motives in others.  
        At the same time individuals at Stage 2 cannot form a third-person or generalised 
perspective and their perceptions remain isolated within the social interaction sequences 
themselves. Thus, one may expect concerns about social evaluation at Stage 2 to be dependent 
on specific cognitive, affective and behavioural cues to elicit their significance. Social anxiety 
similarly varies in the degree to which it is grounded within routine social, cognitive and 
affective sequences. Fear of negative evaluation defined by specific concerns about being 
teased and disapproved of are, for example, likely to be tied to the individuals’ direct and 
vicarious social experiences.  
       It will be hypothesised in the current thesis that FNE will show a greater preponderance 
at Stage 2 than at the following stages, while social anxiety that relies on the individual’s 
consideration of other’s perspectives in the relative absence of actual cognitive-affective and 
behavioural cues will be most evident once the person can ‘escape’ these processes (e.g., 
social anxiety for situations such as being observed, while eating).          
       Stage 3, or third-person or mutual perspectives, is the point at which individuals can 
achieve a more complete view of the relation between self and others. Specifically, between 
approximately age 10 to 15 years of age, the “preadolescent is able to distance themself from 
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dyadic and sequential processing of self-other relations which permits a ‘truly third-person 
perspective which … simultaneously includes and coordinates the perspectives of self and 
other(s)’ (Selman, 1980, p. 34). Selman (e.g., Selman & Byrne, 1974, pp. 804-805) 
emphasised how these developments were situated within the child’s negotiation of group 
processes. These authors write, for example, 
  
The child at level 3 discovers that both self and other can consider each 
party's point of view simultaneously and mutually. Each can put himself 
in the other's place and view himself from that vantage point before 
deciding how to react. In addition, each can consider a situation from the 
perspective of a third party who can also assume each individual's point 
of view and consider the relationships involved. 
 
       Here, social interactions are marked by greater mutuality in conceptions of self and others 
–the self as working with others requires a more distanced and generalised perspective about 
the nature of social interactions. As such, perspective-taking is not restricted to concurrent 
behavioural and affective experiences that occur, for example, idiosyncratically within dyadic 
or isolated group interactions (e.g., non-permeable friendship groups at school). Instead, 
interactions are viewed as being shaped by more integrative principles that allow the self to 
align with others and other’s with the self in a more general way (e.g., without needing to 
refer to discrete and situationally-specific behaviours and emotions). In this stage  one’s 
conduct is conceptualised as needing to fit into broader social milieu beyond that of isolated 
intimate relations (e.g., parents, close friends).  
       Affectively, one may expect this would usher in greater self-reflexivity in thinking about 
self and others, and more importantly, how the self is likely to be evaluated by others, with 
greater anticipation and in the absence of cognitive-affective cues from the social 
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environment or peer group (i.e., spontaneous-observation anxiety). Here social anxiety may 
be generated primarily through the individual’s own sociocognitive efforts. This may 
correspond to social anxiety in situations which are not commonly associated with, or tied to, 
negative evaluation from others. Such situations may include, for example, eating in public, 
entering a room full of people, etc. These situations are without explicit cognitive affective 
consequences and, as such, in order for them to have personal significance the individual may 
have to spontaneously consider the possibility of evaluation in the situation. These proposed 
qualitative differences are represented in the social anxiety typologies described in Chapter 2 
which increase with age (e.g., Sumter et al., 2009).  
       These trends may be further established at Stage 4, societal or in-depth perspectives, 
which develops from approximately age 14 years into adulthood. At this stage gains continue 
to be made toward the understanding of more complex social system interactions, including 
societal, moral, and legal perspectives. The subject can not only conceptualise the subjective 
perspectives of self and others toward one another (e.g., in terms of mutually shared 
expectations), they can conceptualise relations in terms of these deeper societal structures. 
The individual, as such, develops a generalised perspective of social relations.   
       So far, developments in perspective-taking ability have been linked to social anxiety 
more or less directly. That is, social anxiety has been hypothesised to be intrinsic to 
developments in relevant perspective-taking abilities (Stages 2 to 4). Yet, individual 
differences are also likely to add to an explanation of social anxiety. In this regard, a number 
of psychosocial variables—self-presentation, public self-consciousness, social self-efficacy 
and social integration—are hypothesised to predict social anxiety within perspective-taking 
stages.  
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       First, individuals are expected to vary in the degree to which they engage in perspective-
taking and monitor their social relations. Relevant here are the constructs public self-
consciousness (Fenigstein et al., 1975) and self-monitoring (Snyder, 1974). In this context 
they are conceptualised as psychological orientations  that place individuals on two related 
continuums: whether one cares or thinks about (not at all to very much) the public self-image 
projected to others, on the one hand, and the extent to which one monitors and/or intends to 
modify their behaviour in light of perceived demands from the social reference group 
(Banerjee, 2002a). These psychological orientations are expected to further explain social 
anxiety within Stages of social perspective-taking; however, consistent with Carver and 
Scheier’s (1981) expectation these forms of self-monitoring are expected to result in social 
anxiety only when the individual also perceives that they will be unable to engage in 
behaviours that ensure positive appraisals from others. Thus, within the relevant perspective-
taking stages (Stages 2 to 4), self-monitoring is expected to predict social anxiety via negative 
self-efficacy beliefs. This mediating pathway is depicted in Figure 6.1 (paths a and b).  
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 6.1. Moderated Mediation Model Predicting Social Anxiety Within Stages of 
Perspective-Taking.  
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       Also depicted in Figure 6.1 are some moderating relationships (paths d and e). 
Specifically, of interest is whether the mediating relationship is significant across levels of 
social integration. There is only a limited discussion of social integration and social anxiety in 
the literature. Social integration has been linked to social anxiety theoretically (rather than 
empirically) as an important contextual variable (e.g., evolutionary accounts, see Gilbert, 
2001) or it has been considered empirically as a predictor of social anxiety. This empirical 
consideration is also limited by correlational research indicating that social anxiety and social 
integration are negatively correlated. As an example of the latter, studies consistently report 
that poor social integration is a significant and positive predictor of greater social anxiety 
(e.g., Kingery, Erdley, Marshall, Whitaker, & Reuter, 2010; La Greca & Harrison, 2005). 
Thus it might be expected that only those low in social integration would doubt their skills, 
and in turn, experience social anxiety when thinking about their public self-image and 
considering the demands of the social reference group (i.e., the self-monitoring orientations 
above).  
       This thesis aims to extend this limited focus by suggesting that social anxiety may be 
significant at higher (moderate) levels of social integration when social integration is 
considered in the context of sociocognitive development and psychological orientations 
discussed above. Specifically, in the present context,  engaging in perspective-taking and 
thinking about the public self-image are conceptualised as psychological mechanisms through 
which individual’s attempt and seek  social integration (Martin & Sokol, 2010). In this way 
perspective-taking and the self-monitoring orientations above are psychological “tools” that 
serve motives to be socially integrated or accepted by the social reference group (one’s peers 
in this context). Importantly, and what extends current theorising in this area, is the notion 
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that even individuals who are relatively well integrated may anticipate, through self-
monitoring, that their current social abilities are inadequate.  
       For instance, self-monitoring, which is proposed to serve integrative functions, may be 
associated with  negative appraisals of efficacy at both ‘lower’ and ‘moderate’ levels of social 
integration, as there is more likely to be an emphasise on enhancing social integration. This 
can be contrasted with higher levels of social integration where the individual, because of 
their relative security, may engage less in this type of thinking and/or when doing so be less 
likely to doubt their social skills as a consequence. By the same token the attenuating effect 
that efficacy is proposed to have on social anxiety may be more exaggerated for those low in 
social integration compared to those higher in social integration. Thus, social integration is 
specified as a possible moderator of the path from social motives to social self-efficacy (path 
‘d’) and also the path from efficacy to social anxiety (path ‘e’). This decision was made so 
that potential moderating effects were not missed given there is no prior research. 
       In summary, Figure 6.1 describes the proposed relationships between self-monitoring 
(self-presentation and public self-consciousness), social self-efficacy (conflict and non-
conflict) and three forms of social anxiety, as well as moderation of these relations by social 
integration. It is proposed that the effects that self-presentation and public self-consciousness 
have on social anxiety will be mediated by social self-efficacy (conflict and non-conflict) and 
that these effects will hold across levels of the ‘moderator’ social integration. Note that in this 
context, social integration is argued to not moderate the indirect effect of social motives on 
social anxiety so it is the absence of a ‘conditional indirect effect’ or moderated-mediation 
(see Preacher, Rucker, & Hayes, 2007) that is tested.  
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        This moderated-mediation model will be tested within each stage of perspective-taking 
separately. This is done given the expectation that perspective-taking will also moderate the 
prediction of social anxiety. This moderation is expected on the basis that each stage has a 
unique way of structuring the child’s subjectivity. A number of moderating hypotheses have 
already been described above. For example, FNE, which is characterised by social anxiety 
tied to actual cognitive-affective and behavioural circumstances (e.g., teasing), is expected to 
prevail at Stage 2 more than Stages 3 and 4 because individuals at Stage 2 still rely on these 
kinds of cues in their perspective-taking efforts. On the other hand, observational social 
anxiety, where cognitive-affective and behavioural cues are less evident (e.g., being observed 
eating), is expected to predominate once the child can anticipate and adopt a third-person 
perspective (at Stages 3 and 4).  
       Further moderation is also expected regarding the prediction of social anxiety from the 
aforementioned psychosocial variables. A concern with self-presentation, or hiding feelings to 
save the self from embarrassment, is highlighted by Selman as a characteristic of Stage 2. As 
such, one hypothesis is that self-presentation will predict social anxiety (and via efficacy) 
more at Stage 2 than at Stage 3. Another characteristic of Stage 2 development is that the 
child perceives that personal and social goals (e.g., winning a game) can be achieved through 
their psychological will and confidence. One may expect then that self-efficacy will be 
particularly important in predicting social anxiety at Stage 2. This can be contrasted with 
Stages 3 and 4 where social conceptions are marked by greater mutuality, where the self is 
conceptualised as working with others to achieve goals. It follows that satisfaction with social 
relationships with others, rather than social self-efficacy, may be more important in predicting 
social anxiety at Stages 3 and 4.  
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       These hypotheses will be evaluated using both interview and questionnaire methodology. 
Specifically, the Social Understanding Interview (Selman et al., 1979) will be used to assess 
perspective-taking and a questionnaire set will be used to assess social anxiety, self-
monitoring (self-presentation, public self-consciousness), social self-efficacy and social 
integration. As described in the Materials section a number of the questionnaires were adapted 
in light of the study’s aims. In the remainder of this thesis, the model summarized in Figure 
6.1 will be tested, following a description of the method in the following chapter.  
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Chapter 7: Empirical Study 
 
Method 
Participants 
 
     Students from 5 Primary and 5 Secondary schools in Eastern Metropolitan Melbourne 
participated. The total sample consisted of 171 students aged 7 to 15 years (M = 11.17; SD = 
2.11; 112 girls; 59 boys). In the Australian school-system students commence their primary 
education at age 5 or 6 years (Year 1) and their secondary education at approximately 12 to 13 
years of age (Year 7). Of the 171 participants, 69 were in early primary (8 to 10 years4), 60 in 
later primary (11 to 12 years) and 42 were adolescents attending secondary school (see Table 
7.1 for  means, standard deviations and gender composition for these age groups).  
 
Table 7.1 
Gender and Age Composition of the Sample  
 8-10 year-olds 11-12 year-olds 13-15 year-olds 
 Boys Girls Boys Girls Boys  Girls 
N 25 45 22 38 12 30 
Mean Age 9.12 11.43 14.17 
SD 0.81 0.50 0.82 
 
       The response rate of 20% was consistent with similar Australian studies (Cummins, 
Hammond & Moore, 1994). Reasons for not responding could be study information packs and 
parental consent forms not reaching home from school, non-return of parental consent forms, 
the child being absent from school during the time when the study was being undertaken, or 
the child's own disinclination to participate. Data from the non-responders were not collected. 
Due to incompletely filled out questionnaires (N = 2) or the participants being absent for the 
                                                 
4 Even though there is 1 child aged 7 years in this sample this group is referred to as 8 to 10 as it is more 
representative of the actual demographic of this age group.   
93 
 
interview stage of the study (N = 1), three participants were excluded from the study analyses. 
Other than age and gender, demographic data were not collected; however, all schools were in 
the middle to upper socioeconomic demographic according to public records (Australian 
Curriculum, Assessment and Reporting Authority, http://www.acara.edu.au). 
 
Exclusion Criteria  
       A pilot study (N = 3; 2 girls) was conducted to determine whether 7 year-old (Year 2) 
students would have the ability to understand the study’s questionnaires. This was important 
given that studies of the variables under investigation have rarely included children younger 
than 8 years of age. In addition, since self-report questionnaires were used for part of the data 
collection, it was important to determine whether younger participants had the ability to 
complete them on their own.  
       The participants in the pilot study were selected from the first school and were subject to 
the same research protocol as described in the Procedure section below. That is, they 
completed all measures and the interview. The only difference was that instead of answering 
the questionnaires themselves the researcher read each item aloud and probed their 
understanding before assigning a score for each item. Depending on the child, this procedure 
took between 70 and 85 minutes.   
        Of the three participants, two appeared to misunderstand the meaning behind a number 
of the constructs measured. In particular, items indicative of social evaluation concern (e.g., I 
worry about what other people think of me) and self-consciousness (e.g., I worry about how I 
look to others) were endorsed as being highly significant (e.g., Always), while probing 
revealed a misunderstanding of the question (i.e., talking of unrelated subjects). This 
94 
 
misunderstanding was contrasted by appropriate responses to the Self-Efficacy for Peer 
Interaction questionnaire. This questionnaire includes items like, ‘Some kids are using your 
play area. Asking them to move is _____ for you’?  When asked why this would be easy or 
hard, responses like ‘That’s easy because I do that all the time’ or ‘That might be hard 
because they could say no...yeah that could happen’ were indicative of appropriate 
understanding. Thus, problems in understanding appeared restricted to the social anxiety and 
social motive questionnaires which are linked by their assessment of perceptions of the self in 
relation to others (i.e., social anxiety, self-presentation, public self-consciousness). Given that 
the majority of the study’s constructs required the participant to think about self in relation to 
others only participants 8 years or older were subsequently recruited.  
 
Materials 
       The assessment materials included the Social Understanding Interview (Selman et al., 
1979) and a questionnaire set assessing social anxiety, self-monitoring (self-presentation, 
public self-consciousness), social self-efficacy and social integration. The questionnaires were 
provided in a booklet form so the order remained constant over the entire sample. Whether 
participants completed the interview or questionnaires first or second varied according to the 
schools' needs and preferences. Questionnaires were most often completed as a group.  
 
Social Understanding Interview 
       Perspective taking was assessed through the Social Understanding Interview schedule 
designed by Selman et al. (1979). Social perspective-taking, as described in the Introduction, 
is assessed through the discussion of hypothetical dilemmas. These dilemmas are suited for 
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particular ages and are also specific in content to four particular interpersonal domains: 
individuals, close friendships, peer group organisation and parent-child relationship. Each 
domain is associated with a particular set of issues. It is the individual's conceptions of these 
issues that are, in turn, scored as indicative of a given stage of perspective-taking. That is, for 
each domain there is a set of issues which, through discussion, provide content which makes 
sense in light of the individual's perspective-taking stage.  
       What is important is not the content of the domain but the level of social understanding 
exhibited and elicited in response to the content of the story related to that domain. The 
dilemma and interview questions that follow often serve simply as a “jumping-off place” for 
further discussion of children's own experiences or general understanding of interpersonal 
issues (Selman et al., 1979, p. 18). In this way, the process mirrors a cognitive assessor setting 
aside the rigorous standardization of an IQ test in order to “test the limits” of a particular 
child. Thus, while each of the domains may be assessed to provide the most robust account of 
the person's perspective-taking stage, this is unnecessary since each stage is argued to 
represent a structured whole which guides the person’s understanding of the issues and events 
more generally. In the current study only the individual domain was used as it is the most 
face-valid at targeting issues relating to the study. Thus, only the individual domain will be 
described in detail here. Specifically, the stories, issues, and concepts associated with 
different stage scores, as well as the process of scoring, are described.     
 
The Individual Domain  
          The Individual (or person's) domain is assessed and scored for four key issues relating 
to the individual's understanding of persons. Issues include 1) subjectivity (i.e., covert 
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properties of persons, such as thoughts, feelings, and motives), 2) self-awareness (i.e., 
awareness of the self's ability to observe own thoughts and actions), 3) personality (i.e., stable 
or predictive character traits), and 4) personality change (i.e., how and why people change). 
These issues are discussed using standardised questions and follow-up probes. The story 
selected depends on the age of the child. The Puppy Story is suitable for children aged up to 
10, while the Ping-Pong Story can be used for older individuals. Given these stories are 
unique in their content they are associated with their own set of standardized questions for 
each issue. Given space limitations, the questions and the issues targeted for a given stage are 
provided here for the Ping Pong Story only; however, those for the Puppy Story are available 
in Appendix A.     
The Ping-Pong Story 
        Keith, 10, and Jerry, 8, live across the street from each other and are good friends, even though Keith is 
older. They have a lot in common, but Keith especially likes playing ping-pong at Jerry's house. However, Keith 
always wins, and finally one day when he beats Jerry 21 to 10, Jerry throws down his paddle and says, “That's it! 
There's no sense in me playing ping-pong anymore because I always lose”. 
     He and Keith argue, Keith saying he should keep trying, Jerry saying you don't know what it feels like to lose 
all the time. Keith says, "You don't want me to think you're a poor sport, do you?" Jerry says it's not being a poor 
sport; it's just no fun for him when he never wins. Keith says, "Think about me. If you won't play with me, where 
am I going to play? No one else has a ping-pong table." They argue louder and louder, and Jerry's 11- or 12-
year-old sister, Jean, and her friends, Lisa and Ellen, come in to see what's the matter. When the boys tell Jean, 
she says she can see that they both have a point. Why don't they not play ping-pong with each other for a little 
while, and she will let Jerry practice with her. Then maybe when he gets better, he could try playing with Keith 
again. At first Jerry says that wouldn't do any good. Finally, Jean suggests that maybe it's time to try playing 
with Keith again. Jerry says he doesn't think he's good enough and he doesn't want to lose. Jean says he'll never 
know if he doesn't try. So they play. 
     At the beginning of the game, Jerry says that if he loses this time, he'll give up ping-pong for good. Keith 
claims he's out of practice, says Jerry really has gotten a lot better. Jerry wins and is all excited, but Lisa says, 
"Wow, Keith, you sure didn't do very well." Jerry stops leaping around and says, "You were just out of practice, 
right? You didn't let me win, did you?"  
 
       After the child reads this story to themselves they are asked a number of standardised 
questions designed to assess each issue.  
       The issue of subjectivity deals with the individual's concepts of the covert properties of 
persons, for example, whether the self or other can entertain one thought, feeling or intention 
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toward a social object at a time (Stage 1), or whether conflicting orientations may be held 
simultaneously within the self (Stage 2). At stages 3 and 4 conflicting covert aspects of 
person’s are reflected upon and integrated with differing degrees of complexity. Once a third 
person perspective is achieved, for example, the person orders and relates these conflicting 
experiences (Sample questions include, “If Jerry is happy about finally winning, but sad that 
Keith let him win, how would he feel overall?” “Have you ever had mixed feelings about 
something?”  “Could a person look happy on the outside but be sad on the inside?”) 
       Similarly, the issue of self-awareness is defined by conceptions of persons being able (or 
not) to hide their feelings/intentions from self and others with differing levels of self-
reflexivity. The question, “Suppose Jerry finds out that Keith let him win and he says to Keith, 
"I never cared about ping-pong anyway." Why might he say something like that?” is designed 
to assess whether the child understands the idea that people can hide their feelings based on 
personal/social motives (e.g., Jerry saying he doesn’t care when he really does so that he feels 
better about himself and/or is not embarrassed about losing). The question “Could Jerry fool 
himself into thinking he didn't care about the game? How could he do that?” provides a 
measure of the child’s ability to reflect on their subjective experiences from different 
perspectives. At Stage 2, through a second person perspective, answers will reflect an 
understanding that people can fool the self by forgetting or repeating something over and over 
but only until the self remembers or stops doing it. At Stage 3, however, through a third-
person perspective, this dimension is given greater depth with the person referring to the 
mind's activity from an observer perspective (e.g., actively distancing the self from unwanted 
thoughts and feelings as if the self can push things away).  
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        Issues of personality and personality change similarly depend on the achievement of a 
first, second or third person perspective (Stage 1, 2 and 3, respectively). At Stage 1 
personality is described with reference to overt behaviours only, while at Stage 2 the person 
refers to internal motivational states, which are isolated to the specifics of the situation until 
Stage 3 where various motivational states are summarised as traits which go beyond the 
specific interaction sequence. (Questions include, Do you think Jerry is a poor sport, or a 
sore loser, stubborn, thin-skinned, overly competitive? What would that tell you about him? 
What does it mean when you say a person is a poor sport?). The individual’s description of 
change can similarly be described from a physical perspective (e.g., getting bigger, Stage 0), 
changing what one does (Stage 1) versus a self-reflective perspective (e.g., trying hard) versus 
a more generalised perspective (e.g., change as a natural progression that happens to 
everyone, Stage 3).   
 
Scoring      Once interviews are transcribed, scorable issue-concepts are given single stage 
scores that reflect the highest reliable stage identified. For example, the issue self-awareness, 
Stage 2, is associated with 5 concepts that indicate an understanding that inner psychological 
realities—thoughts and feelings—are what is really important and that these can be 
deliberately hidden (e.g., self-presentation) and reflected upon to understand others and to 
help the self (e.g., build confidence). If the child indicates Stage 2 conceptions 75% of the 
time then the issue is scored as indicative of Stage 2. This is then completed for all the 
remaining issues in the same way. Once all of the four issues are given a stage score they are 
then averaged to compute an overall global stage score. This allows for an estimate of the 
perspective-taking stage at which the child is functioning (see Selman et al., 1979; Selman, 
1980).  
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Questionnaires  
     Questionnaires were used to assess social anxiety, social motivational orientations, social 
self-efficacy and social integration. The reliability of the social anxiety scales are discussed in 
the Results section as they require a number of separate analyses. It suffices to say here that 
the consistency with which individuals answer and understand the construct of interest is 
expected to vary according their scores on the social understanding interview just described. 
This makes sense given that social anxiety is argued to vary according to changes in 
understanding and experience. This should be reflected in differences in the consistency or 
reliability with which individuals respond to items, specifically, poorer reliability may be 
expected when individuals do not have requisite understanding or experience to inform their 
responses.   
 
Social Anxiety  
       As discussed in earlier chapters, social anxiety is multidimensional and varies 
significantly in precipitating conditions and quality. Researchers have, however, rarely taken 
account of this variation and have simply analysed scales without considering their findings 
across different dimensions. As described earlier social anxiety is argued to vary 
developmentally as a function of social and cognitive precipitants. Social anxiety may, for 
example, present first in the child’s routine social exchanges (e.g., teasing) with little self-
reflexive cognition, whereas later it may depend on the individuals’ self-reflexive 
consideration of self and others. These differences are readily observable in different 
measures of social anxiety already available. For this study, measures were selected on the 
basis that they had relevant subscales or, in one instance, contained items which were 
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consistent with the theoretical construct of interest. These measures will now be described 
both qualitatively and psychometrically, and their selection is justified.   
 
The Social Anxiety Scale for Children-Revised (SASC-R, La Greca, 1999) 
       The SASC-R was designed to measure social anxiety in the context of children and 
adolescent’s peer relationships. Social anxiety is further conceptualised into three categories 
assessed by the subscales of the SASC-R. These subscales are: Fear of Negative Evaluation 
(FNE, 8 items); Social Anxiety and Distress for New Situations (SAD-New; 6 items) and 
Social Anxiety and Distress for General Situations (SAD-General, 4 items). Social anxiety is 
defined on the FNE scale as ‘fear’/‘concern’/‘worry’ about being evaluated negatively by 
peers (e.g., anticipating or assuming that one is or will be teased, made fun of, not liked). 
Given that the peer context, presumably at school, is the context for these concerns, FNE may 
be conceptualised as a measure consonant with social anxiety that is grounded explicitly 
within the person’s routine social and psychological exchanges with others. (e.g., anticipating 
or assuming that one is or will be teased, made fun of, not liked). SAD-New, on the other 
hand, measures ‘anxiety’/‘shyness’/‘nervousness’ occurring in situations that are new or 
include unfamiliar peers (e.g., doing something new in front of, or talking to, unfamiliar 
peers). SAD-General measures social anxiety more generally (e.g., asking others to play). All 
items are answered on a scale from 1 = ‘Not at all’, 2 = ‘Hardly ever’, 3 = ‘Sometimes’, 4 = 
‘Most of the time’ and 5 = ‘All the time’. 
       It is important to note that these subscales are only moderately correlated (r = .45 to .59, 
p < .001). This suggests that they measure three distinct aspects of social anxiety 
phenomenology. It is in this vein that the subscales of the SASC-R were used in this study. 
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Specifically, the conceptual differences between these subscales are important in light of the 
hypothesis that social anxiety may vary as a consequence of social and psychological 
developments. Specifically, social and psychological development represented by age and 
perspective-taking are argued to determine if individuals experience social anxiety that is 
grounded in their actual and concurrent social and psychological concerns (FNE, SAD-
General) versus social anxiety associated with emerging psychosocial challenges (SAD-New). 
Whether these forms of social anxiety differ as a consequence of age, perspective-taking or 
their interaction is an empirical question to be answered in this study.   
       Both the FNE and SAD-New subscales have illustrated acceptable reliability in children 
aged 7 to 12 years (La Greca & Stone, 1993) and adolescents (La Greca & Lopez, 1998), with 
internal consistencies (Cronbach’s alpha) reported to be .86 and .91 for FNE and .78 and .83 
for SAD-New, respectively. The reliability of SAD-General is somewhat lower depending on 
the study (Ginsburg et al. 1998 [α = .60]; La Greca & Lopez, 1998 [α = .76]; La Greca & 
Stone, 1993 [α = .69]). In the same studies, these scales illustrated moderate test-retest 
reliability after a 4 month interval (r = .61). In the studies cited above both internal 
consistency and test-retest reliability were higher in adolescent samples (see also La Greca, 
Silverman, & Wasserstein, 1998; Vernberg, Abwender, Ewell, & Beery 1992). The reliability 
for these scales in the current study are reported for each stage of perspective-taking below. 
 
Observational Social Anxiety  
      This measure was derived by selecting items from an existing self-report measure of 
social anxiety (Social Phobia Inventory, Moore & Gee, 2003) based on Hoffman et al.’s 
(1999) situational typology of social anxiety for formal speaking/interactions, informal 
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speaking/interactions, observation by others, and assertion. Observational social anxiety 
(Observational SA) is relevant to this study as it provides a measure of social anxiety that is 
not grounded within routine social interactions and cognitive-affective sequelae. This measure 
contrasts with FNE, SAD-New and SAD-General as it relies on participants to self-reflexively 
consider the evaluative significance of the social situation which, according to the theory 
above, depends on their development of third-person and generalised perspective-taking 
abilities (i.e., Stage 3).  
       Items selected from the Social Phobia Inventory included: ‘I get anxious doing things 
when people are watching’, ‘I fear I may do something stupid in front of others’, ‘entering a 
room full of people’, ‘writing in front of others’, ‘wearing different clothes’ and ‘eating in 
front of others’. The original 5-point Likert scale format was maintained with 1 = ‘never’, 2 = 
‘rarely’, 3 = ‘sometimes’, 4 = ‘often’ and 5 = ‘regularly’. Thus, scores can range from 6 to 30 
and indicate the absence of, or high levels of observational social anxiety (respectively). The 
reliability for this scale in the current study is reported for each stage of perspective-taking 
below. 
 
Motivational Orientations  
Monitoring of Self-Presentation 
       A modified version of the Adolescent Self-Monitoring Scale (Pledger, 1992) was used as 
a measure of the degree to which children monitor their behaviour for self-presentation or 
impression management purposes. This is the only self-report measure of these constructs 
designed for use with youth. The original scale consists of two subscales devised by Lennox 
and Wolfe (1984) to measure attention to modifying behaviour (e.g., In almost all situations I 
think about how I should act so that I will make a good impression) and observing the 
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expressive behaviours of others (e.g., I can usually tell how someone feels without him/her 
telling me) for self-presentational goals. Pledger (1992) reported adequate internal 
consistency for the subscales in the modified version of the scale in a sample of 490 12 to 18 
year-olds (α = .78 and .64, respectively) and substantial correlations between this and the 
original scale by Lennox and Wolfe (1984) (α = .75 and .70, respectively).  
       In the present study, only the self-presentation scale was used and items were modified in 
light of the study's aims. Specifically, Pledger’s (1992) measure focuses on the individual’s 
belief that they are able to modify behaviour in light of self-presentational goals. The present 
study is interested not in whether participants believe they can modify their behaviour 
successfully, but whether they orientate to situations regardless of perceived efficacy. If items 
were retained in original form individuals who were motivated and making self-presentational 
efforts but had failed in the past may not have been represented.  
       In this vein, items were changed from  ‘I can...act any way I want to/change my 
behaviour to fit the situation I find myself in/adjust my behaviour to almost anybody’ etc to 
‘In almost all situations I think about or try to change the way I act to make a good 
impression/fit it’ (see Appendix B). The final scale consists of 8 items answered on a 4-point 
response format from Never to Always. In this study this modified scale illustrated acceptable 
internal consistency (α = .70).   
 
Self-Consciousness  
       The Self-Consciousness Scale (Banerjee & Smith, 1999) was used as a measure of public 
and private self-consciousness. This scale was derived from Fenigstein et al.’s (1975) original 
measure, and describes the tendency to be aware of, or monitor, inner thoughts and feelings 
(private) versus being aware of aspects of one’s behaviour that are observable and evaluated 
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by others (public). There is limited research pertaining to the psychometric properties of the 
scale, however, it appears to have face validity in that items are similar to those in the original 
measure by Fenigstein et al. (1975). Banerjee (2002b) also used this scale in his research with 
8 to 11 year-olds; however, no psychometric properties were reported.  
       In the present study some modifications were made to items so that they did not refer to 
negative affective experience as part of public self-consciousness. Some of the original items 
refer to affective experience like ‘worry’ and ‘going red’. However, as conceptualised by 
Carver and Scheier (1981), whether public self-consciousness is associated with negative 
affect, such as anxiety, depends on the individual’s efficacy evaluation. Thus, public self-
consciousness may be associated with social anxiety only when the person makes the 
evaluation that their current behaviour, as it is perceived to be observed and evaluated by 
others, falls short of perceived demands. Through deleting reference to negative affective 
experience in public self-consciousness, variability in whether this form of self-focus is 
associated with positive/negative self-evaluations can be captured. 
       The public self-consciousness scale by Banerjee and Smith (1999) included a total of 7 
items. In this study 4 items were retained in original form, 2 items were modified so that they 
did not refer to affective experience, one was deleted entirely and four new items were added.  
       Items retained unmodified included ‘If I have had my hair cut, it feels like people look at 
me more’, ‘I don’t worry about how I look’, ‘When I am dancing/playing team games, I 
wonder what other people think about me’ and ‘I want people to think well of me’. These 
items were deemed to describe public self-consciousness without being overly biased toward 
negative affective experience.   
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       Modified items included ‘I never worry about what other people think of me’ and ‘I like 
being the centre of attention and having lots of people look at me’ were modified to ‘I never 
think about what other people think of me’ and ‘I often feel like I am the centre of attention 
and that people are looking at me and thinking about me’ so that they did not refer to affective 
experience. The item ‘I sometimes feel myself going red if I notice someone looking at me’ 
was deleted due to its reference to negative affective experience.  
       Items added included ‘When playing a game I am aware that others are watching me’ and 
‘I often wonder what other people think of me’. The items ‘Before leaving for school I take 
one last look in the mirror to make sure everything is alright’ and ‘when getting dressed on 
the weekend I often think about what others might think before I finally decide’ were added 
based on items in Fenigstein et al.’s (1975) original scale.   
       Thus, the final public self-consciousness scale in this study consisted of 10 items. This 
scale exhibited acceptable internal consistency (α = .69). The private self-consciousness scale 
was not modified and includes 7 items like: ‘I don’t think about my feelings very often’; ‘I 
don’t know how I work things out, the answer just pops into my head’. All items were 
answered on a 4-point Likert scale from ‘never’ to ‘always true’. The reliability of the private 
self-conscious scale was poor (α = .40) and could not be improved by item deletion. It was 
not used in further analyses.  
 
Perceptions of Social Self-Efficacy  
       The Children’s Self-Efficacy for Peer Interaction Scale (CSPI, Wheeler & Ladd, 1982) 
provides a measure of perceived prosocial persuasive behaviors in conflict (12 items) and 
non-conflict (10 items) social situations. In conflict situations, the persuasive goal of the 
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child/adolescent is in direct opposition to the goal of a peer (e.g., “Some kids are using your 
play area. Asking them to move is _____ for you”), whereas non-conflict situations do not 
present a contradiction of the goals between the child/adolescent and peer (e.g., “Some kids 
want to play a game. Asking them if you can play is _____ for you”). Respondents evaluate 
how easy or hard it is for them to engage in the presented behaviour by rating on a 4-point 
scale, 1 (‘HARD!’), 2 (‘hard’), 3 (‘easy’), or 4 (‘EASY!’). A higher score indicates greater 
self-efficacy. The CSPI has been used in many studies and illustrated reliability (Wheeler & 
Ladd, 1982) and construct validity, with significant negative correlations between it and 
anxiety (r = -.36 through r = -.49, Wheeler & Ladd, 1982) and loneliness (r = -.31, Galanaki 
& Kalantzi-Azizi, 1999). In this study, the Cronbach’s alpha reliability co-efficients were .83 
for the non-conflict items and .88 for the conflict items. 
 
Social Integration 
       The social/popular subscale of the Social Interaction Questionnaire (SIQ, Manor-
Bullock, Look, & Dixon 1995) derived by Moore and Mellor (2003) was used as a measure of 
child/adolescents' perceived popularity and happiness with their social relations. This 13 item 
scale asks respondents to rate the degree to which items are true or false for them on a 4-point 
scale, 1 (‘Definitely False’), 2 (‘False’), 3 (‘True’), 4 (‘Definitely True’). Items include those 
relating to popularity (e.g., I am not a geek; Others like me because I’m popular) and more 
general social integration (e.g., I often feel lonely at school; It is easy for me to be liked by 
my class; I often feel distant from my class mates; I wish to participate in more activities with 
students than I do). Higher scores indicate greater satisfaction with current social relations. 
Despite representing a mixed social/popular factor, Moore and Mellor (2003) report excellent 
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internal consistency (α =.82) for school aged children. In this study, the reliability of the scale 
was somewhat lower (α = .68) but was improved with the deletion of the item ‘I am not a 
geek’ (α = .72) which illustrated the lowest loading on the social/popular factor in the study 
by Moore and Mellor (-.34).  
 
Procedure 
     After approval was granted from Deakin University Human Research Ethics Committee 
(Faculty of Medicine, Nursing and Behavioural Sciences sub-committee), the Department of 
Education, and the Catholic Education Office, the principals of 12 Primary and 13 Secondary 
schools in Metropolitan Melbourne were contacted by telephone, and provided with an outline 
of the study's purpose and procedure. They were then sent an invitation for their school to 
participate in the project by electronic correspondence. Principals were also given the 
opportunity to view the questionnaires and the interview to be used in the study.  
       Schools whose principals agreed to participate (N = 10) were then visited by the 
researcher and students were given plain language statements and consent forms to return 
home to parents. Students whose parents returned completed consent forms to classroom 
teachers then met with the researcher who explained the study and the requirements of them if 
they chose to participate. On a separate occasion, before completing any of the study’s 
questionnaires or participating in the Social Understanding Interview, students signed consent 
forms. At some schools the questionnaires were completed first and were followed by the 
Social Understanding Interviews, while, at other schools, this situation was reversed. This 
order depended entirely on the particular needs and preferences of each school. With the 
exception of 3, which were completed individually, students met with the researcher as a 
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group to complete the questionnaires. The questionnaires were presented in booklet form so 
remained constant across schools. The Social Understanding Interview was conducted in a 
private room located at the school. No-one but the student and researcher was present during 
the interview. All interviews were digitally recorded for later transcription and coding. All 
data were collected between the months of May 2010 and March 2011.  
 
Results 
Data Screening 
       The data were screened for missing values and outliers using SPSS Version 17. The 
reliability of the social anxiety scales was evaluated within the age groups 8 to 10 years, 11 to 
12 years and 13 to 15 years and within the perspective-taking stages since social anxiety is 
expected to vary accordingly. Similarly, the assumptions underlying statistical analyses were 
established within these grouping variables. 
       Missing Values Analysis revealed data were missing at random (Little's MCAR test: χ2 = 
3862.263, df = 3779, p = .17) and at less than 5%. Therefore, data were replaced using 
expectation maximisation which, according to Tabachnick and Fidell (2007), is most desirable 
when these conditions are satisfied.  
       Univariate outliers were identified using box plots and standard scores greater than  ±3.29 
and Mahalanobis Distance with p < .001, df  = 3, critical value = 16.27. No univariate or 
multivariate outliers were identified on the dependent variables FNE, SAD-New and  
Observational SA.  
       Normality was evaluated within the age groups and perspective-taking stages for the 
social anxiety scales since they are expected to vary accordingly. FNE and Observational SA 
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were significantly positively skewed within age groups 13 to 15 years (z = 2.28, p = .01) and 
11 to 12 years (z = 2.09, p = .01). Following square root transformation skew was no longer 
significant (z = 0.22 and -0.22, p = .001, respectively). Observational SA was significantly 
positively skewed within Perspective-Taking Stage 3, z = 2.34, p = .01, which was no longer 
significant following the square root transformation (z = 0.84, p = .001).  
 
Reliability Analyses  
       The reliabilities of the social anxiety scales were analysed within the grouping variables 
age (8 to 10, 11 to 12 and 13 to 15) and perspective-taking (Stages 1 to 4; PT), given that 
social anxiety is expected to vary according to developments in social understanding. It 
follows that based on these developments the consistency, or rather coherency, with which 
participants answer items will vary within these levels of analysis. Measures of reliability 
(Cronbach’s alpha) for each of the social anxiety scales, FNE, SAD-New, SAD-General and 
Observational SA, are provided below for the sample as a whole, and then within PT stages 
and the age groups 8-10, 11-12 and 13 to 15.   
 
Fear of Negative Evaluation  
        Variability in the reliability of FNE was observed across age and perspective-taking. 
Specifically, while the reliability co-efficient was excellent across the entire sample (α = .90); 
at PT1 it was only .66. Consistent with the studies hypotheses that PT 2 is at least needed for 
FNE the reliability at both PT2 and PT3 was .89 and at PT4 it was .79. The reliability of FNE 
was strong across the 8 to 10 years group (α = .89), 11 to 12 years group (α = .92) and the 13 
to 15 years group (α = .89).  
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 Social Anxiety-New 
        The SAD-NEW scale illustrated a similar pattern to FNE across PT1 (D .63), PT2 
(D .81) and PT 3 (D .82) (D .81, whole sample). However, the internal consistency for 
PT4 was negative (D -.021). This can occur when average item covariance is poor (Nichols, 
1999). Again much less variability was observed across age suggesting consistency across age 
groups: 8 to 10 (D .81), 11 to 12 (D .84) and 13 to 15 (D  .76). 
 
SAD-General  
       Variability was also observed for the reliability of the SAD-General scale. Cronbach’s 
alpha was .71 across the entire sample but only .42 for PT1. The reliability increased for both 
PT2 (α = .66) and PT3 (α = .77). The co-efficients for PT1 to PT2 and PT 3 are lower than 
those observed for the other two scales of the SASC-R which were all > .80. The reliability of 
PT4 was also very poor (α = .29). The internal consistency was better across age groups: 8 to 
10 (α = .68), 11 to 12 (D  .69) and (D .75); however, this scale was not used in further 
analyses.  
 
Observational Anxiety  
       The Observational SA scale illustrated a similar pattern to the FNE and SAD-New 
subscales of the SASC-R. Across the whole sample Cronbach alpha was .78 with increasing 
reliability being observed across PT stages (PT1 D .47; PT2 D .78; and PT3 D .75). 
Similar to the findings above, Cronbach alpha’s were relatively stable across age groups, 8 to 
10 years (D .75), 11 to 12 years (D .80) and 13 to 15 years (D  .80).  
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Preliminary Analyses 
 
Perspective-Taking and Age and Gender  
      Table 7.2 provides summary data for perspective-taking and age. Of note is that cell sizes 
for PT are small in some cases (< 20 for Stage 1 and Stage 4). This was taken into 
consideration when these categories were analysed in relation to the dependent variables.  
 
Table 7.2 
Perspective Taking By Age Group  
  Age Group    
 8-10  11-12 13-15  
PT Stage                                          N (Percentages)                             Total 
Stage 1 6 (60%) 4 (40%) 0 10 
     
Stage 2 51 (62%) 23 (29%) 7 (9%) 81 
     
Stage 3 12 (18%) 30 (45%) 25 (37%) 67 
     
Stage 4  0 3 (23%) 10 (77%) 13 
     
       
       The age composition within each stage provides a test of the structural qualities of PT. 
Specifically, immature/mature forms of perspective-taking should predominate at the 
younger/older ages in an increasing trend. In this sample, 60% of individuals at PT1 are from 
the youngest age group (8 to 10 years); whereas 77% of individuals at the highest level of PT 
(Stage 4) are from the oldest age group (13 to 15 years). This pattern is consistent with and 
satisfies a structural model of cognitive development (Piaget, 1958; Selman, 1980).  
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Between Group Developmental Hypotheses 
       In testing whether social anxiety differed across the developmental constructs age and 
perspective-taking stage independent ANOVAs were conducted. Although some statisticians 
recommend MANOVA when there are multiple DVs to protect against Type 1 error (e.g., 
Tabachnick & Fidell, 2007), this approach has been criticised (see Huberty & Morris, 1989). 
Individual one-way ANOVA also makes sense given the interest is in the DVs as distinct and 
individual constructs rather than their linear combination (i.e., MANOVA). In support of the 
latter, the correlations between the social anxiety constructs for each of the age and 
perspective-taking groups are much less than .90 (see Tables 7.3 and 7.4 respectively).  
 
Table 7.3 
Correlations Between the Social Anxiety Constructs and Age  
 8 to 10 yrs 11 to 12 yrs 13 to 15 yrs 
 N = 69 N = 60 N = 42 
Variable 1. 2. 3.  1. 2. 3. 1. 2. 3. 
1. FNE 1   1   1   
2.SAD-New .61* 1  .73* 1  .63* 1  
3.Obs Anxiety .47* .47* 1 .66* .69* 1 .49* .54* 1 
Note.  * p < .001. 
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Table 7.4 
Correlations Between the Social Anxiety Constructs and Perspective-Taking   
 PT1 PT2 PT3 PT4 
 N = 10  N = 81 N = 67  N = 13 
Variable 1. 2. 3. 1. 2. 3. 1. 2. 3. 1. 2. 3. 
1. FNE 1   1   1   1   
2.SAD-New .74* 1  .58** 1  .63** 1  .48† 1  
3.Obs Anxiety .21 .36 1 .46** .56** 1 .52** .54** 1 .43 .04 1 
Note. *p < .01. **p < .001.  †p < .08. 
 
 
Social Anxiety and Age 
 
Does social anxiety increase with age and more specifically, across the defined age groups 8-
10, 11 to 12 and 13 to 15 years of age?  
     
        In light of the study’s a priori hypotheses about changes in social anxiety across age a 
number of planned comparisons were specified (see Table 7.5). Social anxiety was expected 
to conform to a linear trend and planned contrasts (reverse Helmert) compared the two 
preadolescent groups versus the adolescent group and the two preadolescent groups against 
one another. As these comparisons are directional, specified a priori and are orthogonal, p 
was evaluated at .05, one-tailed. The assumption of homogeneity of variance was met for each 
of the social anxiety constructs across age.  
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Table 7.5 
Means (standard deviations) Correlations, Univariate Comparisons and Effect Sizes of Social 
Anxiety Scales Across Age Groups 
 Means (Standard Deviations)     
 
Age Group: 
 
1. 8 to 10  
 
2. 11 to 12 
 
3. 13 to 15  
Pearson 
Correlation, 
ra 
Univariate 
F-Tests  
F(2, 168) 
Planned 
Comparisonsb 
Effect Size 
(d) of 
Differencesc 
N:  (n = 69) (n = 60) (n = 42) (n = 171)    
FNE 21.99 (6.62) 20.87 (7.20) 20.12 (6.32)  -.12  1.07 (ns) n.s - 
SAD-New 16.51 (4.85) 16.18 (4.60) 17.19 (3.93)  .02    .54 (ns) n.s - 
Obs Anxiety 11.94 (4.22) 12.57(4.78) 13.29(4.16)  .11  1.22 (ns) n.s - 
Note. a The pearson correlation coefficient between each of the social anxiety scales and age measured continuously (N = 
171).   
b Reverse Helmert (i.e., 1. and 2. vs. 3. and 1. vs. 2.).    
c d = M1 - M2 / (SD1+SD2)/2. 
 
       One-way analyses of variance revealed no significant main effect for FNE, F(2, 168) = 
1.07, p = .18, SAD-New, F(2, 168) = .61, p = .54, or Observational Social Anxiety, F(2, 168) 
= 1.22, p = .305. Comparisons revealed that adolescents did not experience significantly more 
FNE, t(168) = -.47, p (one-tailed) = .32, SAD-New, t(168) = 1.04, p (one-tailed) = .15,  or 
Observational Social Anxiety, t(168) = 1.03, p (one-tailed) = .10 than preadolescents, 
although mean values were in the expected direction for the latter comparisons. Of the two 
preadolescent groups, older pre-adolescents (11 to 12 year-olds) did not experience more 
FNE, t(168) = -1.12, p (one-tailed) = .18, SAD-New, t(168) = -.32, p (one-tailed) = .34, or 
Observational anxiety, t(168) = .63, p (one-tailed) = .21, than their younger counterparts (8 to 
10 year-olds). Thus, the hypothesis that social anxiety would increase with age, from 
preadolescence to adolescence in particular, was not supported for any type of social anxiety.  
                                                 
5 A linear trend was also not supported for FNE, F(2, 168) = .83, p = .36, SAD-New, F(2, 168) = .59, p = .44, or 
Observational Anxiety, F(2, 168) = 1.70, p = .19.  
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Perspective-Taking and Social Anxiety 
Is Perspective-Taking Stage 2 a requisite for the experience of social anxiety? 
        This question can be answered in reference to perspective-taking Stage 1 (PT1) scores on 
the social anxiety measures presented in Table 7.6. The total scores on each of the social 
anxiety scales are provided for each individual from the PT1 stage (N = 10). It is important to 
note that, depending on the scale, “no anxiety” is indicated by scores that fall at the lower end 
of the scales range. The lowest and highest scores for each of the scales are 8 and 40 (FNE), 6 
and 30 (SAD-New) and 6 and 30 (Observational SA). Thus, average scores of 8 and 6 indicate 
absolutely no anxiety present (i.e., subjects responded 1 for each item = Not at All or Never). 
Scores above 8 and 6 indicate that the participant reported having at least some social anxiety 
(i.e., indicating a 2, 3, 4 etc on at least 1 item). Given the small number of participants in PT1 
their total scores for each of the social anxiety constructs is provided in Table 7.6.        
       As can be seen from the table most individuals within PT1 scored near the lower end of 
the scales. Some even reported experiencing no social anxiety (None or Never) for each item 
(N = 3 for Observational). These scores of effectively zero anxiety provide convincing 
evidence that some individuals with PT1 experienced no social anxiety as hypothesized. 
However, most participants at PT1 did indicate experiencing some anxiety given scores were 
greater than the scale’s minimum. Understanding what these deviations mean in terms of how 
much social anxiety these individuals experienced, and whether it qualifies them as 
experiencing social anxiety in a consistent and ongoing manner, as the constructs are 
commonly understood, requires some inductive inference.  
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Table 7.6 
Total scores for Social Anxiety: PT1 
Participant Total Scores for Social Anxiety at PT1 
 FNEa 
(Possible range = 8 to 40) 
SAD-Newa  
(Possible range = 6 to 30) 
Observational SA b 
(Possible range = 6 to 30)  
1 13 11 7 
2 16 12 8 
3 13 12 13 
4 10 8 8 
5 10 8 6 
6 17 16 7 
7 17 14 6 
8 18 16 12 
9 10 14 8 
10 12 8 6 
        MEAN  13.60 11.90 8.10 
        SD 3.17 3.14 2.47 
Note. aSASC-R Scales: 1 = Not at all, 2 = hardly ever, 3 = sometimes, 4 = ‘most of the time’ and 5 = ‘All the 
time’.  
bObservational Anxiety: 1 = ‘never’, 2 = ‘rarely’, 3 = ‘sometimes’, 4 = ‘often’ and 5 = ‘regularly’. 
 
         Specifically, a consideration of the total scores in Table 7.6 indicates that PT1 
individuals did not regularly indicate a “2” on all items of the scale. This fact can be inferred 
with reference to the total score that are (or not) twice the value of the scales minimum. 
According to the scores in the table above this occurs 4 times for FNE, 6 for SAD-New and 2 
for Observational SA. This is equivalent to participants saying that they ‘Hardly Ever or 
Rarely’ experienced social anxiety in most of the scenarios presented by the item. If this is 
true then it would provide additional data illustrating that that those within PT1 are without 
the mechanism required to truly or consistently experience social anxiety.  
117 
 
      One problem with this interpretation is that, in elevating their scores above the scales 
minimum participants may have indicated anywhere between a 2 and 5. For some items the 
participant may have indicated that they (3) ‘sometimes’, (4) ‘often/most of the time’, or, (5) 
‘regularly/all the time’, experienced social anxiety in the scenario presented in the item. The 
conclusion from this scenario would have to be that some individuals with PT1 abilities 
experience social anxiety with at least some regularity (e.g., ‘sometimes’). As such, in order 
to get a sense of variation that occurred for each scale, the frequencies of endorsing each item 
(e.g., I worry…) at a particular value (e.g., 1 = rarely) are presented in Table 7.7 below for the 
FNE scale. 
  
Table 7.7 
Frequencies for Each Item on the FNE Scale 
 Response on Scalea 
    FNE Scale Item  1. 2. 3. 4. 5. 
1. I worry about being teased 5  3  2  0 0 
2. I feel other kids talk…behind my back 5 4 1 0 0 
3. I worry about what other kids think of me 2 7 1 0 0 
4. I’m afraid that others will not like me 6 3 1 0 0 
5. I worry about what others say about me 3 6 1 0 0 
6. I worry that other kids don’t like me 4 5 1 0 0 
7. I feel that other kids make fun of me 6 4 0 0 0 
8.  After arguing... I worry they will not like me 4 3 2 1 0 
Note. a Response Scale: 1 = Not at all, 2 = hardly ever, 3 = sometimes, 4 = ‘most of the time’ and 5 = ‘All the 
time’.  
 
        This table illustrates that individuals with PT1 typically endorsed FNE items with either a 
1 (Not at all) or a 2 (Hardly ever). Items 1 and 8 were exceptions with 2 people out of 10 
endorsing ‘Sometimes’ experiencing social anxiety for these scenarios. One person also 
endorsed Item 8 (“If I get into an argument with another kid, I worry that he or she will not 
like me”) as occurring, (4) ‘Most of time’. Interestingly, this item is the most concrete social 
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evaluation item as it refers to a specific interpersonal scenario. In comparison to the other 
items it appears to depend less on the individual’s ability to form a mental representation of 
another person’s evaluation of the self which is determined by PT ability. Either way the 
pattern of responses for FNE appear to generally support the interpretation above that, at the 
level of particular items, FNE is experienced generally “Not at all” or “Hardly Ever” by those 
with PT1 abilities.    
       As can be seen in Table 7.8 there is much more variation for SAD-New. Specifically, a 
greater number of participants (out of the 10) are likely to indicate at least experiencing 
anxiety (3) ‘Sometimes’ in a number of the scenarios represented in the items. The most 
notable item is item 2 (I feel shy around kids I don’t know) given that four out ten people 
answered with a (3) and one individual indicated a (4) (Most of the Time). Only item 2 
provoked a score greater than 3. Item 1 (I worry about doing something new in front of other 
kids) is also notable given that 6 out 10 PT1 individuals endorsed experiencing anxiety at 
least ‘Sometimes’ for this situation. For the other remaining items (3, 4, 5, 6) responses of (1) 
Not at all, and (2) hardly ever are endorsed more frequently with between 60% and 90% of 
individuals endorsing this level of anxiety for these situations. This means that, with the 
exception of items 1 and 2, the majority of PT1 individuals also experience SAD-New “Not at 
all” or “Hardly Ever”, although the differences are not as clear compared to FNE.    
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Table 7.8 
Frequencies for Each Item on the SAD-New Scale 
 Response on Scalea 
    SAD-New Scale Item  1. 2. 3. 4. 5. 
1.Worry...doing something new in front of others 2 2 6 0 0 
2.I feel shy around kids I don’t know 4 1 4 1 0 
3.I only talk to kids that I know really well 3 4 3 0 0 
4.I get nervous when I talk to kids I don’t know well 4 2 4 0 0 
5.I get nervous when I meet new kids 4 4 2 0 0 
6.I feel nervous when I’m around certain kids 6 3 1 0 0 
Note. aResponse Scale: 1 = Not at all, 2 = hardly ever, 3 = sometimes, 4 = ‘most of the time’ and 5 = ‘All the 
time’.  
 
 
              The final type of social anxiety, Observational SA, is summarised in Table 7.9. The 
figures in this Table are much more similar to FNE and they are perhaps more convincing. 
The item with the greatest variability is item 1 (I get anxious doing things with others 
watching) where 2 individuals with PT1 abilities endorsed experiencing anxiety in this 
situation (3) ‘Sometimes’. Otherwise, this item was endorsed as provoking anxiety Never 
(60%) or Rarely (20%). The only other items that provoked responses greater than a 1 or 2 
were items 4 and 5 and on these items only one person was responsible. Specifically, for the 
item “I fear I might do something stupid in front of others” one person endorsed this as 
occurring (4) ‘Often’, while for the item “Entering a room full of people” one participant 
endorsed this as causing anxiety (5) ‘All the time’. Otherwise, for these and remaining items 
scores of (1) Never occurred between 70% and 90% of the time. Thus, for those with PT1 
abilities, experiencing Observational SA even (2) ‘Rarely’, was rare.    
       Taken together, these findings suggest that PT2 may be required for the experience of 
social anxiety. We now turn to the question about whether particular forms of social anxiety 
are associated with specific levels of perspective-taking. 
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Table 7.9 
Frequencies for Each Item on the Observational SA Scale 
 Response on Scalea 
    Observational SA Scale Item  1. 2. 3. 4. 5. 
1.I get anxious doing things with others watching 6 2 2 0 0 
2.I might do something stupid in front of others  8 1 0 1 0 
3.Entering a room full of people  7 2 0 0 1 
4.Eating in front of others  8 2 0 0 0 
5.Wearing different clothes 9 1 0 0 0 
6.Writing in front of others  8 2 0 0 0 
Note. a Response Scale: Observational Anxiety: 1 = ‘never’, 2 = ‘rarely’, 3 = ‘sometimes’, 4 = ‘often’ and 5 = 
‘regularly’. 
 
Does social anxiety increase across levels of PT? 
       In light of the study’s a priori hypotheses about changes in social anxiety across levels of 
PT a number of planned comparisons were specified (see Table 7.10). In evaluating these 
predictions, sample size and tests of homogeneity of variance needed to be considered. 
Specifically, sample sizes are small and variable between the levels of PT (see Table 7.2). The 
assumption of homogeneity of variance was also violated for SAD-New6, Levene’s F(3, 167) 
= 3.40, p  < .05. Given that the larger groups (PT2 and PT3) contained greater variance than 
the smaller groups (PT1 and PT4) Brown-Forsyth (FBF) method was used to calculate the F-
ratio for SAD-New. In evaluating the significance of all comparisons Dunn-Sidak’s sequential 
method was applied which controls for Type 1 error when contrasts are non-orthogonal. In 
this case the p values required for contrast 1, 2 and 3 were p < .02, .03 and .05, respectively. 
Table 7.10 summarises the mean and standard deviations for each of the social anxiety 
constructs across levels of PT and the planned comparisons.     
 
                                                 
6 Note the assumptions of normality and independence of observations were sought within groups and established 
previously.  
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Table 7.10  
Means (standard deviations), Univariate Comparisons and Effect Sizes of Social Anxiety 
Scales Across Perspective-Taking 
 Means (Standard Deviations)    
 
PT Stage 
   
1. PT1                2. PT2             3. PT3                 4. PT4 
F-Tests  
F(3, 167) 
Planned 
Comparionsa 
Effect Size (db) 
of Differences 
N:      10                     81                  67                          13    
FNE 13.60 (3.17) 23.30 (6.67) 20.37(6.39) 17.62(5.03) 9.50** 1-2; 2-3 .71; .43 
SAD-New 11.90 (3.14)  17.64 (4.75) 16.33 (4.24) 14.62 (2.26) 9.91** 1-2 .61 
Obs. Anx 8.10 (2.47)  13.27 (4.66) 12.49 (4.09) 11.00 (3.61) 3.47* 1-2 .47 
Note. a Significant differences between PT groups are reported (e.g., 1-2 means that PT1 differed from PT2 at 
least at p < 05.    
b d = M1 - M2 / (SD1+SD2)/2. 
*p < .001; **p < .0001. 
 
 
       There was a significant main effect of PT for all three social anxiety constructs: FNE 
F(3,167) = 9.50, p < .0001, ω = .13, SAD-New FBF(3, 90) = 9.91, p < .0001, ω = .08 and 
Observational Anxiety, F(3, 167) = 3.47, p <.01, (ω = .06). The difference between PT1 and 
PT2 were significant and in the expected direction for FNE, t(167) = - 4.57, p <.0001), SAD-
New, t(167) = -3.95, p < .0001, and Observational SA, t(167) = -3.03, p = .003. The effect 
sizes associated with these comparisons (i.e., PT1 vs. PT2) were all medium in magnitude (d 
= .40-.79) according to Cohen’s interpretive guidelines (Cohen, 1992) (see Table 7.10). Thus, 
the hypothesis that social anxiety would increase from PT1 to PT2 was supported.   
       The expected linear increase in social anxiety across PT2 to PT3 was not supported for 
SAD- New, F(1, 167) = 1.53, p = .22, or Observational SA, F(1, 167) = 1.53, p = .22. 
However, the hypothesis that FNE would illustrate a preponderance at PT2 compared to the 
following stages was supported with the comparison of PT2 vs. PT3revealing a significant 
decrease, t(167) = -2.77, p = .006, d = .43. This decreasing trend was also observed for the 
remaining social anxiety constructs between PT2 and PT3, however, these differences were 
not significant at p > .05. Thus, the hypothesis that SAD-New and Observational SA would 
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increase as a consequence of the development of PT3 was not supported (see Figure 7.1). 
Bonforroni adjusted post-hoc analyses revealed that PT3 and PT4 and PT1 and PT4 also did 
not differ in their levels of social anxiety.  
 
 
Figure 7.1. The Mean of Social Anxiety at Each Stage of Perspective-Taking. 
 
        As can be seen in Figure 7.1 social anxiety increases and then decreases across PT and 
this is true of all three social anxiety constructs. Although mean differences after PT2 were 
only significant for FNE and only then between PT2 and PT3 these incremental decreases are 
of significance. Consider that a) the social anxiety experienced by those with PT4 is 
equivalent to that experienced by PT1, but that b) the social anxiety experienced by those with 
PT4 is no less than that experienced by those with PT3, which is, again no more/less than that 
experienced by those with PT2 (with the exception of FNE), which is, on the other hand, 
much greater than PT1! This means that, while no mean differences are detectable between 
any single stage between PT2 and PT4 social anxiety does, nevertheless decrease quite 
significantly across these stages. Given this trend follow up analysis fitting a quadratic trend 
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to the data were significant for each form of social anxiety: FNE, F(1,167) = 18.99, p = .00, 
SAD-New F(1, 167) = 14.46, p = .00 and Observational SA, F(1, 167) = 8.12, p = .01. This 
suggests that the relationship between developments in perspective-taking and social anxiety 
is curvilinear, with social anxiety first emerging with the advance from Stage 1 to Stage 2 but 
then declining with further advances at Stages 3 and 4.  
 
Moderated-Mediation Model of Social Anxiety 
 
       The hypotheses tested earlier illustrated that developments in perspective-taking, rather 
than age, explained variation, specifically an increase, in social anxiety. In fact, a quadratic 
trend was observed for all forms of social anxiety with a large increase from PT1 to PT2 with 
a decline from PT2 to PT3 (statistically significant for FNE only) and then from PT3 to PT4. 
This decrease was, however, incremental and there were no detectable differences between 
any PT Stage except for PT1 and PT2. In light of this gradual decline in social anxiety across 
PT, PT may moderate social anxiety, at least FNE. Specifically, advances in the ability take 
others’ perspectives may at first provide the cognitive mechanism for social anxiety to occur 
developmentally and, with further developments, it may buffer social anxiety. FNE may 
decrease at PT3, for example, because these individuals are better at observing and getting a 
distanced view of interpersonal relations. These developments may provide the individual 
with psychological skills which negate anxiety about being teased or talked about by others. 
These skills may, for instance, mean they get less “caught-up” in anticipating what may 
happen or in analyzing what is potentially going on behind their backs. The moderating 
effects of perspective-taking may also be apparent in differences in the psychological 
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processes hypothesised to account for the experience of social anxiety depicted in Figure 6.1 
(above) and again in Figure 7.2 below.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 7.2. Moderated Mediation Model Predicting Social Anxiety Within Stages of 
Perspective-Taking. 
 
       Figure 7.2 depicts the proposed relations between self-monitoring (self-presentation and 
public self-consciousness), social self-efficacy (conflict and non-conflict) and social anxiety, 
as well as moderation of these relations by social integration. It is expected that the effects 
that self-presentation and public self-consciousness have on social anxiety will be mediated 
by social self-efficacy (conflict and non-conflict) and that these effects will hold across both 
negative (‘low’) and positive (‘high’) levels of satisfaction with social integration (the 
moderator). Thus, tested is a ‘conditional indirect effect’ (see Preacher et al., 2007).  
         In order to ensure that moderating effects are not missed, in the absence of prior 
research, social integration is specified as a possible moderator of the path from self-
monitoring to social self-efficacy (path ‘d’) and also the path from efficacy to social anxiety 
(path ‘e’). In these analyses it is possible that social integration will act as a moderator of 
paths a and b. For instance, self-monitoring, which is proposed to serve an integrative 
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function, may be associated with negative appraisals of efficacy only at lower (but not the 
highest) levels of social integration because engaging in this thinking highlights the 
disconnection from peers. This can be contrasted with higher levels of social integration 
where the individual, because of their relative security, may engage less in this type of 
thinking and/or when doing so be less likely to doubt their social skills as a consequence. By 
the same token, the attenuating effect that efficacy is proposed to have on social anxiety may 
be more exaggerated for those lower in social integration compared to those higher in social 
integration because a sense of confidence may be more important in conditions of relative 
social deprivation.   
       In testing the moderated mediation model, the moderation and mediation effects were 
tested separately in sequences of three steps following the guidelines and analytic procedures 
outlined by Preacher et al. (2007). Tested first was the ‘mediator model’, that is, whether self-
monitoring predicted efficacy and, importantly, whether social integration moderated this 
relationship (step one). The second step was to evaluate the ‘dependent variable model’, that 
is, whether social self-efficacy significantly predicted social anxiety, and whether this 
relationship was moderated by social integration. Provided that Step 1 and Step 2 were 
significant, conditionally or not, the third step was to evaluate explicitly whether self-
monitoring had a significant effect on social anxiety through social self-efficacy, and, 
importantly, whether this was true at a range of positive and negative values of social 
integration.    
      For the first two steps, that is, estimation of both the mediator (i.e., path a) and dependent 
variable (i.e., path b) models, including their moderation (i.e., path d and path e), ordinary 
least squares moderated regressions were conducted (e.g., Aiken & West, 1991). Separate 
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moderated regression analyses were conducted for each self-efficacy mediator and each 
dependent variable, social anxiety. Specifically, in step 1, self-efficacy was regressed onto 
one of the self-monitoring predictors as well as their product with social integration (i.e., self-
presentation* social integration). In step 2, social anxiety was regressed on self-monitoring 
and self-efficacy, and the latter’s product with social integration. In both Step 1 and 2, with 
the exception of control variables entered in the first step (discussed below), all predictors and 
product terms were entered at once. All variables contributing to interaction terms were mean 
centered prior to analyses to aid interpretation of regression coefficients. In step 3, determined 
was the strength of the conditional indirect effects as products of the paths linking self-
monitoring with social self-efficacy (path a) and social self-efficacy with social anxiety (path 
b) at specific positive and negative values of social integration. For these analyses the 
bootstrapping procedure described by Preacher et al. (2007) was used, along with the SPSS 
macro provided by the authors. This analytic procedure implements bootstrapping to test the 
strength and significance of “conditional indirect effects” (i.e., a*b at specified levels of a 
moderator). 
       The bootstrapping procedure draws k samples (usually 1,000 or greater) from the original 
sample of N units, with replacement, and the coefficients (paths a–e in Fig. 7.2) are calculated 
for each of the k samples. The average coefficients are then calculated as the mean across the 
k samples. Conditional indirect effects are calculated as the product of the unstandardized 
regression weight for the path from the predictor to the mediator and the unstandardized 
regression weight for the path from the mediator to the outcome variable (i.e., coefficient for 
a*b) separately across levels of the moderator (social integration in this study). In testing the 
meditational hypothesis this procedure is preferred over alternatives (e.g., Sobel Test), 
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especially in smaller samples, as it does not make assumptions (e.g., normal distribution of 
a*b) which decrease statistical power (see Hayes, 2009; McKinnon, Lockwood, Hoffman, 
West, & Sheets, 2002; MacKinnon, Lockwood, & Williams, 2004; Shrout & Bolger, 2002). 
In this study 5,000 draws were specified to generate a bias-corrected 95% confidence interval 
for the conditional indirect effects.   
       There is only limited research into the power of moderated mediation analyses and, as 
such, it has been identified as an area requiring future research (Preacher et al., 2007). In their 
simulation study, however, Preacher et al. (2007) report that, for moderated mediation models 
where both a1 and b1 are tested for moderated mediation simultaneously (by the same 
predictor), with a desired power of .80 or greater, sample sizes between 200 and 500 are 
indicated for a small effect (B = .14) with only 50 or greater needed to detect a moderate (B = 
.39) and large (B = .59) effect. For models where either the a1 or b1 paths are moderated, with 
a desired power of .80 or greater, required sample sizes are larger, albeit similar, in that 500 or 
greater are required to detect a small effect (B = .14) with 50 to 100 being required to detect a 
moderate (B = .39) and large effect (B = .59). Thus, assuming a moderate effect, sample sizes 
of between 50 to 100 and greater are at least required in order to have adequate power. Thus, 
one can tentatively conclude that there is enough power to detect an effect that is moderate or 
greater for perspective-taking groups 2 (N = 81) and 3 (N = 67) only. Given the small number 
of participants in perspective-taking groups 1 (N = 10) and 4 (N = 13) only a limited set of 
analyses were undertaken for these groups (see below).       
       Note, that by conducting moderation analyses before testing conditional indirect effects 
these analyses may also be classed as ‘mediated moderation’, as opposed to ‘moderated 
mediation’ (Baron & Kenny, 1986). Muller, Judd, and Yzerbyt (2005) point out, however, 
128 
 
that the distinctions between mediated moderation and moderated mediation are blurred given 
they rely on the same analytic models. Given the nature of the moderating models just 
described (i.e., that social integration may moderate both a and b paths) the appropriate 
strategy is to probe more closely where the mediating effect is significant. This is moderated 
mediation or the analysis of “conditional indirect effects” just described. Importantly, by 
determining where the mediation is conditionally significant (or not), on the moderator, the 
use of arbitrary cutoffs (e.g., the mean and +/-1 SD) is unnecessary. In this way, even if social 
integration moderates the paths as hypothesized (i.e., with a negative process occurring at 
lower levels of social integration), the mediated effect may still occur across both positive and 
negative levels of social integration as hypothesised.   
       The results are presented in 3 sections for each stage of perspective-taking separately. 
The mediator model, detailing the prediction of self-efficacy by self-monitoring and its 
possible moderation by social integration, is presented first. Presented second is the prediction 
of social anxiety by self-monitoring, self-efficacy, social integration and their product. Third, 
conditional indirect effects are presented. Note that interaction effects could not be tested for 
Stage 1 and 4 given small sample size. The mediator and dependent variables models are, 
however, presented without product terms included.   
 
Social Perspective-Taking Stage 1 
Step 1: Predicting Self-Efficacy from Self-Monitoring and Social Integration 
       The parameter estimates for the regression models with self-efficacy (non-conflict and 
conflict) regressed on the self-monitoring, social integration and their interaction are 
summarized in Table 7.11. Note that in these analyses age and one of the self-monitoring 
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variables (e.g., public self-consciousness) were controlled and entered in the first block while 
the remaining self-monitoring variable and the other predictors were entered in the second 
block7. As can be seen in Table 7.11 neither form of self-efficacy was predicted by the self-
monitoring variables or social integration. This is likely on account of the small sample size 
and an increase in the error terms (see associated standard errors). This error may also explain 
the standardized beta weights being greater than one in the prediction of conflict efficacy 
from self-presentation and social integration.   
Table 7.11 
Regression Results for the Prediction of Self-Efficacy by Self-Presentation, Public Self-
Consciousness and Social Integration  
 Mediator Variable Model (DV = Conflict Negotiation Skills) 
Predictor B b SE t p 
Self-Presentation -3.96 -1.99 3.84 -1.03 .36 
Public .66 .28 1.99 .31 .77 
Integration -3.08 -1.77 2.69 -1.14 .32 
 Mediator Variable Model (DV = Non-Conflict Negotiation Skills)  
Predictor  B b SE t p 
Self-Presentation  .49 .33 3.48 .14 .89 
Public  -.50 -.31 1.74 -.29 .79 
Integration  .20 -.15 2.44 .08 .94 
Note. n = 10. 
 
Step 2: Predicting Social Anxiety from Self-Efficacy, Self-Monitoring and Social Integration  
       Although there were no significant relationships at Step 1, still of interest was whether 
social anxiety was predicted by any of the psychosocial variables at Stage 1. For the analyses 
age was the only covariate and was entered in the first block. All other variables were entered 
together. As can be seen from Table 7.12, social anxiety was not significantly predicted by 
                                                 
7 Note that only one simple effect for social integration is represented in the table despite separate moderation analyses for each of the IVs. 
The simple, or ‘main effect’, estimates for social integration in predicting the mediators are of course different depending on whether public 
self-consciousness or self-presentation are the predictors being estimated. These differences are not great and have not been presented 
because the presentation of this data would only increase the amount of information to consider while making no difference to interpretation 
of the results. The simple effect represented in Table 7.11 for social integration was chosen arbitrarily and is that for the analysis for self-
presentation.  
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any of the psychosocial variables. Again, this is likely due to the small sample size and large 
standard errors.  
 
Table 7.12 
Regression Results for the Prediction of Social Anxiety from Self-Efficacy, Self-Monitoring  
and Social Integration 
 
Social Perspective-Taking Stage 2 
Step 1: Predicting Self-Efficacy from Self-Monitoring and Social Integration  
       The parameter estimates for the regression models with self-efficacy (non-conflict and 
conflict) regressed on the self-monitoring, social integration and their interaction are 
summarized in Table 7.13. Note that in these analyses age and one of the self-monitoring 
    Dependent Variable Model (DV = FNE)  
Predictor B b SE t p 
Conflict  .04 .10 .23 .19 .86 
Non-conflict -.01 -.02 .26 -.04 .97 
Self-Pres -.01 -.02 .55 -.01 .99 
Public .31 .34 .63 .49 .66 
Integration -.48 -.66 1.11 -.43 .67 
 Dependent Variable Model (DV = SAD-New)  
Predictor B b SE t p 
Conflict .046 .11 .17 .27 .81 
Non-conflict -.32 -.58 .20 -1.65 .20 
Self-Pres -.55 -.67 1.16 -.48 .67 
Public .16 .18 .48 .34 .75 
Integration -.93 -1.29 .83 -1.11 .35 
 Dependent Variable Model (DV = Observational SA)  
Predictor B b SE t p 
Conflict .06 .19 .20 .30 .78 
Non-conflict -.17 -.38 .23 -.72 .52 
Self-Pres .34 .53 1.37 .25 .82 
Public .44 .62 .56 .79 .49 
Integration .31 .55 .98 .32 .77 
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variables (e.g., public self-consciousness) were controlled and entered in the first block while 
the remaining self-monitoring variable and the other predictors and their interaction terms 
were entered in the second block. Note, while interaction terms are traditionally entered in 
their own block this is unnecessary in the present context (see Hayes and Mathes, 2009). 
Again, the estimate for social integration represents its relation to self-efficacy when self-
presentation was the predictor (see Footnote above). The estimates for controlled variables 
(e.g.,  age) are not included given the amount of data and it does not contribute to the 
discussion.  
 
Table 7.13 
Moderated Regression Results for the Prediction of the Self-Efficacy Mediators  
 Mediator Variable Model (DV = Conflict Negotiation Skills) 
Predictor  B  b SE t p 
Self-Presentation -.08 -.04 .23 -.35 .73 
Public -.03 -.02 .17 -.16 .87 
Integration .85 .50 .18 4.78 .00** 
Pres*Integration .04 .07 .06 .62 .54 
Public*Integration .02 .05 .04 .45 .66 
 Mediator Variable Model (DV = Non-Conflict Negotiation Skills)  
Predictor  B  b SE t p 
Self-Presentation  -.33 -.22 .15 -2.19 .03* 
Public  .19 .17 .11 1.72 .09 † 
Integration  .73 .56 .11 6.45 .00** 
Pres*Integration  .07 .19 .04 1.94 .06 † 
Public*Integration .03 .11 .03 1.14       .26 
Note. n = 81. 
*p < .05. **p < .01. †p < .10.        
        
       As can be seen from Table 7.13, for those with PT2 abilities neither self-presentation (B = 
-.08, b = -.04, SE = .22, p = .72) or public self-consciousness (B = -.03, b = -.02, SE =.16, p = 
.87) predicted perceptions of conflict negotiation (‘a path’). Social integration also did not 
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moderate the prediction of these efficacy beliefs, for either of the self-monitoring variables. 
These non-significant findings indicate that, for those with PT2 ability, self-monitoring is 
unrelated to perceptions of conflict negotiation skills both directly and conditionally across 
social integration. Regressions of social anxiety on these efficacy perceptions were also non-
significant; FNE (B = .07, b = .08, SE = .11, p = .53), SAD-New (B = -.02, b = -.03, SE = .09, 
p = .83) and Observational Social Anxiety (B = -.003, b = .004, SE = .09, p = .97). This means 
that these efficacy beliefs are unimportant as an aspect of self-monitoring and social anxiety 
for those with PT2 abilities.  
       A different set of findings were apparent when considering perceptions of non-conflict 
negotiation skills. Both self-presentation (B = -.33, b = -.22, SE = .15, p = .03) and public self-
consciousness (B = .19, b = .17, SE = .11, p = .09), the latter marginally, predicted perceptions 
of non-conflict negotiation skills. The signs of these betas were in opposite directions. This 
means that these forms of self-monitoring are associated with favourable and unfavourable 
perceptions of these social skills, respectively. These efficacy beliefs were also strong 
predictors of social anxiety (discussed below, Table 7.15). First, however, there was evidence 
that social integration moderated the link between self-presentation and perceptions of non-
conflict negotiation (B = .07, b = .19, SE = .04, p = .06). Analyses of the simple slopes (Aiken 
& West, 1991) were performed at conditional values of social integration, including the mean 
(zero in this case) as well as +/- the SD (+/- 4.00), and are plotted in Figure 7.3. 
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Figure 7.3. Simple Slopes of Self-Presentation Predicting Non-Conflict Efficacy at the Mean 
and +/- 1 SD of Social Integration.   
 
       These analyses revealed that engaging in higher levels of monitoring self-presentation 
was associated with a decrease in perceptions of non-conflict negotiation skills only for those 
of low (B = -.64, SE = .25, p = .01) and, less so, moderate social integration (B = -.33, SE 
=.15, p = .03). The efficacy perceptions of those high in social integration were, however, 
unaffected by whether they engaged in higher levels of self-presentation (B = -.02, SE = .18, p 
= .90). This finding may be interpreted as supporting the study’s hypothesis that monitoring 
of self-presentation is associated with negative self-efficacy beliefs only when the individual 
is suffering from relative social deprivation and has a desire for greater social connection. 
Engaging in this form of thinking may, on the other hand, be less threatening for those at high 
levels of social integration because they are otherwise satisfied and confident in their social 
relationships.    
       As can be seen in Table 7.13, the interaction between public self-consciousness and 
social integration (Public*Integration) in the prediction of non-conflict efficacy perceptions 
was not significant (B = .03, b = .11, SE = .03, p = .26). This suggests that the marginally 
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significant positive effects incurred by public self-consciousness for perceptions of non-
conflict negotiation skills are equivalent across high and low levels of social integration. Yet, 
this interaction only tests whether moderation occurs linearly and/or systematically (e.g., as 
observed in Figure 7.3 for self-presentation). An alternate test, consistent with the study’s 
aims, relates to whether public self-consciousness is associated with positive appraisals of 
efficacy at all levels of social integration. This empirical question is not encapsulated in the 
interaction effect just described (Hayes, 2011, personal communication).  
        In testing whether public self-consciousness is associated with positive effects at all 
levels of social integration the JN technique can be implemented (Johnson & Neyman, 1936; 
Potthoff, 1964). This procedure provides the values of the moderator at which the simple 
slopes of the focal predictor (public self-consciousness) predicting the DV (non-conflict 
efficacy), transitions from being significant to not being significant (see Hayes & Matthes, 
2009). This procedure thus allows one to answer the question of precisely when, or at what 
level(s), of social integration does public self-consciousnesses confer benefits to perceptions 
of social self-efficacy, or when does it not act in this way. The Macro MODPROBE (Hayes & 
Matthes, 2009) generates these values implementing the same OLS regression procedures 
used in the above analyses.  
       These analyses revealed that at values of social integration between 1.04 and 5.3 public 
self-consciousness significantly predicted positive appraisals of these social skills at p < .05 
(see Table 7.14). Interpreted in light of the mean being equal to zero, and the SD being equal 
to 4.17, these results indicate that only for those with a social integration score greater the 
mean, and then  up to approximately 1SD above the mean, does public self-consciousness 
predict greater perceptions of efficacy. Conversely, for individuals who have social 
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integration scores either at or below the mean, or too far above the mean, this relationship 
does not carry. Thus, the positive effects of public self-consciousness are true only at 
‘moderately high’ levels of social integration.          
 
Table 7.14 
Conditional Effects of Public Self-Consciousness on Self-Efficacy Non-Conflict at Values of 
Social Integration (JN Method) 
Integration B SE t p LLCI(b) ULCI(b) 
-1.06 .16 .12 1.34 .19 .08 .39 
-.01 .19 .11 1.72 .09 -.03 .41 
1.04 .19 .11 1.99 .05 .00 .44 
5.30 .36 .18 2.00 .05 .00 .73 
6.29 .40 .21 1.92 .06 -.01 .81 
8.39 .47 .26 1.80 .08 -.05 .98 
Note. n = 81.  
For clarity, this is a truncated version of the output: Only a selection of the range of values of social integration 
(in SD units) is shown.  
Emboldened type signifies statistical significance at p <.01. 
 
Step 2: Predicting Social Anxiety from Self-Efficacy, Self-Monitoring and Social Integration  
         The next step in evaluating the moderated mediation model (Figure 7.2) is to evaluate 
the dependent variable model, that is, whether self-efficacy for non-conflict predicts social 
anxiety (i.e., ‘path b’), and whether this relationship is moderated by social integration (i.e., 
‘path e’). Given that perceptions of conflict efficacy were not significant predictors of social 
anxiety, these perceptions, and age, were covariates in the regressions for social anxiety (see 
Table 7.15 below). In these regression analyses, age and conflict efficacy were entered into 
the first block, followed by the self-monitoring variables, non-conflict negotiation skills, 
social integration and the interaction term “non-conflict*integration”, in the second block. 
This interaction term is the moderation of self-efficacy by social integration in the prediction 
of social anxiety (i.e., path e).  
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       As can be seen in Table 7.15 perceptions of non-conflict negotiation skills were strong 
predictors of FNE (B = -.48, b = -.39, SE = .17, p = .00), SAD-New (B = -.40, b = -.46, SE = 
.13, p = .00) and Observational Social Anxiety (B = -.42, b = -.49, SE = .14, p = .00). There 
was no evidence that social integration moderated the prediction of social anxiety from these 
efficacy perceptions (i.e., “noncon*integr”), indicating that the effect of efficacy on reducing 
social anxiety is equivalent across levels of social integration. Also, social integration, while 
predicting favourable perceptions of both conflict (B = .85, b = .50, SE = .18, p = .00) and 
non-conflict negotiation (B = .73, b = .55, SE .11, p = .00), was significant only in the 
prediction of FNE (B = -.44, b = -.28, SE = .15, p = .00). Conversely, social anxiety associated 
with interaction with new and novel peers (SAD-New) and being observed and scrutinised 
(Observational SA) was not related to (dis)satisfaction with peer group integration. Thus, for 
those with PT2 abilities, current level of social integration may only have an impact (over and 
above efficacy beliefs) on social anxiety tied to negative interactions perceived within the 
school peer group rather than that which extends beyond that setting (e.g., interacting with 
unknown peers). 
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Table 7.15  
Moderated Regression Results for the Prediction of Social Anxiety  
    Dependent Variable Model (DV = FNE) R2 = .52 
Predictor B b SE t p 
Non-conflict -.48 -.39 .17 -2.85 .00* 
Self-Pres -.14 -.08 .17 -.81 .42 
Public .65 .47 .12 5.42 .00* 
Integration -.44 -.28 .15 -2.93 .00* 
Self-Pres*Integr. -.02 -.03 .05 -.33 .74 
Pub*Integr. .01 .03 .03 .32 .75 
Noncon*Integr. .03 .12 .04 .75 .45 
 Dependent Variable Model (DV = SAD-New) R2 = .43 
Predictor B  b SE t p 
Non-conflict -.40 -.46 .13 -3.02 .00* 
Self-Pres -.01 -.01 .14 -.09 .93 
Public .27 .27 .10 2.86 .00* 
Integration -.19 -.17 .12 -1.61 .12 
Self-Pres*Integr. -.01 -.04 .04 -.38 .71 
Pub*Integr. -.02 -.07 .03 -.77 .44 
Noncon*Integr. -.02 -.09 .03 -.52 .61 
 Dependent Variable Model (DV = Observational SA) R2 = .32 
Predictor B  b SE t p 
Non-conflict -.42 -.50 .14 -3.12 .00* 
Self-Pres .06 .05 .14 .41 .68 
Public .38 .39 .10 3.94 .00* 
Integration .05 .05 .12 .43 .67 
Self-Pres*Integr. -.01 -.04 .04 -.34 .74 
Pub*Integr .02 .01 .03 .07 .95 
Noncon*Integr. -.05 -.27 .03 -1.52 .13 
Note. n = 81.  
*p < .01.  
 
 
Step 3: Indirect effects of Self-Monitoring on Social Anxiety through Self-Efficacy at levels of 
Social Integration 
       
       The mediation hypothesis depicted in Figure 7.2 is that self-monitoring is associated with 
increased social anxiety through negative perceptions of self-efficacy, and it was 
hypothesized that this would be true across positive (high) and negative (low) levels of social 
integration. The direction of the parameter estimates above suggests that this may be true in 
both the negative and positive sense. Self-presentation predicted negative efficacy appraisals 
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and public self-consciousness predicted positive appraisals of efficacy, while higher efficacy 
was associated with reduced social anxiety. This is consistent with the interpretation that, self-
presentation had an effect of increasing social anxiety by reducing efficacy, while public self-
consciousness had an effect of reducing social anxiety by increasing efficacy. Supported then 
is the study’s hypothesis that self-monitoring would be associated with heightened social 
anxiety in light of negative efficacy appraisals. This negative process was also significant at 
positive and negative levels of social integration, supporting the study’s hypothesis that 
individuals enjoying relative social security can also experience social anxiety via the 
mediation process described—i.e., there was support for moderated mediation. 
       Of note is that while the effect of self-presentation on social anxiety was entirely due to 
the efficacy*integration interaction, this was not the case for public self-consciousness. This 
is indicated in the  “dependent variable models” (see Table 7.15) showing non-significant 
relationships between self-presentation and its  interaction (self-presentation*social 
integration)  with each form of social anxiety  That self-presentation does not predict social 
anxiety “directly” (in the dependent variable model the associations are all non-significant) is 
consistent with the interpretation that the negative effect of self-presentation on social anxiety 
is entirely due to—i.e., ‘fully mediated’ by—the negative effects of self-presentation on 
efficacy at low and moderate levels of social integration (Baron & Kenny, 1986). While the 
public self-consciousness*social integration interaction was not significant in the prediction 
of social anxiety (indicating full mediation of the positive effects of public self-consciousness 
at higher levels of social integration), public-self-consciousness still predicted heightened 
levels of social anxiety over and above the positive efficacy. This indicates that despite the 
positive effects that public self-consciousness has on reducing social anxiety by increasing 
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efficacy, at higher levels of social integration specifically, the anxiety provoking aspects of 
public self-consciousness are not completely nullified. This is consistent with partial 
mediation of the negative effects of public self-consciousness on social anxiety via increased 
appraisals of efficacy at ‘higher’ (approximately the mean and 1SD above the mean) levels of 
social integration.   
       Given these findings there is support for a moderated mediation process. These effects 
were also probed more explicitly for statistical significance. For both self-presentation and 
public self-consciousness, the conditional indirect effect is calculated by (a1 + a3W)b1, where 
a1 is the path from self-monitoring to self-efficacy (from mediator variable model), a3 is the 
path from the interaction of self-monitoring and social integration to self-efficacy (from 
mediator variable model), W is integration, and b1 is the path from self-efficacy to social 
anxiety (from dependent variable model).  
       Table 7.16 provides the conditional indirect effect of self-presentation on social anxiety, 
via negative perceptions of self-efficacy, at three levels of social integration (the mean, as 
well as 1 SD above and 1 SD below) according to normal theory significance tests (i.e., 
Sobel’s ‘z’) and bias corrected bootstrapped confidence intervals (N = 5000 resamples) (α = 
.05).  
       The normal theory tests of the above conditional indirect effects are marginally 
significant at both ‘low’ and ‘moderate’ levels of social integration, while not nearing 
significance at high levels, for each form of social anxiety. Similarly, the bootstrapped, bias 
corrected, confidence intervals do not contain zero for low and moderate levels of social 
integration, while zero is included at high levels of social integration. Thus, one can conclude 
that these conditional indirect effects are significantly different from zero at p < .05 at low and 
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moderate levels of social integration. Given that the signs of the indirect effects are positive, 
individuals at moderate and low levels of social integration experience greater levels of social 
anxiety when engaging in self-presentation and, in turn, doubting their non-conflict 
negotiation skills. This means that even those who are relatively well integrated (i.e., 
moderately so) experience social anxiety when thinking about managing their self-
presentation and, in turn, having doubts about their ability to manage them through their own 
behaviours.  
 
Table 7.16 
Indirect Effects of Self-Presentation on Social Anxiety via Self-Efficacy at Conditional Levels 
of Social Integration 
         Conditional Indirect Effects for Integration: Normal Theory & Bootstrap (BC) (FNE) 
Integration      Ind. Eff. SE Z p Bias Corrected 
High (+4.00) .04 .07 .52 .60 -.06 .22 
Moderate (0) .15 .08 1.86 .06 .04 .35 
Low (-4.00) .25 . 13 1.92 .06 .06 .57 
 Conditional Indirect Effects for Integration: Normal Theory & Bootstrap (BC) (SAD-New) 
Integration Ind. Eff. SE Z p Bias Corrected 
High (+4.00) .03 .06 .60 .55 -.04 .18 
Moderate (0) .12 .06 1.86 .06 .02 .30 
Low (-4.00) .20 .12 1.91 .06 .04 .50 
 Conditional Indirect Effects for Integration: Normal Theory & Bootstrap (BC) 
(Observational) 
Integration Ind. Eff. SE Z p Bias Corrected 
High (+4.00) .03 .05 .59 .55 -.05 .18 
Moderate (0) .11 .06 1.81 .07 .01 .31 
Low (-4.00) .20 .11 1.86 .06 .02 .54 
Note. Emboldened type signifies statistical significance at p <.05.        
      Table 7.17 provides the conditional indirect effect of public self-consciousness on social 
anxiety, via positive perceptions of social skills, at three levels of social integration (the mean, 
as well as 1 SD above and 1 SD below). As can be seen in Table 7.17 the bias corrected 
confidence intervals pertaining to individuals of both ‘moderate’ and  ‘high’ social integration 
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(the mean and 1 SD above the mean) were negative and do not contain zero. This means that 
these conditional indirect effects are significantly different from zero at p < .05. Thus, 
engaging in public self-focus, for those of moderate and high social integration, is associated 
with enhanced perceptions of efficacy and, in turn, reduced social anxiety. However, given 
that public self-consciousness was still a strong predictor of FNE (b = .65, p = .00), SAD-New 
(b = .27, p = .00) and Observational SA (b = .39, p = .00) (see Table 7.15 above) the 
associated, favourable, perceptions of social skills do not fully attenuate the effects that public 
self-focus has in increasing social anxiety.  
 
Table 7.17 
Indirect Effects of Public Self-Consciousness on Social Anxiety via Self-Efficacy at 
Conditional Levels of Social Integration 
        Conditional Indirect Effects for Integration: Normal Theory & Bootstrap (BC) (FNE) 
Integration      Ind. Eff.  SE Z P Bias Corrected 
High (+4.00) -.15 .08 -1.85 .06 -.36 -.03 
Moderate (0) -.11 .06 -1.84 .07 -.25 -.02 
Low (-4.00) -.06 .07 -.89 .37 -.25 .06 
 Conditional Indirect Effects for Integration: Normal Theory & Bootstrap (BC) (SAD-New) 
Integration Ind. Eff. SE Z P Bias Corrected 
High (+4.00) -.11 .06 -1.79 .07 -.28 -.02 
Moderate (0) -.08 .04 -1.79 .07 -.20 -.01 
Low (-4.00) -.05 .05 -.88 .38 -.19 .05 
 Conditional Indirect Effects for Integration: Normal Theory & Bootstrap (BC) 
(Observational) 
Integration Ind. Eff. SE Z P Bias Corrected 
High (+4.00) -.11 .06 1.72 .09 -.28 -.01 
Moderate (0) -.07 .04 1.72 .09 -.19 -.01 
Low (-4.00) -.04 .05 -.86 .39 -.20 .04 
Note. Emboldened type signifies statistical significance at p <.05. 
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Social Perspective-Taking Stage 3 
Step 1: Predicting Self-Efficacy from Self-Monitoring and Social Integration 
         Contrary to the results for individuals with PT2 abilities, neither public self-
consciousness (B = -.21, b = -.20, SE = .12, p = .10) or self-presentation motives (B = -.12, b = 
-.09, SE = .16, p = .45) predicted positive or negative perceptions of non-conflict negotiation 
skills. Social integration also did not moderate the prediction of these efficacy beliefs from 
either of the social motives variables (see Table 7.18). These efficacy perceptions also did not 
predict FNE (B = .15, b = .11, SE = .16, p = .37) or SAD-New (B = -.08, b = -.09, SE =.14, p 
= .47) but were marginal predictors of Observational Social Anxiety (B = -.22, b = -.25, SE = 
.13, p = .09) (The effects of these efficacy perceptions on social anxiety were estimated 
including conflict efficacy and social integration in order to minimise redundant information). 
Given that both self-presentation and public self-consciousness were unrelated to perceptions 
of non-conflict negotiation skills, and there was no evidence of moderation by social 
integration, these efficacy perceptions could not mediate any effects on social anxiety. 
Table 7.18 
Moderated Regression Results for the Prediction of the Self-Efficacy Mediators 
 Mediator Variable Model  (DV = Non-Conflict Efficacy) 
Predictor B  b SE t p 
Self-Presentation -.12 -.09 .16 -.75 .45  
Public Self-Cons -.21 -.20 .12 -1.65 .10  
Integration .49 .41 .13 3.66 .00** 
Pres*Integr (path a) .03 .10 .04 .83 .41  
Pub*Integ (path a) .02 .10 .03 .89 .37  
 Mediator Variable Model  (DV = Conflict Efficacy) 
Predictor B  b SE t p 
Self-Presentation -.19 -.11 .21 -.90 .37 
Public Self-Cons -.34 -.24 .17 -2.06 .04* 
Integration .73 .45 .18 4.10 .00** 
Pres*Integr (path a) .02 .05 .05 .43 .67 
Public*Integr (path a) .03 .09 .04 .81 .42 
Note. n = 67. * p < .05. **p < .01.  
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         In contrast, public self-consciousness predicted negative perceptions of conflict 
negotiation skills (B = -.35, b = -.24, SE = .18, p = .04). Self-presentation motives were, 
however, unrelated to these efficacy perceptions for those with PT3 (B = -.19, b = -.11, SE = 
.21, p = .37). In evaluating whether social integration moderated the link between public self-
consciousness and these efficacy perceptions, self-presentation and non-conflict negotiation 
skills acted as covariates. The interaction (public*integration) was not significant (B = .03, b 
= .09, SE = .04, p = .67). Thus, the negative effect that public self-consciousness has on 
perceptions of efficacy is equal across levels of social integration for those with PT3 abilities.  
 
Step 2: Predicting Social Anxiety from Self-Efficacy, Self-Monitoring and Social Integration 
       Given that only public self-consciousness and conflict negotiation skills were significant 
in the mediator model only these variables could mediate, conditionally or otherwise, the 
effects of self-monitoring on social anxiety. Of interest then is whether the efficacy 
perceptions are predictive of social anxiety for those with PT3 and whether these links are 
moderated by social integration.  
        In these analyses age, self-presentation and non-conflict efficacy acted as covariates and 
were entered in the first step, while public self-consciousness, conflict efficacy beliefs, social 
integration and their interaction (“conflict*integration”) were entered in the second. As can be 
seen in Table 7.19 (below), conflict negotiation skills were only significant in the prediction 
of FNE (B = -.29, b = -.29, SE = .12, p = .02). Social integration on the other hand, and 
contrary to PT2, was significant in the prediction of all forms of social anxiety, especially 
FNE (B = -.90, b = -.55, SE = .16, p = .00) but less so SAD-New (B = .33, b = -.30, SE = .13, 
p = .02) and Observational SA (B = -.28, b = -.26, SE = .12, p = .03). Further, social 
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integration moderated the effect of efficacy on FNE (B = .05, b = .20, SE = .02, p = .02) and 
Observational SA (B = .04, b = .24, SE = .02, p = .02). Thus, the effect that efficacy beliefs 
have on FNE and Observational SA depend on social integration. In the former case these 
perceptions are only predictive of social anxiety when the moderating effect of social 
integration is considered (indicated by the non-significant relationship between conflict 
efficacy and observational social anxiety).    
 
Table 7.19 
Moderated Regression Results for the Prediction of Social Anxiety 
 Dependent Variable Model (DV = FNE) R2 = .59 
 B b SE     t p 
Conflict -.29 -.29 .12 -2.38 .02* 
Public Self-Cons .43 .30 .14 3.00 .00** 
Integration -.90 -.55 .16 -5.70 .00** 
Conflict*Integr.  .05 .20 .02 2.38 .02* 
 Dependent Variable Model  (DV = SAD-New) R2 = .34 
 B  B SE t p 
Conflict -.16 -.24 .11 -1.44 .16 
Public Self-Cons .08 .09 .12 .69 .49  
Integration -.33 -.30 .13 -2.48 .02* 
Conflict*Integr.  -.01 -.04 .02 -.36 .72  
 Dependent Variable Model (DV =  Observational) R2 = .42 
 B  B SE t p 
Conflict -.15 -.23 .10 -1.46 .15  
Public Self-Cons -.05 -.05 .11 -.45 .65  
Integration -.28 -.26 .12 -2.30 .03* 
Conflict*Integr.  .04 .24 .02 2.36 .02* 
Note. n = 67. 
*p < .05 **p < .01.  
        
       Post-hoc probing of the significant interactions (Aiken & West, 1991) demonstrated that 
this interaction was  consistent  with moderating—buffering—explanation: the buffering 
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effect of higher perceptions of conflict efficacy on FNE was significant at both low (B = -.54, 
SE = .16, t = -3.37, p = .00) and moderate (B = -.35, SE = .14, t = 2. 53, p = .01), but not high 
(B = -.16, SE = .16, t = -.99, p = .32), levels of social integration. The buffering effect of these 
perceptions for Observational SA, however, was significant only at low (B = -.28, SE = .11, t 
= -2.49, p = .02) but not moderate (B = -.14, SE = .10, t = -1.42, p = .16) or high (B = .003, SE 
= .12, t = .03, p = .98) levels of social integration (see Figures 7.4 and 7.5)8. These findings 
suggest that, for those with PT3 abilities, the buffering effect (i.e., decreasing) that confidence 
has on social anxiety occurs at lower levels of social integration as hypothesised.  
 
 
 
 
Figure 7.4. Simple Slopes of Self-Efficacy Conflict Predicting FNE at the Mean and +/- 1 SD 
of Social Integration.   
 
                                                 
8 Given that public self-consciousness is still significant in the prediction one might say that these effects are only partially mediated, 
although of most interest is whether this indirect effect is equivalent across levels of social integration (reported below). 
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Figure 7.5. Simple Slopes of Self-Efficacy Conflict Predicting Observational SA at the Mean 
and +/- 1 SD of Social Integration.   
 
 
Step 3: Conditional indirect effect of Public Self-Consciousness at levels of Social Integration 
       The primary interest is in whether the negative effects that public self-consciousness 
confer to social anxiety through efficacy beliefs exist across levels of social integration. Given 
that conflict efficacy was significant in the prediction of FNE and Observational Social 
Anxiety, at low and moderate levels of social integration, conditional indirect effects were 
examined for these variables only.   
      Table 7.20 provides the conditional indirect effects at three levels of the moderator (the 
mean, as well as 1 SD above and 1 SD below) as well as a range of values that illustrate the 
point of transition from significance to non-significance for these conditional effects. The 
conditional indirect effect is calculated by, a1(b1 + b3W), where a1 is the path from public 
self-consciousness to conflict efficacy, b1 is the effect of efficacy on social anxiety and b3W is 
the interaction between efficacy and social integration in the prediction of social anxiety, in 
this case FNE and Observational SA. 
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Table 7.20 
Indirect Effects of Public-Self-Consciousness on Social Anxiety via Self-Efficacy at 
conditional levels of Social Integration 
         Conditional Indirect Effects for Integration: Normal Theory & Bootstrap (BC) (FNE) 
Integration      Ind. Eff. SE z p Bias Corrected 
High (+4.00) .02 .05 .39 .70 -.06 .12 
Moderate (0) .09 .06 1.56 .12 .01 .22 
Low (-4.00) .16 .09 1.74 .08 .003 .38 
 Conditional Indirect Effects for Integration: Normal Theory & Bootstrap (BCA) 
(Observational) 
Integration Ind. Eff. SE z p Bias Corrected  
High (+4.00) .04 .04 1.02 .31 -.01 .15 
Moderate (0) .09 .05 1.70 .09 .01 .22 
Low (-4.00) .13 .08 1.77 .08 .001 .31 
Note. Emboldened type signifies statistical significance at p < .05.  
 
       For both FNE and Observational SA the conditional indirect effects do not contain zero 
for both ‘low’ and ‘moderate’ levels of social integration and are thus significant at p < .05. 
The positive signs of the bootstrap confidence intervals indicate that the negative effect that 
public self-consciousness has on perceptions of conflict negotiation skills increases social 
anxiety for those of moderate and low social integration. Thus, the hypothesis that the indirect 
effect would be significant across levels of social integration was supported.  
 
Social Perspective-Taking Stage 4 
 
Step 1: Predicting Self-Efficacy from Self-Monitoring and Social Integration 
 
       The parameter estimates for the regression models with self-efficacy (non-conflict and 
conflict) regressed on the self-monitoring, social integration and their interaction are 
summarized in Table 7.21. Note that in these analyses age and one of the self-monitoring 
variables (e.g., public self-consciousness) were controlled and entered in the first block while 
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the remaining self-monitoring variable and the other predictors were entered in the second 
block. As can be seen in Table 7.21 the only significant finding was that integration was a 
strong predictor of self-efficacy for conflict situations. As with Stage 1 it is likely the other 
non-significant findings are due to small sample size and an increase in the error terms (see 
associated standard errors). This error may also explain the standardized beta weights being 
greater than one in the prediction of conflict efficacy from self-presentation and social 
integration.  
 
Table 7.21 
Regression Results for the Prediction of Self-Efficacy by Self-Presentation, Public Self-
Consciousness and Social Integration 
 Mediator Variable Model (DV = Conflict Negotiation Skills) 
Predictor  B B SE t p 
Self-Presentation -.31 -.25 .40 -.76 .47 
Public -.43 -.31 .46 -.93 .38 
Integration .44 .42 .36 1.21 .26 
 Mediator Variable Model (DV = Non-Conflict Negotiation Skills)  
Predictor  B B SE t p 
Self-Presentation  -.07 -.08 .21 -.32 .76 
Public  -.26 -.27 .24 -1.08 .31 
Integration  .58 .80 .18 3.14 .01* 
Note. n = 13. 
*p< .01. 
 
 Step 2: Predicting Social Anxiety from Self-Efficacy, Self-Monitoring and Social Integration  
      Although there was only one significant relationships at Step 1, still of interest was 
whether social anxiety was predicted by any of the psychosocial variables at Stage 4. For 
these analyses age was the only covariate and was entered in the first block. All other 
variables were entered together.  
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       As can be seen from Table 7.22, only FNE was significantly predicted by any other 
variables; specifically, there was a strong positive relationship between public self-
consciousness and FNE. This strong negative relationship is consistent with the findings from 
both perspective-taking Stage 2 and Stage 3.  
 
 
Table 7.22  
Regression Results for the Prediction of Social Anxiety from Self-Efficacy, Self-Monitoring 
and Social Integration 
Note. n = 13. 
*p< .05. 
 
Moderation by Perspective-Taking Stage: A Comparison of Stages 2 and 3  
       A number of hypotheses were also made regarding the moderation of the prediction of 
social anxiety by perspective-taking stage. It was expected that a) self-presentation and 
 Dependent Variable Model (DV = FNE)  
Predictor B b SE t p 
Conflict  -.21 -.27 .25 -.84 .44 
Non-conflict -.17 -.15 .49 -.35 .74 
Self-Pres -.26 -.27 .21 -1.24 .26 
Public .58 .54 .24 2.39 .05* 
Integration -.36 -.44 .28 -1.28 .25 
 Dependent Variable Model (DV = SAD-New)  
Predictor B b SE t p 
Conflict -.15 -.40 .20 -.71 .50 
Non-conflict .12 .22 .40 .29 .78 
Self-Pres -.24 -.55 .17 -1.44 .12 
Public .27 .55 .20 1.39 .21 
Integration -.08 -.21 .23 -.34 .74 
 Dependent Variable Model (DV = Observational SA)  
Predictor B b SE t p 
Conflict -.01 -.01 .21 -.02 .98 
Non-conflict -.28 -.34 .40 -.70 .51 
Self-Pres .39 .57 .17 2.36 .06 
Public .09 .11 .20 .45 .67 
Integration -.14 -.23 .23 -.61 .56 
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confidence would be of particular significance to Stage 2, while b) social integration, rather 
than confidence, would be of particular significance at Stage 3. For comparison, Figures 7.6 
and 7.7 (below) depict the significant aspects of the moderated mediation models for PT2 and 
PT3, respectively. Note that not all paths analysed are displayed given non-significant 
relationships. For example, only the relationships between one form of self-efficacy (non-
conflict or conflict) are displayed for each of the models as the alternative form of efficacy 
was not significantly related to the other constructs. A comparison of these models reveals a 
number of differences that provide support for hypotheses a) and b) above.  
        Regarding the former, self-presentation was hypothesised to be a significant predictor at 
Stage 2 on the basis that it is at this stage that these concerns are most relevant according to 
Selman’s (1980) descriptions. Consistent with this expectation, a comparison of the Figures 
reveals that this psychological orientation was only a significant predictor in Stage 2 (Figure 
7.6). In addition, the self-presentation predicted social anxiety only in light of negative 
perceptions of confidence (i.e., there was no direct relationship between self-presentation and 
social anxiety). This is consistent with the importance of confidence at this stage, while also 
illustrating that self-presentation and confidence act together in a theoretically consistent way. 
Also, only perceptions of non-conflict negotiation skills were predictive in the moderated- 
mediation for Stage 2, while the reverse was found for Stage 3 individuals. This was 
unexpected but is consistent with the way that thought is structured at Stage 2. Specifically, 
while non-conflict negotiation skills involve only a consideration of intentions and desires 
from a first-person perspective (e.g., I want...), conflict negotiation skills are employed in 
light of an appreciation of multiple perspectives simultaneously (e.g., I want but they want...) 
(Stage 3). The development of Stage 3 may make the negotiation of multiple perspectives 
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more important as a factor in psychosocial experience and so explain its unique prediction of 
social anxiety at this stage.  
       Regarding the latter hypothesis above, it was hypothesised that social integration would 
be more important to the prediction of social anxiety at Stage 3 given that individuals at this 
stage conceptualise social interaction in a more interdependent and less egocentric manner 
(Selman, 1980, 2003). This hypothesis was largely supported given that only social 
integration (and no form of efficacy) predicted SAD-New (see Figure 7.7). Also, self-efficacy 
did not predict observational social anxiety directly (B = -.15, b = -.23, SE = .10, p = .15) until 
levels of social integration were considered. That is, social integration moderated the 
relationship between efficacy for conflict and social anxiety (see CONFLICT*INTEG Æ 
OBSERVATIONAL Figure 7.7; B = .04, b = .24, SE = .02, p = .02). Specifically, higher 
perceptions of conflict efficacy were predictive of reduced observational social anxiety only 
at low levels of social integration (see Simple Slopes analysis in Figure 7, p. 147). Together 
these findings support the hypothesis that social integration would be a more important 
predictor of social anxiety at Stage 3, compared to efficacy, given Stage 3 individuals are 
better at conceptualising the integrated nature of social relationships and, as a consequence, 
place less emphasis on a sense of confidence. The exception to this is that both efficacy for 
conflict and social integration predicted FNE interdependently (i.e., both predicted social 
anxiety when added to the regression equation simultaneously) suggesting that confidence is 
still an important factor in mitigating FNE; indeed, the moderation analyses revealed that this 
was true only at lower levels of social integration (see Simple Slopes analysis Figure 7.4, p. 
146). At the same time, indicative of moderation by perspective-taking stage is that efficacy 
for conflict, not non-conflict, was predictive of both observational social anxiety and FNE. 
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This is consistent with Stage 3 individuals being able to assimilate others’ perspectives from a 
third-person perspective (as discussed above).  
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
** < .01 
* < .05 
 
 
Figure 7.6. Moderated Mediation Model Predicting Social Anxiety Within Stages 2 
Perspective-Taking. 
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Figure 7.7. Moderated Mediation Model Predicting Social Anxiety Within Stage 3 
Perspective-Taking. 
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Chapter 8 
 
Discussion 
 
       The central issue raised in the current thesis relates to whether social anxiety studied in 
middle childhood and adolescence is distinguishable from forms of social anxiety studied 
earlier in development (e.g., behavioural inhibition). This is an important issue given that 
accepted developmental and qualitative distinctions between social anxiety constructs have 
been questioned. It was proposed in the current thesis that earlier and later forms of social 
anxiety could be distinguished in terms of their cognitive mechanisms. Specifically, 
spontaneously taking another’s perspective on the self was argued to be a core cognitive and 
discriminatory feature of social anxiety in middle childhood and adolescence. As such, it was 
hypothesised that developments in perspective-taking (Stage 2) would be a requisite for social 
anxiety involving a reflexive consideration of other’s (negative) perspectives on the self. A 
number of hypothesises were also made regarding the qualitative nature of social anxiety 
within stages of perspective-taking and its association with the psychosocial variables 
measured in the study—i.e., self-monitoring, public self-consciousness, social self-efficacy 
and social integration. Specific forms of social anxiety were, on the one hand, expected to 
illustrate a preponderance at particular stages of perspective-taking, while, on the other hand, 
perspective-taking was argued to moderate the prediction of social anxiety from the 
aforementioned psychosocial variables. The psychosocial variables were also argued to 
operate in mediating and moderating ways, as depicted in Figure 7.2 (above). These inter-
related hypotheses relate to the qualitative nature of social anxiety between stages of 
perspective-taking based on the way that cognitive developments structure subjectivity, while 
relations between psychosocial variables within each stage highlight the individual and 
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contextual predictors of social anxiety. The findings relating to these issues and their 
implications for an understanding of social anxiety are discussed in detail below. 
 
The Developmental Underpinnings of Social Anxiety 
 
Age and Social Anxiety 
 
     A number of specific forms of social anxiety—fear of negative evaluation (FNE), social 
anxiety for new situations (SAD-New) and social anxiety for observational scenarios 
(Observational SA)—were expected to increase from middle childhood to adolescence. This 
was expected, in part, because social anxiety was argued to depend on the, age-related, 
development of perspective-taking abilities (Selman, 1980). However, while age was strongly 
associated with perspective-taking, r(169) = .54, p = .00, social anxiety did not increase 
across the broad age range studied (8 to 15 years). Social anxiety did, however, vary 
according to developments in perspective-taking (discussed later).  
       The absence of an age-effect is not inconsistent with the cognitive-developmental 
hypothesis tested here. Indeed, compared to age, cognitive development provides a more 
specific account of the maturational factors underlying the development of social anxiety. 
Yet, it is important to consider age as a factor since it can help to identify what period of 
development is a significant time for study. This is also important because, in contrast to the 
present findings, not all studies report that social fears are as frequent in middle childhood as 
in adolescence. More specifically, most researchers have suggested that the adolescent period 
is of greatest significance from both a normative, sociocognitive (Westenberg et al., 2004), 
and abnormal, disorder-based, perspective (APA, 2000). Yet, these positions are contestable 
in light of this and other research illustrating that social anxiety is not more frequent in 
adolescence compared to middle childhood. A closer consideration of the research related to 
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these different views helps to integrate the current findings and clarify areas for further 
research.  
           The current finding is consistent with a number of large representative studies 
illustrating that social fears are not more frequent in adolescence than middle childhood 
(Burnham & Gullone, 1997; Campbell, 1996; Gullone et al., 2001; Gullone & Lane, 2002; 
Inderbitzen-Nolan & Walters, 2000; La Greca, Dandes, Wick, Shaw, & Stone, 1988; 
Ollendick, King, & Frary, 1989; Silverman, La Greca, & Wasserstein, 1995). The majority of 
these studies have used the Fear Survey Schedule for Children (Ollendick et al., 1989) which 
includes a broad fear of failure and criticism factor (see Ollendick, 1983). Importantly, 
Westenberg et al. (2004) argue that previous research using this fear of failure and criticism 
has failed to find the expected increase in social anxiety because it has not appropriately 
distinguished between specific types of social anxiety that vary developmentally. Further, 
according to these authors, this increase is “expected” because social anxiety disorder is more 
prevalent in adolescence, which the authors suggest is due to the “increase of normally 
occurring social fears” at this time (p. 482).  
       In support of this argument, these authors, and others (Westenberg et al., 2007), have 
found that positive responses to items on the Fear Survey Schedule for Children (Gullone & 
King, 1992; Ollendick, 1983) associated with “punishment” (e.g., being called on by a 
teacher, school principal or parent) decrease from middle childhood to adolescence, while 
fears associated with “social evaluation” (e.g., being publicly teased, criticized, meeting 
someone new) and “achievement” (e.g., taking or failing a test, getting a report card) increase 
across this period. It follows that one reason researchers have not illustrated a rise in social 
fears in adolescence is that opposing (increasing and decreasing) trends of these social fears 
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cancel each other out when they are analysed globally (Bokhorst et al., 2008). This research 
would appear to suggest that it is important to differentiate between specific social fear 
“clusters”, and that adolescence is of particular significance to an understanding of social 
anxiety.  
       Yet, not all studies are confounded in the way suggested by Westenberg et al. (2004). The 
FNE and SAD-New scales, part of the Social Anxiety Scale for Children (La Greca & Stone, 
1993), used in this study are not overly general or under-differentiated like the fear of failure 
and criticism factor of the Fear Survey Schedule for Children (Ollendick, 1983). Rather, FNE 
and SAD-New measure specific facets of social anxiety associated with concerns about being 
negatively evaluated by, and meeting unknown peers, respectively. Consistent with the 
current findings, a number of large studies (~ N = 1000 or greater), including children as 
young as 6 years of age, have either found no differences between younger children and 
adolescents (La Greca, Dandes, Wick, Shaw, & Stone, 1988; see also Campbell, 1996; 
Campbell & Rapee, 1994), or that FNE specifically is more frequent in the former 
(Inderbitzen-Nolan & Walters, 2000 [N = ~ 3000]; see La Greca, 1999 for review). Further, 
the observation that FNE decreases from middle childhood to adolescence has been reported 
longitudinally (La Greca & Lopez, 1998).  
      In addition, there are a number of overlaps between the “social evaluation” scale created 
by Westenberg et al. (2004) and the FNE and SAD-New scales. For example, 5 of the 8 items 
on the social evaluation subscale (Being criticized by others; Being teased; Looking foolish; 
Doing something new; Meeting someone for the first time) overlap with items on the FNE 
(Worry about what others think of me; Worry about being teased; I feel that others are making 
fun of me) and SAD-New (e.g., I worry about doing something new in front of others; I get 
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nervous when I talk to peers I don’t know very well; I get nervous when I meet new people) 
scales. Perhaps the only difference between these scales is that Westenberg et al.’s (2004) 
includes two items relating to public performance (Giving a speech, Putting on a recital) and 
one item relating to self-consciousness (Having to wear clothes different from others). How 
then are findings to be interpreted? 
       Given these overlaps it is difficult to integrate current findings and draw conclusions 
about age-related variation in social anxiety. The studies (including this one) illustrating that 
FNE  and SAD-New, validated and specific measures of social anxiety, either decrease or are 
as frequent in middle childhood as they are in adolescence, challenge ideas that adolescence is 
of particular significance to an understanding of these social fears. Yet, taking the unique 
items from Westenberg et al. (2004) scale, adolescence may be associated with greater 
performance anxiety (e.g., public speaking and taking tests) (see also King et al. 1989; 
however, see Sumter et al. 2009). It has also been reported that, compared to younger 
children, adolescents endorse a broader and greater number of situations as eliciting distress  
(Rao et al., 2007) and that they endorse anxiety provoking situations as causing greater 
distress (e.g., ‘mild’ distress versus ‘moderate’ or ‘strong’ distress) (see Westenberg et al., 
2004). It follows that adolescence may be associated with a number of unique developments 
including the emergence of: a) specific social performance fears, b) a generalisation of social 
anxiety across various situations and/or c) an increase in the intensity of anxiety associated 
with these situations. The latter may also explain the rise in the social anxiety disorder in 
adolescence (Ranta et al., 2009; Van Roy et al., 2009). Yet, given the aforementioned 
confounds these possibilities are yet to be supported with any certainty.  
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       What is not clear, and central to this thesis, is what these age-related patterns would mean 
from a developmental perspective. There is the possibility that categorising social anxiety 
according to different situational subtypes (e.g., achievement and public performance) 
captures changes in emphasis and activity rather than changes in fundamental phenomenology 
(see Rapee & Spence, 2004). The apparent rise in performance-related fears in adolescence 
may be, for example, a consequence of these activities being more relevant to adolescents’ 
educational experiences. Further, a generalisation of social anxiety across different situations, 
an increase in the intensity of distress, and increased prevalence of social anxiety disorder in 
adolescence, may also represent the amplification of existing tendencies rather than a change 
in the basic sociocognitive underpinnings of social anxiety. There is little reason to believe, 
for example, that the many social anxieties shared by children and adolescents—i.e., those 
associated with concerns about being negatively evaluated (being teased, made fun of, spoken 
about, not liked) and meeting new people—are different in any fundamental way from that 
which arises in the public or achievement-related tasks in adolescence. In other words, it is 
possible that the basic biological and cognitive “architecture” for social anxiety is present well 
before adolescence with different names being applied to the same phenomena based on the 
situations and circumstances in which social anxiety occurs (Rapee et al., 2009; Rapee & 
Spence, 2004). 
       A question left begging is when and what factors are associated with the emergence of 
social anxiety developmentally. The research above suggests that a core feature of social 
anxiety, argued here to be a concern about other’s potential perceptions and behaviour toward 
the self, emerge well before adolescence, in middle childhood beginning as early as 8 years. 
However, as reviewed previously, some researchers have argued that social anxiety and 
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overlapping temperament constructs are basically the same (Angold & Costello, 2009) and 
that social anxiety (disorder) is observable in preschoolers (Bufferd et al., 2011; Egger et al., 
2006). It was argued earlier, however, that these studies may not be capturing subjective 
phenomena central to social anxiety (e.g., a concern with other’s potential perceptions or 
behaviour toward the self), and a number of issues were outlined as requiring further 
investigation (e.g., corroborating parent report, distinguishing overlapping constructs, 
confirming subjective phenomena, see Chapter 2).  
       In order to further these issues, instead of differentiating social anxiety according to 
different situational subtypes, this study set out to evaluate whether social anxiety, 
characterised by subjective concern about other’s evaluations, judgements and behaviour 
toward the self, required the development of complementary perspective-taking abilities, 
specifically, Stage 2 according to Selman’s (1980) theory. The findings related to this 
hypothesis are discussed below.  
 
 
Perspective-Taking and Social Anxiety 
               
       It was argued, through qualitative analysis, that subjectively social anxiety involved a 
reflexive consideration of others’ perceptions and potential behaviour toward the self, or 
social perspective-taking. From this basis, it was hypothesised that in order for social anxiety 
to be experienced and emerge developmentally, complementary social perspective-taking 
abilities must at least be developed. These abilities appear to correspond to Stage 2 of 
Selman’s (1980) theory—developing between 8 and 12 years—and contrast with prior stages 
where the child does not differentiate between physical and subjective perspectives (Stage 0) 
and cannot yet take others perspectives on the self (Stage 1). Consistent with this argument all 
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forms of social anxiety (FNE, SAD-New, Observational SA) were associated with 
developments in perspective-taking abilities. Specifically, social anxiety was relatively 
infrequent in children who were unable to take another’s perspective on the self (Stage 1); 
while, there was a large increase in social anxiety with the development of these abilities at 
Stage 2. The findings are consistent with the absence of age-related differences in social 
anxiety between middle childhood and adolescence, and confirm, from a sociocognitive 
perspective, that the middle childhood period (not adolescence) is most significant to an 
understanding the development of social anxiety. 
       One broad implication of these findings is that social anxiety phenomena, occurring 
across the developmental spectrum, may be meaningfully differentiated according to their 
subjective qualities and underlying mechanisms. It can be argued, for example, that 
behavioural inhibition (e.g., Kagan et al., 1988) and social anxiety (disorder) (e.g., Bufferd et 
al., 2011; Egger et al., 2006) observed in toddlers and preschoolers is not the same as that 
observed in this study. This research indicates that in order for youth to experience social 
anxiety, associated with core subjective phenomena, including a reflexive consideration of 
others’ (negative) perspectives and potential behaviour toward the self, Stage 2 perspective-
taking abilities must at least be developed. These capacities typically develop in middle 
childhood beginning at 8 through to 12 years of age (Selman, 1980). This suggests that social 
anxiety occurring before this time is likely to depend on mechanisms not associated with 
complex cognition (e.g., a “basic” fear mechanism). This issue is discussed further below. 
         In comparison to previous research that has focussed on age, this research indicates that 
a specific and relatively mature sociocognitive mechanism is involved in the emergence of 
social anxiety. This is consistent with the only other studies to have considered sociocognitive 
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factors underlying the expression of social evaluative concerns. Vasey et al. (1994) 
considered the relation between social fears and self-conceptual development (Mohr, 1978) 
and found that social evaluation concerns were associated with an advance from 
conceptualising self and others in terms of external objects or physical qualities of self (e.g., 
age, gender) to conceptualising self and others in terms of their psychological qualities (e.g., 
thoughts, feelings and personality traits). Westenberg et al. (2004), on the other hand, studied 
ego development (Loevinger, 1976) and found that “moderate” and “strong” social anxiety—
defined by social anxiety above the statistical average (see Westenberg et al., 2004 for 
details)—was associated with ego levels associated with garnering approval from the social 
reference group in terms of correct opinions, behaviour and appearance (conformist), on the 
one hand, and, on the other, an internal orientation “toward personal feelings, thoughts, and 
opinions” that does not replace the need for the psychological approval, or alignment, from, 
and with, others (self-aware) (p. 484). Interestingly, these measures of sociocognitive maturity 
overlap with the structural (perspective-taking) and conceptual aspects associated with Stage 
2. Together, it would appear that mature cognitive abilities are linked to the experience of 
social evaluative concerns.  
       With the above exceptions, this is the only study to have focussed on the sociocognitive 
mechanisms underlying the actual experience of social evaluative concerns. The current 
research bears on a larger, although still sparse, literature that has considered the 
sociocognitive developments underlying the understanding of embarrassment and self-
presentation motivations in others (in story characters). Interesting is that researchers in this 
area have argued that much earlier developments, in theory of mind and second-order 
reasoning, are that which underlie an appreciation of others’ perspectives on the self and, in 
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turn, the understanding (e.g., Bennett & Matthews, 2000) and experience (Banerjee, 2002ab) 
of these concerns. Yet, cognitive abilities associated with second-order reasoning appear to 
correspond with those associated with Stage 1 perspective-taking where social evaluation 
concerns were infrequent. As in Stage 1, passing second-order reasoning tasks (cf. Perner & 
Wimmer, 1985; Sullivan et al., 1994), involves the child understanding that people hold 
different beliefs about another object or person based on their unique experiences (Miller, 
2009). Unlike Stage 2 perspective-taking, second-order reasoning does not involve the child’s 
reflexive consideration of another person’s perspective on the self.  
       As such, the findings from this study explain why second-order reasoning has failed to 
account for much of the variability in the understanding of embarrassment and self-
presentation—i.e., because it is not the key developmental mechanism. The findings from this 
study also shed light on why it is that before 8 to 11 years of age children do not make 
spontaneous references to embarrassment and self-presentation motives in others (see Chapter 
4). Specifically, children before 8 and 11 years are not expected to make spontaneous 
references to embarrassment in others because they do not yet self-reflexively consider 
other’s perspectives on the self (that is, in the absence of environmental and affective cues).  
       It can be argued that children’s appreciation of social evaluation as an aspect of social 
interaction before 8 years (Stage 2) is first dependent on explicit negative social feedback and 
does not involve reflexive perspective-taking. Indeed, with explicit and observable negative 
social feedback, perspective-taking is not required. In these instances the child does not have 
to consider or imagine how others regard the self because this information is directly available 
to them. In contrast, with the development of Stage 2, the appreciation of social evaluation 
becomes more anticipatory with the child being able to self-reflexively think about other’s 
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potential perspectives and behaviours toward the self. Here, the child begins to orientate to 
social situations with other’s perspectives in mind—e.g., they “worry” and think about their 
self-presentation with the others’ perspective on the self only available as a potential in the 
child’s mind.  
       The hypothesis that social anxiety would then vary across Stages 2 and 3 according to 
differences in the level of self-reflexivity involved was only partially supported. Specifically, 
it was proposed that FNE was a measure of social anxiety that simultaneously required a 
reflexive consideration of other’s perspectives and potential behaviour toward the self, while 
also likely being tied to the individuals’ actual and vicarious social experiences (e.g., teasing, 
gossip). As such, it was hypothesised that FNE would predominate at Stage 2 because 
perspectives are taken sequentially and limited to one perspective at a time and, as a 
consequence, the consideration of others’ (negative) perspectives is still largely grounded 
within actual social, cognitive and affective experiences. This aspect of the hypothesis was 
supported given that FNE decreased significantly from Stage 2 to Stage 3. However,  it was 
also expected that social anxiety associated with meeting new peers and observational social 
anxiety, where negative evaluation is not as explicit or routine, would predominate at Stage 3, 
that is, with the ability to observe the self and others from a third-person perspective, and 
consider others’ perspectives on the self outside of interactional sequences. Yet, rather than 
Stage 3 resulting in an increase in these self-reflexive and self-conscious forms of social 
anxiety, there was an incremental (linear) decrease in all forms of social anxiety between 
Stages 2 and 4, and, although the difference was statistically significant for FNE (between 
Stages 2 and 3), there were no significant differences between Stages 3 and 4 and Stages 4 
and 1 for any form of social anxiety.  
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       These findings are inconsistent with the argument that more self-reflexive forms of social 
anxiety (SAD-New and Observational Social Anxiety) would follow naturally from 
complementary changes in the ability to consider others’ perspectives on the self (i.e., at 
Stages 3 and 4). While it appears that social anxiety is associated with initial developments in 
perspective-taking ability (Stage 2) further developments lead to a decrease in all forms of 
social anxiety.   .This was unexpected since the ability to take another’s perspective on the 
self only improves with the emergence of Stages 3 and 4. At these latter stages, formed is the 
ability to step outside the dyadic relation and take a third-person perspective, observing both 
self and other from the perspective of the “observing ego”. More broadly, the individual 
appreciates the complexity of navigating social relationships and attempts to coordinate 
behaviour according to the “generalised other” (i.e., peer group and societal norms). To 
remain theoretically consistent, social anxiety should increase at these stages as there is 
greater ability to not only take one, but multiple perspectives, and to also monitor these 
perspectives from an abstract and self-conscious position (see Damon & Hart, [1982] and 
Lapsley & Murphy, [1985]; Martin & Sokol, [2010] for similar accounts of adolescent self-
consciousness and preoccupation with imaginary audiences, respectively).  
       As such, the curvilinear relationship between social anxiety and perspective-taking 
requires further theoretical and empirical elaboration. In the meantime, some theoretical 
speculation can be brought to bear on why social anxiety might decrease once the individual 
can observe self and other from a more distanced and socially normative (“generalised”) 
perspective. One possibility is that Stages 3 and 4 provide the individual with some way of 
thinking about social relations that lessens the importance of thinking about other’s 
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perceptions of the self. In this vein, there are a number of qualities that define these later 
stages which might bring about this kind of change. At Stage 3, with the ability to take a more 
generalised third-person perspective, there is a movement away from considering self and 
other in terms of “context specific actions or feelings as they are meant to impress or be 
considered by others (Stage 2)” (Selman et al., 1979, p. 95) toward a conceptualisation of 
persons in terms of stable and generalised traits and attitudes (Stage 3), and in terms of a 
complex system of personal and societal values and needs which are not always internally 
consistent or subject to the person’s awareness (Stage 4). This ability to conceptualise others 
and social relations more completely, that is, less in terms of immediate actions, intentions or 
mood-states, and more in terms of personality “types” that are stable and complex may lessen 
the need, importance, and value of continuously monitoring or imagining the likely 
perceptions and behaviours of others toward the self. Some tentative support for this idea may 
come from the fact that FNE decreased significantly at Stage 3 (Cohen’s d = .43); 
importantly, unlike the other measures, FNE directly asks the child about their concerns about 
others’ context specific perceptions and actions toward the self (e.g., teasing). In this vein, 
advances in sociocognitive maturity may be conceptualized as introducing both costs and 
benefits to social and emotional functioning that are intimately tied to the way that they 
(re)structure the individual’s way of relating to self and others at each stage.  
        At the same time, the global trends discussed above, whether increasing or decreasing, 
can be considered from another perspective. Another aim of this thesis was to consider 
individual differences within these broad stages of sociocognitive maturity. Specifically, it 
was hypothesised that there would be variability in the tendency, or motive, to consider 
others’ perspectives, and that these motives would predict social anxiety through a particular 
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psychological process (perceptions of social competence) in a particular context (satisfaction 
with social integration). However, it was also proposed that perspective-taking stages would 
moderate which factors were significant predictors of social anxiety based on the way that the 
stages structure and limit the child’s way of relating to self and others. A consideration of 
these individual difference and contextual hypotheses provide an additional, and understudied 
(Banerjee, 2002b), lens to consider the general trends in social anxiety across sociocognitive 
maturity. Indeed, while social anxiety decreased at Stage 3, it was still associated with a 
negative psychological process within this stage.   
 
Individual Differences Within Perspective-Taking 
 
       It was hypothesised that within stages of perspective-taking individuals would differ in 
the degree to which they engaged in motivated forms of social perspective-taking (see 
Banerjee, 2002ab). Self-presentation and public self-consciousness, as representations of this 
kind of motivated social cognition, were argued to be associated with social anxiety only 
when the individual also doubted their ability to engage in successful social behaviours (e.g., 
manage conflict and non-conflict peer relations) (see Carver & Scheier, 1981). This mediation 
hypothesis was also expected to be significant for those who were both satisfied and 
dissatisfied with their current level of social integration in light of the salience of integrative 
goals during the school years. In addition, perspective-taking was argued to moderate the 
relationship between social anxiety and the aforementioned psychosocial variables based on 
the way these perspective-taking levels structure subjective experience. As such, these 
mediation and moderating effects are discussed within each stage of perspective taking in 
turn. Only Stage 2 and Stage 3 are discussed, however, in light of non-significant relations 
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found within Stage 1 and 4, likely on account of the small sample sizes (N = 10 and 13, 
respectively). 
 
Perspective-Taking Stage 2  
 
Mediation: Self-Monitoring, Social Self-Efficacy and Social Anxiety 
        
       The findings relating to Stage 2 perspective-taking support the study’s meditational 
hypothesis that self-presentation and public self-consciousness would predict increased social 
anxiety via negative perceptions of social self-efficacy (i.e., conflict and non-conflict 
negotiation skills). Yet, this process occurred differently depending on the particular form of 
social cognition involved. Specifically, self-presentation was associated with low efficacy 
beliefs and increased social anxiety, while public self-consciousness was associated with high 
self-efficacy beliefs and, in turn, reduced social anxiety. Both mediations were significant 
with “full” and “partial” mediation at lower and higher levels of social integration, 
respectively. As motivated forms of social cognition, this suggests that they may be associated 
with a “negative” and “positive” motivational orientation. These moderated mediations are 
consistent with the study’s hypotheses yet require individual consideration given their 
opposite effects—i.e., increases and decreases on social anxiety via negative and positive 
appraisals of social self-efficacy. 
        Regardless of their opposite effects, these mediations are consistent with Carver and 
Scheier’s (1981) argument that self-focused attention may be an adaptive form of social 
cognition that is aversive, and associated with social anxiety, only when the individual also 
perceives that they will be unable to perform to a particular standard (e.g., Bandura, 1991) 
(see also Schlenker & Leary, 1982). This is illustrated with self-presentation being associated 
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with social anxiety through negative efficacy beliefs and via public self-consciousness being 
associated with positive efficacy appraisals and less social anxiety. Thus, Carver and 
Scheier’s (1981) position is supported in both the negative (i.e., self-presentation associated 
with decreases in efficacy and, in turn, more social anxiety) and positive (i.e., public self-
consciousness associated with increases in efficacy and, in turn, less social anxiety) sense.  
       There is little theoretical or empirical work that may be brought to bear on why these 
forms of social cognition are associated with a negative and positive process. Indeed, the 
negative association between self-presentation and self-efficacy is inconsistent with the view 
that motivation to self-presentation (or self-monitoring) is a positive motivational orientation 
indicative of an approach (i.e., confident) orientation (Snyder, 1974). Indeed, self-presentation 
is most often associated with greater sensitivity to social contingencies resulting in greater 
social abilities/and adjustment (see Snyder & Gangestad, 2000 for a review). Public self-
consciousness, on the other hand, is more often conceptualized as an aversive psychological 
process associated with negative self-evaluation and social anxiety (e.g., Clark & Wells, 
1995; Duval & Wicklund, 1972). A partial explanation for these theoretically-divergent 
findings may relate to the way that these constructs were measured in the present study.  
       Self-presentation is usually defined by perceived success or ability at modifying 
behaviours in light of perceived social contingencies (cf. Pledger, 1992; Snyder & Gangestad, 
1986). Logically, self-presentation is associated with greater self-efficacy/social adjustment as 
these are presupposed. Similarly, public self-consciousness is often defined with reference to 
negative affect (e.g., worry, blushing) and so links with social anxiety are perhaps 
unsurprising. The focus on perceived ability and negative affective experience were 
deliberately removed in this study in order to capture a “pure” motivational orientation of 
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being cognizant of self and others in social situations—that is, regardless of perceived ability 
or affective quality. The constructs were, therefore, free to vary in their association with self-
efficacy and social anxiety. These modifications were essential in order to study the mediation 
hypothesis proposed by Carver and Scheier (1981)—i.e., to rule out construct overlaps that 
may increase correlation in a particular direction. As a result, there is limited research on 
these constructs as defined in the present study. At the same time, this is true regarding the 
study of these constructs in youth generally. Indeed, studies can be summarised as illustrating 
social anxiety being associated with higher levels of public self-consciousness (Higa et al., 
2008) and lower levels of social integration (e.g., La Greca & Harrison, 2005) and social self-
efficacy (Muris, 2002). There are no studies linking self-presentation and public self-
consciousness to social self-efficacy in youth and, as such, there are also no studies that have 
investigated the mediational hypothesis described. This means that the associations between 
these motivational orientations and social self-efficacy, in particular, are largely unknown.  
       One possible reason for these constructs differentially exacerbating and alleviating social 
anxiety via efficacy appraisals is that, while both involve a focus on the self with reference to 
others, they are associated with different goal or motivational orientations. Self-presentation 
in this study was defined in particular by being aware of and being motivated to align conduct 
with the group (e.g., When I am with a group of people, I will think about changing the way I 
act to fit in; I think about my behaviour and try to fit in wherever I am). Briggs, Cheek, and 
Buss (1980) illustrated in a large college sample (N > 1000) that this “other directed” self-
monitoring is correlated positively with shyness (social awkwardness) and neuroticism, and 
negatively with self-esteem (defined by having a sense of worthiness and self-efficacy). 
Briggs et al. thus described individuals high in “other-directed” self-monitoring as a) 
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“insecure and defensive rather than shrewd and pragmatic controllers of social interaction” (p. 
685) b) concerned with “pleasing others, conforming to the social situation, and masking 
one's true feelings” (p. 681) and c) as “be[ing] shy and lacking in self-esteem” (p. 683). 
Similarly, in this study, self-presentation was defined by monitoring behaviour in order to “fit 
in”, and was associated with lower perceived social self-efficacy and increased social anxiety. 
       In comparison, public self-consciousness as measured in this study describes an interest 
in others’ attention toward the self without a focus on modifying behaviour for perceived 
group standards (Items include: If I have had my hair cut, it feels like people look at me more; 
I want people to think well of me; I think about what other people think of me when 
performing). Public self-consciousness is associated with social anxiety (Fenigstein et al., 
1975), shyness (Pilkonis, 1977), and neuroticism (e.g., Scandell, 1998), while also being 
correlated positively with extroversion (in youth, Abrams, 1988), sociability (Carver & Glass, 
1976 i.e., the desire to be with others), the need for affiliation and exhibition (Tunnel, 1984), 
and perceived ability to engage in successful self-presentation management behaviours 
(Pilkonis, 1977). Thus, public self-consciousness appears to be associated with a mixed 
positive and negative orientation to situations. This is indeed predicted by Carver and 
Scheier's (1981) argument that consciousness of the way one looks and presents oneself may 
be positive or negative in orientation via self-presentational efficacy (see also Scheier & 
Carver, 1985). The positive and negative aspects of public self-consciousness are mirrored in 
this study given that positive efficacy appraisals only partially mediated the negative 
association that public self-consciousness had with social anxiety.  
       Interesting parallels can be made between this adult (personality) literature and the recent 
study of social demonstration avoidance and social demonstration approach goals in youth. 
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Like self-presentation in this study, the former is defined by making sure that one is not 
perceived as socially awkward or ineffective (e.g., not being seen as a “loser” or “geek”), and 
is associated with self- and teacher-reported solitary anxious behaviour (e.g., social 
withdrawal) and a number of constructs measuring social anxiety or social worry (e.g., “I 
worry about what my friends think of me”) (Horst, Finney, & Barron, 2007; Ryan & Shim, 
2006, 2008). The latter goal orientation is, on the other hand, primarily associated with 
“demonstrating social competence and gaining from peers positive judgments that one is 
socially desirable...compared to others” (Ryan & Shim, 2008, p. 673), while also being 
associated with an avoidance orientation, especially regarding negative social evaluation (see 
Ryan & Shim, 2008). In the aforementioned study a social demonstration approach 
orientation was associated with sixth grade students’ greater perceptions of popularity and 
self-efficacy, while also being associated with social worry, but less so compared to those 
with a social demonstration avoidance orientation. Taken together, the current findings may 
be accommodated by self-presentation and public self-consciousness being indicative of 
avoidant and mixed approach-avoidance orientations which are associated with perceptions of 
social self-efficacy and, in turn, social anxiety (or not). Given the scarcity of research and 
variability in measures, the relations between these constructs still need to be verified 
empirically.  
 
Moderation: Social Integration and Perspective-Taking  
       It was also predicted that self-monitoring—self-presentation and public self-
consciousness—would be associated with social anxiety whenever an individual doubted their 
social abilities, regardless of current satisfaction with social integration (i.e., non-moderated 
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mediation). This hypothesis was made with particular reference to those who were of higher 
levels of social integration. In light of the self-conscious nature of this period of development, 
it was argued that even these individuals may experience social anxiety when engaging in 
these forms of social cognition and, in turn, doubting their social abilities. This hypothesis 
received only partial support. Self-presentation was associated with social anxiety via 
negative efficacy expectations for individuals who were low (i.e., 1 SD below the mean) and 
moderate (i.e., at the mean) but not high (i.e., 1 SD above the mean) levels of social 
integration.  
       These findings expand on the treatment of social integration as predictive of social 
anxiety. Typically “not enough” or deficits in social integration are linked to social anxiety 
(see Kingery, Erdley, Marshall, Whitaker, & Reuter, 2010 for a review). The current findings 
illustrate, however, that even those who are relatively well- integrated experience social 
anxiety in light of motivational orientations and negative self-efficacy appraisals. This is 
consistent with Leary’s (2001, 2010) sociometer theory of social anxiety. This theory suggests 
social anxiety arises when the individual perceives threats to relational value (i.e., that others 
will or do not value them as much as they would like). This perception is also argued to 
motivate a defensive change in behaviour (e.g., self-presentation) in order to avoid potential 
rejection (see Leary, 2007; Leary, Tambor, Terdal, & Downs, 1995), and to lead to social 
anxiety only when the person perceives that they will be unable to avoid this (i.e., low 
presentational self-efficacy). Similarly, in this study, social anxiety was characterised by 
motives to align behaviour with the group (self-presentation) via negative efficacy perceptions 
which only when there was a desire for greater social connection (i.e., in the presence of the 
experience of relational devaluation). This theory may, therefore, provide a post-hoc 
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explanation as to why the mediation was not significant for those high in social integration (or 
low desire for more interaction with peers): these individuals, because of their relative 
security, engage less in this type of thinking and/or when doing so are less likely to doubt 
their social skills as a consequence.     
       The attenuating effect of public self-consciousness on social anxiety via positive 
appraisals was also moderated by social integration. This attenuating effect was significant 
only for those of moderate and high social integration. No hypotheses were made regarding 
the moderation of this mediation effect. Yet, the fact that the positive effects of public self-
consciousness extended to both those high and moderate in social integration is not 
inconsistent with the above account, especially when public self-consciousness is 
conceptualized as an approach orientation. When individuals engage in this form of social 
cognition in the interest of demonstrating social competence and garnering approval, public 
self-consciousness may be associated with an attenuation of social anxiety even for those of 
moderate social integration because these individuals have greater social self-efficacy (social 
integration was a strong predictor of social self-efficacy). That this does not extend to those 
low in social integration may be explained, in part, by their relative social deprivation and 
lower social self-efficacy which may, in turn, mean they are less likely to be engaging in 
public self-conscious with a social demonstration orientation in mind. Again, the relationship 
between public self-consciousness, as measured here without reference to negative affect, and 
social demonstration approach goals needs to be to empirically verified.   
       A number of hypotheses were also made regarding the moderation of the above 
psychological processes in light of the quality of perspective-taking stage (i.e., Stage 2). It 
was hypothesised that social integration would be less important than efficacy at this stage 
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given Stage 2 is characterised by the belief that problems can be solved via an act of will, or 
by having more confidence in oneself. Social integration was argued to be more important as 
an elicitor of social anxiety at Stage 3 in light of these individuals being more concerned with 
social integration in light of their complementary social perspective-taking skills. This 
hypothesis received some support given that social integration did not predict social anxiety 
for new situations or observational social anxiety directly at Stage 2. At Stage 2, social 
integration was only important in the prediction of these forms of social anxiety in that it 
moderated the aforementioned psychological processes. In other words, social integration was 
only important as a factor in social anxiety in that it was associated with different patterns of 
social cognition. Importantly, indicative of a consistent moderation, this can be contrasted 
with the findings regarding social anxiety as a psychological process at Stage 3. Here social 
integration predicted all forms of social anxiety directly as well as being a moderator of the 
mediation pathway.  
       Self-presentation was also hypothesised to be a predictor of social anxiety at Stage 2 on 
the basis that it is at this stage that these concerns are most relevant according to Selman’s 
(1980) descriptions. The finding that this motivational orientation predicts social anxiety only 
in light of negative perceptions of confidence is also consistent with the importance of 
confidence at this stage, while also illustrating that they act together in a theoretically 
consistent way. That this is a process particular to Stage 2, as opposed to Stage 3, is also 
supported by self-presentation not being associated with Stage 3 individuals’ perceptions of 
confidence or social anxiety. As discussed this is expected based on Stage 3 individuals being 
able to conceptualise social relations less egocentrically (e.g., from a distanced third person 
perspective), which may, in turn, reduce the importance of engaging in this defensive 
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motivational stance. Also, along similar lines, only perceptions of non-conflict negotiation 
skills were predictive in the psychological process for Stage 2, while the reverse was found 
for Stage 3 individuals. This was unexpected but is also consistent with the way that thought 
is structured at Stage 2. Specifically, while non-conflict negotiation skills involve only a 
consideration of intentions and desires from a first-person perspective (e.g., I want...), conflict 
negotiation skills are employed in light of an appreciation of multiple perspectives 
simultaneously (e.g., I want but they want...) (Stage 3). The development of Stage 3 may 
make the negotiation of multiple perspectives more important as a factor in psychosocial 
experience and so explain its unique prediction of social anxiety at this stage.  
  
Perspective-Taking Stage 3 
Mediation : Self-Monitoring, Social Self-Efficacy and Social Anxiety 
       In contrast to Stage 2 perspective-taking, self-efficacy for non-conflict situations was 
unrelated to either form of self-monitoring or to any form of social anxiety at Stage 3. As 
discussed above, this is consistent with theoretical expectations given individuals at Stage 3 
appreciate the mutuality of social relationships and the need to coordinate self- and other-
perspectives (or desires) simultaneously. Self-presentation was also unrelated to perceptions 
of self-efficacy and social anxiety, and there was no evidence that social integration 
moderated this effect. These findings were predicted according to the preponderance of self-
presentation concerns at Stage 2.  
         In contrast to Stage 2, public self-consciousness predicted negative perceptions of social 
self-efficacy for conflict situations. It is not clear why this motivational orientation was 
associated with negative perceptions of conflict efficacy at Stage 3. It is interesting to note 
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that public self-consciousness did not predict efficacy for non-conflict situations. This 
suggests that, in contrast to Stage 2, public self-consciousness is not relevant to egocentric 
desires. Instead, at Stage 3, public self-consciousness is relevant to conflict situations where 
others’ perspectives need to be taken into consideration and there is a potential for 
interpersonal conflict. Public self-consciousness may, therefore, be aversive at Stage 3 
because individuals in this stage are considering threats to their interpersonal relationships.    
         Indeed, and most relevant, is that conflict efficacy perceptions predicted social anxiety 
(FNE and observational only) and there was evidence that these perceptions mediated the 
strong negative effect that public self-consciousness had on social anxiety, although only 
partially for FNE. Specifically, for both FNE and observational social anxiety, public self-
consciousness predicted less social self-efficacy for conflict and, in turn, increased social 
anxiety. This mediation was “partial” for FNE and “full” for observational social anxiety, and 
significant only at low and moderate levels of social integration. This indicates that 
individuals high in social integration did not doubt their social skills nor experience social 
anxiety while engaging in public self-consciousness. As discussed above this may be because 
individuals high in social integration are more confident in their social abilities.  
       This moderated mediation finding is consistent with prior theory while also illustrating 
that perspective-taking stage significantly moderates these effects. Regarding the former, the 
mediation is consistent with Carver and Scheier’s (1981) expectation that engaging in public 
self-focus is associated with social anxiety through negative efficacy expectations. The 
strongest support came from the findings relating to observational social anxiety given 
efficacy perceptions fully mediated the effect, while for FNE, confidence only partially 
mediated the association. While only conjecture, one can suggest that this may have 
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something to do with the differences between these forms of social anxiety. Observational 
social anxiety was operationalised here as being a more self-reflexive form of social anxiety 
that is less dependent on actual (negative) psychosocial experience (e.g., walking into a room 
full of people, eating in front of others). This can be contrasted with FNE which is defined in 
reference to teasing and being talked about. With these differences in mind, a sense of 
efficacy may be enough to mitigate self-consciousness when social anxiety is derived through 
self-reflexive processes. In contrast, a number of factors above and beyond efficacy may be 
important when considering social anxiety derived from negative peer group dynamics (e.g., 
actual social/experiential change).  
  
Moderation: Social Integration and Perspective-Taking 
       The moderation of this mediation by social integration—i.e., non-significance at higher 
levels for both forms of social anxiety—can be interpreted in the same light as above. In brief, 
these findings suggest as well that social anxiety can be experienced in light of the 
psychological process described across levels of social integration. At the same time, social 
integration does appear to provide a buffer against negative emotional experience given this 
association was not significant for those of the highest level of social integration. The findings 
perhaps highlight most importantly that youth are vulnerable to negative emotional 
experiences even when they are relatively (on average) happy with their social relations. This 
may be due to the salience of peer relations during this period making any social deprivation 
keenly felt. On a positive note, social integration moderated (increased) the attenuating effect 
that self-efficacy had on social anxiety for those of low social integration. This suggests that 
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confidence can be a significant buffer against social anxiety in conditions of social 
deprivation for those with Stage 3 perspective-taking abilities.   
       As noted above it was hypothesised that social integration would be more important to 
the prediction of social anxiety at Stage 3 given that individuals at this stage conceptualise 
social interaction in a more interdependent and less egocentric manner (Selman, 1980, 2003). 
This was largely supported given that only social integration (and no form of efficacy) 
predicted SAD-New. Self-efficacy was also predictive of observational social anxiety only 
because social integration moderated the relationship between public self-consciousness and 
efficacy for conflict. Specifically, higher perceptions of conflict efficacy were predictive of 
reduced observational social anxiety only at low levels of social integration. Together these 
findings support the hypothesis that social integration would be a more important predictor of 
social anxiety at Stage 3, compared to efficacy, given Stage 3 individuals are better at 
conceptualising the integrated nature of social relationships and, as a consequence, place less 
emphasis on a sense of confidence. The exception to this is that both efficacy for conflict and 
social integration predicted FNE interdependently (i.e., both predicted social anxiety when 
added to the regression equation simultaneously) suggesting that confidence is still an 
important factor in mitigating FNE; indeed, the moderation analyses revealed that this was 
true only at low levels of social integration. At the same time, indicative of moderation by 
perspective-taking stage, is that efficacy for conflict, not non-conflict, was predictive of both 
observational social anxiety and FNE. This is consistent with Stage 3 individuals being able to 
assimilate others’ perspectives from a third-person perspective (as discussed above).  
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General Discussion and Future Research 
       
       This study shows that social anxiety, defined by a reflexive consideration of others’ 
(negative) potential views and behaviour toward the self, appears in middle childhood 
contemporaneous with complementary developments in the ability to take others’ 
perspectives on the self. As such, this research suggests that social anxiety of this quality, 
dependent on Stage 2 perspective-taking abilities, can be distinguished on a cognitive-
developmental basis from social anxiety occurring without these capacities. One can assume, 
for example, that behavioural inhibition (e.g., Kagan et al., 1988) and social anxiety (disorder) 
in preschoolers (e.g., Bufferd et al., 2011; Egger et al., 2006) does not include the 
consideration of others’ (negative) perspectives on the self as these appear to rely on the 
development of Stage 2 perspective-taking abilities. At the same time, infants and young 
children do experience fear and anxiety in social situations before these mechanisms have 
developed.  How then are earlier forms of social anxiety to be classified?  
       A broad framework pointed to in this research, and that which may also be applied to 
other evaluative phenomena, is differences in whether and what kind of subjectivity is 
involved in generating social anxiety. This is not a new idea. Lewis (2007), for example, 
proposed a three stage model beginning with the development of an “idea of me” toward an 
appreciation of standards rules and goals (see Crozier, 2010). In this model the development 
of self-representation is argued to be the key cognitive-developmental mechanism. Yet, as 
Zinck (2008) pointed out, this model is problematic because it cannot account for what appear 
to be “self-conscious” behaviours predating self-representation (e.g., coyness in infants, 
Reddy, 2000).  
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       A number of developmental theories dovetail in a description of development of persons 
as beginning with non-conceptual sensory experience characterised by routine interactions 
between self, other (a parental figure) and the social environment which “recreate” affective 
and interactional sequences in self and others (e.g., Case, 1991; Meltzoff, 1990; Piaget, 1963; 
Russell, 1996, 1999). These repeated interactions are, in turn, argued to provide infants with 
an early “appreciation” of their own agency and intentionality in relation to the social world 
(i.e., self-world distinction) and the actions and attention of others more specifically (see 
Carpendale, Lewis, Müller, & Racine, 2005; Martin et al., 2008; Newen & Vogeley, 2003; 
Reddy, 2003; 2005; Zinck, 2008). It may be these early nonconceptual experiences, with self 
and other(s), that underlie early examples of social evaluative phenomena such as coyness 
and/or exposure embarrassment (e.g., Reddy, 2000), as well as fear of novelty (see Moretti & 
Higgins, 1999). This early “basic” affective experience, built on nonconceptual sensory 
interactions with self-other-world, may, in turn, build on the cognitive basis of these 
experiences.  
       At the same time, it is also necessary to explain social evaluative anxiety. The term 
anxiety suggests some cognizance and elaboration on a threat to self from something “other”, 
that is, something outside the self. Infants appear to be endowed with basic emotions (e.g., 
“fear”) and arousal patterns (negative affect) that ensure survival-needs are met via the 
attention the child receives from the attachment figure. These patterns of interaction, mediated 
by aversive environmental conditions, are also activated in conditions of apparent social threat 
(e.g., novelty, separation) suggesting “social anxiety” or “behavioural inhibition”. In infancy, 
however, the child’s own cognitive elaboration of social threat may be limited. This appears 
to be predicated, in part, on the fact that numerous and contemporaneous developments in 
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language and cognition are likely necessary before threats to self can be conceptualised at a 
cognitive level; to include, for example, not only the potential of physical and environmental 
threats (e.g., separation, novelty) but to an elaboration on the apparent (imagined) threat 
coming from another’s imagined perception of them. That is, it appears that social evaluative 
experiences eventually come to be elicited outside of more basic and routinised circumstances 
of threat to become more self-reflexive in anticipation of social interactions and imagined 
outcomes. This is likely to require further developments in self-other representation and well 
as self-other conceptual knowledge. Martin, Sokol, and Elfers (2008; see also Moretti & 
Higgins, 1999) detailing a theory of social perspective-taking including preconceptual and 
reflective forms as detailed in Chapter 6 argue: 
 
‘[that the] genesis of our psychological personhood lies in the 
developmental movement from embodied positioning within extant 
interpersonal and social perspectives to the linguistically mediated 
recollection and imagination of intersubjective perspectives. These 
later levels of perspective taking are still embodied, but now, through 
the vehicles of language and thought, may be recollectively and 
imaginatively freed from immediate social contexts (italics added, p. 
314). 
 
 
       This characterisation of subjective development, as moving from preconceptual forms of 
perspective-taking or social positioning toward greater self-reflexivity might help to describe 
changes in the quality or kind of social anxiety observed at different ages as a function of 
developmental differences in their underlying subjective mechanisms. A challenge for 
researchers is to capture this developmental variation. Currently, there has been a focus on 
making the assessment of social evaluation developmentally sensitive by including situations 
that are more relevant to each age group. The findings from this research have been used to 
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suggest that social evaluative concerns are identifiable at increasingly younger ages—e.g., 
that the apparently cognitively-mediated “self-consciousness shyness” is typical of 5 to 6 
year-olds. Yet, the subjective quality of these social evaluative concerns are only implied by 
the type of situation in which they arise. It is not clear, for example, that children this age are 
self-consciously considering or anticipating others’ negative perspectives on the self. Indeed, 
the current study suggests that this is unlikely given that subjective concerns about the 
perceptions and behaviours of others toward the self, depended on perceptual (i.e., 
perspective-taking) and conceptual developments (i.e., knowledge of persons) that are of 
greater complexity than those available to children this age. The development of assessment 
paradigms where children, with limited verbal ability, can indicate their reactions (thoughts 
and feelings) and that which they perceive (or not) in others non-verbally (e.g., pictorially) 
may further this area.  
       Inhibiting the integration of developmental processes into a complete understanding of 
social anxiety across development is that little attention has been paid to changes beyond the 
age of 5 years (Carpendale & Lewis, 2006). There has been a sustained focus on false-belief 
understanding that has contributed to a “one miracle view” of social development (Carpendale 
& Lewis, 2010). Best, Miller, and Jones (2009) identify the same issue in the area of 
executive functions which they suggest are likely to underlie perspective-taking and processes 
within the peer domain, but highlight the dearth of relevant research. Selman’s (1980) model 
provides one way to measure these kinds of developments across the entire developmental 
spectrum without breaking them into numerous components but there are challenges here as 
well. Even Selman (2008) notes the difficulty of relating broad developments in social 
understanding to meaningful qualitative shifts in actual psychosocial processes. Indeed, this is 
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difficult even within a limited span of development characterised by false belief 
understanding.  
       On the other hand, this study suggests that social perspective-taking is meaningfully 
linked to social and emotional outcomes, especially given the findings that perspective-taking 
stages moderated the prediction of social anxiety in theoretically meaningful ways. A fruitful 
area for further research is the use of direct measures of varied psychological mechanisms 
(e.g., communicative engagements, perspective-taking co-ordination, executive functions) as 
they occur within actual social engagements (Hay, Caplan & Nash, 2009). Such interactive 
paradigms exist for studying the child engaged with parents and peers in “joint attention” 
(e.g., Mundy et al., 2003) and “mental-state talk” (e.g., Hughes, Ensor, & Marks, 2011); yet, 
greater attention should be paid to these processes occurring within middle childhood.  
       The peer domain provides fertile ground for studying the links between the psychological 
mechanisms described (e.g., perspective-taking coordination) and actual social engagements 
as it is here where these mechanisms emerge and are utilised. Some even argue that it is in the 
peer domain, rather than between parent and child, that true psychological interactivity 
emerges (e.g., Brownell, Nichols, & Svetlova, 2005; Martin et al., 2008; Reddy, Hay, Murray, 
& Trevarthen, 1997). Despite this, the development of psychological mechanisms, within and 
through peer interactions, has rarely been studied. This is not due to a dearth of relevant 
theorising. For example, most recent accounts of the imaginary audience—i.e.,  preoccupation 
with others’ apparent interest in the self/self-consciousness—is a functional and relational 
mechanism supporting separation-individuation (Lapsley, 1993) and, in light of perspective-
taking developments, an effort to align the self with others according to increasingly diverse 
and varied set of social norms and practices (Martin & Sokol, 2010). Importantly, these 
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theories describe the subjective (i.e., individuation/perspective-taking) and interactive context 
(parents, peers, places) as intimately and functionally related. As such, to return to issues of 
measurement, these intersubjective accounts provide a fertile basis for the study of these 
processes utilising interactive paradigms to study intersubjective developments within actual 
social interactions (e.g., gossiping, exclusionary practices, moving away from home) (see Bell 
& Bromnick, 2003; Vartanian, 2001 for examples of an interactive contextual approach). 
      More generally, it is important that future research attempts to elucidate those factors that 
contribute to the continuation of social anxiety across time. This is important from a clinical-
developmental perspective as it is this continuation of symptomatic behaviour that 
characterises disorder and the need for psychosocial intervention. We know that various 
“negative” psychosocial variables are strong predictors of social anxiety (e.g., lowered 
efficacy, social rejection), while at the same time, we know very little about how social 
anxiety moderates these and other aspects of the developmental trajectory, especially over 
time. For example, why is it that despite these strong associations that many, even very 
socially anxious individuals, do not remain that way over time (Westenberg et al., 2007)?  
      One answer to the above question is that social anxiety in childhood is a normal 
phenomenon that waxes and wanes across development as a function of psychosocial 
maturation. In these cases it may “work itself out”. Alternatively, it may not need such 
“working out” at all. It may be that social anxiety, although difficult in the short term, primes 
individuals to ensure that they maintain favourable and beneficial relations with others. That 
is, when not extreme, social anxiety may cue “social problem-solving”.  This “social problem-
solving” aspect of social anxiety may explain why it was not associated with age in the 
current study—i.e., because eight year-olds are just as concerned as adolescents about 
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navigating the self within their peer relationships and ensuring that they are accepted. In this 
vein, social anxiety may be functional in many ways and it may be a gradual improvement to 
psychosocial outcomes that explain why it waxes and wanes considerably. Indeed, social 
anxiety decreased across levels of social perspective-taking which are conceptualised as a 
primary mechanism through which individuals navigate their interpersonal relations with 
increasing maturity and understanding. In this vein, the field may benefit from further 
exploration of the reparative social processes which may emerge from social evaluative 
concerns overtime (see Keltner & Busswell, 1997; Keltner & Kring, 1998; for a consideration 
of these integrative factors in the study of embarrassment). 
 
Study Limitations 
 
       It should be acknowledged that the current study suffers from various limitations. The 
study is cross-sectional only. A longitudinal design, where children were followed for several 
years, would provide a more detailed picture regarding the developmental underpinnings of 
social anxiety. For example, it can only be assumed from this study that it is the transition 
from one stage to the next that increases (Stage 1 to Stage 2) and attenuates (Stage 2 to Stage 
3 and 4) social anxiety. It would be informative to know when these broad transitions in 
sociocognitive maturity are (and not) associated with changes in social anxiety. Indeed, this 
study highlights that differences in social motives, self-efficacy and social integration explain 
social anxiety within perspective-taking stages. As such, not all individuals making the 
transition from one cognitive-developmental stage experience greater (Stage 2) or lesser 
(Stage 3) social anxiety. It may be that continuity and change in these individual differences 
determines whether developments in sociocognitive maturity are associated with changes in 
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social anxiety at a given stage. Only a longitudinal design can confirm whether this is the 
case.       
       In addition, as a cross-sectional study, sample sizes were small for Stage 1 and 4. Small 
sample sizes in these groups are likely to have contributed to the non-significant relationships 
between the study’s variables within these stages. Given this limitation the relationships 
between variables within these stages could not be verified. This means that key confirmatory 
and discriminatory data are not available. With greater sample sizes it would have been 
possible to determine whether variables not dependent on perspective-taking were related at 
Stage 1 (e.g., confidence and satisfaction with peer relations). At Stage 4, it would have been 
useful to know whether the trends from Stage 3 continued given the similarities between these 
stages. Another limitation is that no verbal or cognitive measures were included. As such, 
confounds (e.g., language ability, discussed below) and specificity of perspective-taking could 
not be appropriately illustrated. 
       It also would have been better to include children younger than 8 years. While it is clear 
that the younger children included were unable to complete the self-report questionnaires 
some careful interviewing and parent-reports may have provided some useful information 
(e.g., parents may have been asked about what their children actually tell them about their 
social fears so that information on the child’s subjective experience could be gathered). 
Indeed, this limitation highlights the need to develop innovative ways of measuring complex 
cognitive phenomena in children.  
       In addition, the assessment of both social anxiety and perspective-taking make demands 
on the ability to reflect on experience and report them through verbal means. Of course, it is 
developments in conceptual understanding that are argued to provide a measure of perceptual 
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abilities and to, in turn, account for the emergence of social anxiety. Yet, it may be that the 
shared demands on verbal ability, between measurement, introduce a confound to the 
developmental interpretation of these findings. Milligan, Astington, and Dack’s (2007) meta-
analysis of over 100 studies reports a strong relationship between general language ability, 
including expressive language, and false belief understanding. In this light, it is possible that 
some children find it difficult to elaborate on their social conceptions and experiences of 
social anxiety verbally, but nevertheless experience these concerns “in the moment”. This has 
pragmatic implications because “in the moment” experiences of social anxiety are associated 
with social and psychological disruption regardless of whether these experiences are 
cognitively and/or verbally elaborated expressively.  
       Similarly, although individuals without relevant perspective-taking skills are not expected 
to have the conceptual abilities required to think about others’ views of the self, and so are 
expected to score low on the social anxiety scales as they did in this study, it remains that 
their responses may be confounded by their inability to understand the questions. Although 
the consistency with which Stage 1 individuals responded to the social anxiety scales suggests 
that their answers are meaningful—rather than completely random—the current study would 
be strengthened by controlling for confounded understanding of the social anxiety 
questionnaires. In future, researchers may seek to examine response patterns on (non-social) 
anxiety items where perspective-taking does not play a role and they are expected to 
understand the question. If, in such a scenario, there is an understanding or experience of 
(non-social) anxiety but not social anxiety (involving perspective-taking) one could be more 
confident that responses are linked in the way proposed, and not confounded by 
misunderstanding. 
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       Relating to the assessment procedure, questionnaires were presented in a fixed order and 
so it is possible that order effects confound the results. The reliability of the social 
understanding interviews was also not established. The self-monitoring measures were also 
changed substantially for the goals of the study and require further study. At the same time, 
there is a dearth of reliable and validated measures of these constructs for youth generally. 
Finally, the generalisability of these findings is limited by the fact that response rate was poor 
at both the school and parent-child level and the sample was limited to children from middle-
class Anglo families. Significantly more girls than boys participated in the study. It would be 
informative to know whether the findings replicate in more representative and less privileged 
and ethnically diverse samples. 
       In spite of these limitations, this study provides some useful insights into the cognitive-
developmental underpinnings and psychosocial process associated with social anxiety. The 
current findings appear to indicate at least that core social anxiety phenomena are apparent 
well before adolescence and associated with developments in perspective-taking and 
individual differences; differences which themselves are specific to sociocognitive maturity.   
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The Individuals Interview  
(Selman et al., 1979) 
 
Instructions – For interviewing younger children on conceptions of individuals we have found 
the Puppy Story preferable, while for older children, adolescents and adults, the Ping-Pong 
Story is better. These same stories are presented in filmstrip form published by Guidance 
associates.  
 
The Puppy Story 
(for children below the age of 9 or 10) 
 
Tom has just saved some money to buy Mike Hunter a birthday present. He and his friend 
Greg go downtown to try to decide what Mike will like. Tom tells Greg that Mike is sad these 
days because Mike’s dog Pepper ran away. They see Mike and decide to try to find out what 
Mike wants without asking him right off. After talking to Mike for a while the kids realize 
that Mike is really sad because of his lost dog. When Greg suggests he get a new dog, Mike 
says he can’t just get a new dog and have things be the same. Then Mike leaves to run some 
errands. As Mike’s friends shop some more they see a puppy for sale in the pet store. It is the 
last one left. The owner says that the puppy will probably be sold by tomorrow. Tom and 
Greg discuss whether to get Mike the puppy. Tom has to decide right away. What do you 
think Tom will do? 
 
Interviewer Questions 
 
Open-ended Probes – What do you think Tom, the boy who is buying the birthday present 
should do? Why? Have you ever known a boy like Mike, what was he like? 
 
Issue 
I. Subjectivity 
1. How do you think Mike might have felt it Tom gave him the new puppy 
2. If Mike’s smiling could still be sad, how is that possible? Could someone look 
happy on the outside, but be sad on the inside? How is that possible? 
3. Could he feel happy and sad at the same time? Have you ever been in a situation 
where you felt happy and sad at the same time? 
4. Could he feel both happy and sad about the new puppy? Could he have mixed 
feelings? How can feelings be mixed, like happy and sad? 
5. Can you ever know another’s feelings? When? 
Issue 
II. Self-Reflection 
1.   Mike said he never wants to see another puppy again. Why did he say that? 
2.   Did he mean what he said? Can someone say something and not mean it? How? 
3.   Do you think Mike would change his mind later? Why? Is it possible that he 
doesn’t know his own mind? 
4.   Might Mike feel guilty about losing his dog? Why? What is guilt, anyway? 
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5.   Is it possible that Mike doesn’t know how he feels? How is that possible? 
6.   Is it possible to not know your own feelings, even if you think about them? 
7.   Did you ever think you’d feel one way and then find out you felt another? How 
could that happen?  
8.   Can you ever fool yourself? How? What’s the difference between fooling 
yourself and fooling somebody else? 
Issue 
III. Conceptions of Personality 
1. What kind of person do you think Tom is, the boy who had to decide whether or 
not to get Mike the puppy? 
2. Was he a thoughtful (kind) person? What makes a person thoughtful (kind)? How 
can you tell if a person is thoughtful (kind)? What do you think makes someone 
become a thoughtful (kind) person? 
3. What kind of person is Mike if he doesn’t care if the dog is lost? Can you tell 
what kind of person someone is from a situation like this?  
4. How does one get to know someone else’s personality? What is a personality? 
Can someone have more the one personality? 
5. Do you think Tom will lose self-esteem if he gets Mike a puppy and he doesn’t 
like it? Why? Does one’s self-esteem have anything to do with what kind of 
person you are? 
Issue 
IV. Personality Transformation 
1. What do you think it will take to change the way Mike feels about losing his old 
dog Pepper? How long will it take him to get over it? Why? What will it take to 
make him happy again? 
2. If Mike had been older, say 18, do you think he would have acted the same way 
about losing his dog? Why? How does being older change the way a person acts? 
3. If Mike is usually an unhappy kid now, what will he be like when he grows up? 
Do you think he will change or stay the same? How do people usually change as 
they get older? 
4. If you were Mike’s Friend, what would you do to help him get over his lost dog? 
Anything besides buying him another dog? What might you say to him? 
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The Ping Pong Story 
 
Keith, 10, and Jerry, 8, live across the street from each other and are good friends, even 
though Keith is older. They have a lot in common, but Keith especially likes playing ping-
pong at Jerry's house. However, Keith always wins, and finally one day when he beats Jerry 
21 to 10, Jerry throws down his paddle and says, “That's it! There's no sense in me playing 
ping-pong anymore because I always lose”. 
     He and Keith argue, Keith saying he should keep trying, Jerry saying you don't know what 
it feels like to lose all the time. Keith says, "You don't want me to think you're a poor sport, 
do you?" Jerry says it's not being a poor sport; it's just no fun for him when he never wins. 
Keith says, "Think about me. If you won't play with me, where am I going to play? No one 
else has a ping-pong table." They argue louder and louder, and Jerry's 11- or 12-year-old 
sister, Jean, and her friends, Lisa and Ellen, come in to see what's the matter. When the boys 
tell Jean, she says she can see that they both have a point. Why don't they not play ping-pong 
with each other for a little while, and she will let Jerry practice with her. Then maybe when he 
gets better, he could try playing with Keith again. At first Jerry says that wouldn't do any 
good. Finally, Jean suggests that maybe it's time to try playing with Keith again. Jerry says he 
doesn't think he's good enough and he doesn't want to lose. Jean says he'll never know if he 
doesn't try. So they play. 
     At the beginning of the game, Jerry says that if he loses this time, he'll give up ping-pong 
for good. Keith claims he's out of practice, says Jerry really has gotten a lot better. Jerry wins 
and is all excited, but Lisa says, "Wow, Keith, you sure didn't do very well." Jerry stops 
leaping around and says, "You were just out of practice, right? You didn't let me win, did 
you?"  
 
Interviewer Questions 
 
Open-ended Probes—What do you think is the problem in this story? What do you think the 
older boy, Keith, did? Do you think he let Jerry win? Why would he do that? Why might he 
not let Jerry win? Have you ever known a kid (person) like Jerry? What was he like? What do 
you think made him that way? 
 
Issue  
   I. Subjectivity 
1. If Jerry wins, but finds out that Keith let him win, how will Jerry Feel? Why? 
Could he feel more than just____ about winning? Could he feel both happy and 
upset? Happy that he won, but upset that Keith let him win? How could that be? 
How can you feel two ways about something? 
2. If Jerry is happy about finally winning, but sad that Keith let him win, how would 
he feel overall? Could he have mixed feelings? What would that mean? Have you 
ever had mixed feelings about something? Tell me about it? How can feelings be 
mixed, like happy and sad? 
3. If Jerry is smiling even after he finds out that Keith let him win, does that mean 
he is happy? Is a person always happy when you see him smiling? Could a person 
look happy on the outside, but be sad on the inside? How is that possible? 
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Issue 
II.       Self-Reflection 
1. Suppose Jerry finds out that Keith let him win and he says to Keith, “I never 
cared about ping-pong anyway.” Why might he say something like that? Why 
might he say something he didn’t mean? 
2. Could Jerry fool himself into thinking he didn’t care about the game? How could 
he do that? (Why couldn’t he do that?) Is it ever possible to really fool yourself? 
3. Is there a difference between fooling yourself and fooling another person? What 
is it? 
4. If Jerry Tells himself he is going to lose will the affect the way he plays the 
game? Why would that be? 
5. Would it help jerry if he had confidence? Why might confidence help? What is 
confidence, anyway? (If subject says they don’t know, say, a feeling he can do a 
good job.) How does a person gain confidence? Can you have confidence even if 
you lose? How? 
6. If Keith lets Jerry win, but then Jerry finds out, what will happy to Jerry’s 
confidence? Do you think Jerry might be embarrassed if he finds out that Keith 
let him win? Why? What does it mean when someone is embarrassed? 
Issue  
III.        Conceptions of Personality 
1.  What kind of person do you think Jerry is? Does watching how he plays ping-
pong with Keith tell you what kind of person he might be? From seeing the way 
he plays ping-pong, what kind of person do you think he would be in school? 
2.  Do you think Jerry is poor sport (or a sore loser, stubborn, thin-skinned, overly 
competitive)? What would that tell you about him? What does it mean when you 
say a person is a poor sport? What makes a person become a poor sport? 
3.   Is there a difference between being a poor sport and just being tired of losing?  
What is the difference? 
4.  Can Jerry be a poor sport sometimes but other times not make a big deal if he 
wins or loses? How is that possible? 
5.  Can there be a different side to Jerry, other than just being a poor sport? Can there 
be different parts to a person? 
6.  What kind of personality do you think Jerry has? What does it mean when you say 
that you know what kind of personality someone has? Can a person have more 
than one personality? How is that possible? 
Issue  
IV.       Personality Transformation 
1.  If Jerry is a poor sport now, what will he be like when he grows up? Do you think 
he will change or will he stay the same? What might make him change? How do 
people change as they get older? 
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2.  If Jerry was older, do you think he would act the same when he lost at ping-pong? 
How does being older change the way a person acts? 
3.   If Jerry knows he is a poor sport, do you think there is any way he can change the 
way he is? How can a person change themselves? 
4.   If you were Jerry’s friend, how might you help him change from being a poor 
sport? Anything besides letting him win? What might you say to help him 
change? Why that? 
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Social Anxiety Scale for Children-Revised (La Greca, 1999) 
 
 
I worry about doing something new in front of other kids 
        1                    2                           3                             4                               5 
Not at all        Hardly Ever        Sometimes        Most of the time        All of the time 
 
I like to play with other kids 
        1                    2                           3                             4                               5 
Not at all        Hardly Ever        Sometimes        Most of the time        All of the time 
 
I worry about being teased 
        1                    2                           3                             4                               5 
Not at all        Hardly Ever        Sometimes        Most of the time        All of the time 
 
I feel shy around kids I don't know 
        1                    2                           3                             4                               5 
Not at all        Hardly Ever        Sometimes        Most of the time        All of the time 
 
I only talk to kids that I know really well 
        1                    2                           3                             4                               5 
Not at all        Hardly Ever        Sometimes        Most of the time        All of the time 
 
I feel that other kids talk about me behind my back 
        1                    2                           3                             4                               5 
Not at all        Hardly Ever        Sometimes        Most of the time        All of the time 
 
I like to read 
        1                    2                           3                             4                               5 
Not at all        Hardly Ever        Sometimes        Most of the time        All of the time 
 
I worry about what other kids think of me 
        1                    2                           3                             4                               5 
Not at all        Hardly Ever        Sometimes        Most of the time        All of the time 
 
I'm afraid other kids will not like me 
        1                    2                           3                             4                               5 
Not at all        Hardly Ever        Sometimes        Most of the time        All of the time 
 
I get nervous when I talk to kids I don't know very well 
        1                    2                           3                             4                               5 
Not at all        Hardly Ever        Sometimes        Most of the time        All of the time 
 
I like to play sports 
        1                    2                           3                             4                               5 
Not at all        Hardly Ever        Sometimes        Most of the time        All of the time 
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I worry about what other children say about me 
        1                    2                           3                             4                               5 
Not at all        Hardly Ever        Sometimes        Most of the time        All of the time 
 
I get nervous when I meet new kids 
        1                    2                           3                             4                               5 
Not at all        Hardly Ever        Sometimes        Most of the time        All of the time 
 
I worry that other kids don't like me 
        1                    2                           3                             4                               5 
Not at all        Hardly Ever        Sometimes        Most of the time        All of the time 
 
I'm quiet when I'm with a group of kids 
        1                    2                           3                             4                               5 
Not at all        Hardly Ever        Sometimes        Most of the time        All of the time 
 
I like to do things by myself  
        1                    2                           3                             4                               5 
Not at all        Hardly Ever        Sometimes        Most of the time        All of the time 
 
I feel that other kids make fun of me 
        1                    2                           3                             4                               5 
Not at all        Hardly Ever        Sometimes        Most of the time        All of the time 
 
If I get into an argument with another kid I worry that he or she won't like me 
        1                    2                           3                             4                               5 
Not at all        Hardly Ever        Sometimes        Most of the time        All of the time 
 
I'm afraid to invite other kids to my house because they might say no 
        1                    2                           3                             4                               5 
Not at all        Hardly Ever        Sometimes        Most of the time        All of the time 
 
I feel nervous when I'm around certain kids 
        1                    2                           3                             4                               5 
Not at all        Hardly Ever        Sometimes        Most of the time        All of the time 
 
I feel shy even with kids I know well 
        1                    2                           3                             4                               5 
Not at all        Hardly Ever        Sometimes        Most of the time        All of the time 
 
It's hard for me to ask other kids to play with me 
        1                    2                           3                             4                               5 
Not at all        Hardly Ever        Sometimes        Most of the time        All of the time 
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Observational Social Anxiety 
 
Please circle the answer that best describes you 
 
 
I get anxious doing things when people are watching 
Never    Rarely     Sometimes     Often    Regularly  
 
I fear I may do something stupid myself in front of others 
Never    Rarely     Sometimes     Often    Regularly  
 
I feel anxious when…Entering a room full of people 
Never    Rarely     Sometimes     Often    Regularly  
 
I feel anxious when…Eating in front of others 
Never    Rarely     Sometimes     Often    Regularly  
 
I feel anxious when…Wearing different clothes 
Never    Rarely     Sometimes     Often    Regularly  
 
I feel anxious when…Writing in front of others 
Never    Rarely     Sometimes     Often    Regularly  
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Self-Consciousness Scale 
 
Please circle the answer that best describes you 
 
1. I want people to think well of me 
Never True     Sometimes True     Often True     Always True 
 
2. I don’t worry about how I look  
Never True     Sometimes True     Often True     Always True 
 
3. If I have had my hair cut, it feels like people look at me more 
Never True     Sometimes True     Often True     Always True 
 
4. I often wonder why I do things 
Never True     Sometimes True     Often True     Always True 
 
5. I think about how I am feeling a lot 
Never True     Sometimes True     Often True     Always True 
 
6. I never think about what other people think of me 
Never True     Sometimes True     Often True     Always True 
 
7. When I am dancing/playing team games, I wonder what other people think about me 
Never True     Sometimes True     Often True     Always True 
 
8. Before leaving for school I take one last look in the mirror to make sure everything 
looks alright 
Never True     Sometimes True     Often True     Always True 
 
9. I always know what kind of mood I am in 
Never True     Sometimes True     Often True     Always True 
 
10. Before I go somewhere, I sometimes imagine how I am going to feel 
Never True     Sometimes True     Often True     Always True 
 
11. I often wonder what other people think of me  
Never True     Sometimes True     Often True     Always True 
 
12. When playing a game I am aware that others are watching me 
Never True     Sometimes True     Often True     Always True 
13. I don’t know how I work things out…the answer just pops into my head 
Never True     Sometimes True     Often True     Always True 
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14. I often feel like I am the centre of attention and that people are looking at me and 
thinking about me  
Never True     Sometimes True     Often True     Always True 
 
15. I don’t think about why I do something I just do it 
Never True     Sometimes True     Often True     Always True 
 
16. When getting dressed on the weekend I often think about what others might think so 
that I can decide what to finally wear  
Never True     Sometimes True     Often True     Always True 
 
17. I don’t think about my feelings very often  
Never True     Sometimes True     Often True     Always True 
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Self-Presentation Scale 
 
Please circle the answer that best describes you 
 
 
1. I think about my behaviour and try to fit in wherever I am 
     Never            Sometimes            Usually            Always 
 
 
2. In almost all situations I think about how I should act so that I will make a good 
impression 
     Never            Sometimes            Usually            Always 
 
 
3. Once I know how I am supposed to act, I try to act that way 
     Never            Sometimes            Usually            Always 
 
 
4. I will act differently to suit different situations  
     Never            Sometimes            Usually            Always 
 
 
5. When I am with a group of people, I will think about changing the way I act to fit in 
Never            Sometimes            Usually            Always 
 
 
6. When I am not sure how to act I watch others to see what to do  
 Never            Sometimes            Usually            Always 
 
 
7. I try to fit my behaviour to the situation I find myself in 
Never            Sometimes            Usually            Always 
 
 
8. When I feel that I am not making a good impression I will try and   change it 
       Never            Sometimes            Usually            Always 
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Self-Efficacy for Peer Interactions Scale (Wheeler & Ladd, 1982) 
 
 
1. Some kids want to play a game. Asking them if you play to is____for you? 
HARD!           hard           easy           or          EASY! 
 
 
2. Some kids are arguing about how to play a game. Telling them the rules is___ for  you. 
HARD!           hard           easy           or          EASY! 
 
 
3. Some kids are teasing your friend. Telling them to stop is____for you. 
HARD!           hard           easy           or          EASY! 
 
 
4. You want to start a game. Asking other kids to play the game is____for you. 
HARD!           hard           easy           or          EASY! 
 
 
5. A kid tries to take your turn during a game. Telling the kid it's your turn 
    is____for you. 
HARD!           hard           easy           or          EASY! 
 
 
6. Some kids are going to lunch. Asking if you can sit with them is____for you. 
HARD!           hard           easy           or          EASY! 
 
 
7. A kid cuts in front of you in line. Telling the kid not to cut in is____for you. 
HARD!           hard           easy           or          EASY! 
 
  
8. A kid wants to do something that will get you into trouble. Asking the kid to do    
    something else is____for you. 
HARD!           hard           easy           or          EASY! 
 
 
9. Some kids are making fun of someone in your classroom. Telling them to stop    
    is____for you. 
HARD!           hard           easy           or          EASY! 
 
 
10. Some kids need more people to be on their teams. Asking to be on a team is____for you. 
           HARD!           hard           easy           or          EASY! 
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11. You have to carry some things home after school. Asking another kid to help you   
       is ____for you. 
HARD!           hard           easy           or          EASY! 
 
 
12. A kid always wants to be first when you play a game. Telling the kid you are  
      going first is____for you. 
HARD!           hard           easy           or          EASY! 
 
 
13. Your class is going on a trip and everyone needs a partner. Asking someone to  
      be your partner is____for you. 
HARD!           hard           easy           or          EASY! 
  
 
14. A kid does not like your friend. Telling the kid to be nice to your friend is____for   
      you. 
HARD!           hard           easy           or          EASY! 
 
 
15. Some kids are deciding what game to play. Telling them about a game you like   
      is____for you. 
HARD!           hard           easy           or          EASY! 
  
 
16. You are having fun playing a game but the other kids want to stop. Asking them   
      to finish playing is____for you. 
HARD!           hard           easy           or          EASY! 
 
 
17. You are working on a project. Asking another kid to help is____for you. 
HARD!           hard           easy           or          EASY! 
  
 
18. Some kids are using your play area. Asking them to move is____for you. 
HARD!           hard           easy           or          EASY! 
 
 
19. Some kids are deciding what to do after school. Telling them what you want to   
      do is____for you. 
HARD!           hard           easy           or          EASY! 
 
 
20. A group of kids wants to play a game that you don't like. Asking them to play a  
      game you like is____ for you. 
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HARD!           hard           easy           or          EASY! 
 
21. Some kids are planning a party. Asking them to invite your friend is____for you. 
HARD!           hard           easy           or          EASY! 
 
 
22. A kid is yelling at you. Telling the kid to stop is____for you. 
HARD!           hard           easy           or          EASY! 
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Social Interaction Questionnaire 
 
Please circle the answer that best describes you 
 
1. At my school I have several close friends 
Definitely False           False            True           Definitely True 
 
2. My friends and I have many things in common 
Definitely False           False            True           Definitely True 
 
3. I feel different from most of the people at my school 
Definitely False            False            True           Definitely True 
 
4. I act differently so others will like me 
Definitely False           False            True           Definitely True 
 
5. It is easy for me to be liked by my class/peers 
Definitely False            False            True           Definitely True 
 
6. Others like me because I am popular 
Definitely False           False            True           Definitely True 
 
7. Other students are liked more than I am 
Definitely False            False            True           Definitely True 
 
8. Other students expect me to be different 
Definitely False            False            True           Definitely True 
 
9. I often feel distant from my classmates 
Definitely False            False            True           Definitely True 
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10. I often feel lonely at school  
      Definitely False            False            True           Definitely True    
 
11. I am not a ‘geek’  
      Definitely False           False            True           Definitely True     
 
12. I wish I could participate in more activities with other students than I do  
      Definitely False            False            True           Definitely True     
 
13. I am content with the amount of time I spend with classmates  
      Definitely False            False            True           Definitely True     
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DEAKIN UNIVERSITY 
PLAIN LANGUAGE STATEMENT  
 
Plain Language Statement for PARENTS 
Date: 22.07.10 
Full Project Title: Reasoning ability, social relationships and fears of negative evaluation in 
children and adolescents.   
Principal Researcher: Associate Professor David Mellor  
Student Researcher: Thane Camwell  
 
Dear Parents/Guardians  
 
My name is Thane Camwell and I am studying for a Doctor of Psychology degree at Deakin 
University. For my studies I am doing a research project with Associate Professor David 
Mellor who is also from Deakin University. Your child’s school has been invited to 
participate in this research project. We are hoping that we can recruit two to three hundred 
students aged 7-15 from the participating schools, and hope that you will allow your child to 
participate in this project.  
 
As background, this project seeks to better understand the changes that occur in youth’s 
reasoning ability as they grow. We know that they can consider more information and that 
they become interested in the perspectives and views of others. These developments are 
important for social and emotional skill development. In trying to understand themselves and 
others, and negotiate personal relationships, it is not surprising that we also see a rise in self-
consciousness and fears of negative evaluation. We are interested in what changes, in 
understanding of self and others, might underlie children/adolescents being self-conscious at 
this sensitive time. We would also like to know how personality traits and peer relationships 
might influence these concerns. This research will also tell us how significant social anxiety 
actually is for Australian youth.   
 
This is an important area because for approximately 10% to 15% youth these concerns have a 
significant effect on their academic achievement, their ability to make lasting friendships and 
establishment of a sense of security and independence in adulthood. Greater understanding of 
what makes this time a sensitive period will contribute to our understanding of the thinking 
patterns of youth and will allow us to help those who experience significant self-
consciousness and social fears at this time.       
 
Participation in this research will involve your child speaking to the researcher (Thane 
Camwell) in a one-on-one interview and answering questions related to social stories. These 
stories encourage the participant to think about situations from multiple perspectives and 
provide an assessment of their perspective-taking skills. For example, one story involves them 
considering whether it is fair that a boy (or girl) throw a party at their school in order to 
impress their peers - even though the boy’s (girl’s) family is struggling financially. We would 
also like them to answer some questions about whether they are shy in social situations, how 
confident they are in their social relationships, and whether they generally consider the needs 
and perspectives of others. Questions include:  
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I get anxious doing things when people are watching   
Never,     Rarely,     Sometimes,     Often,     Regularly 
 
When I am dancing/playing team games, I wonder what other people think about me.  
Never True          Sometimes True         Often True        Always True  
 
You want to start a game. Asking other kids to play the game is____for you. 
HARD!           hard           easy           or          EASY! 
 
My friends and I have many things in common  
Definitely False           False            True           Definitely True      
 
 
All together this will take your child 45 minutes to an hour to complete depending on how old 
and how fast they can read and communicate. We strongly encourage participants from all 
backgrounds to participate.   
 
We cannot guarantee or promise that your child or their school will receive any benefits from 
this project. However, the results may benefit families, schools and health professions in the 
future in managing youth’s social anxiety and social skills.  
  
The questions are not sensitive and your child can choose not to answer any of them. If they 
indicate that they do not want to answer a question it will be indicated that this is fine. If it is 
apparent that they are experiencing any distress as a consequence of any of the assessment 
they will be asked if they would like to stop. If they say no but still illustrate a high level of 
distress (e.g., anxiety) assessment will be discontinued and they will be allowed to go back to 
class if this is really what they want to do.          
 
Please note that in the unlikely event that any child is found to be experiencing extreme levels 
of distress parents will be made aware of this the researcher will offer a referral to an 
appropriate counselling service for assistance.   
 
Participants are not required to write their full name on the questionnaire, but we will be 
asking your child to write the first two letters of their first and last name on the 
questionnaires, and the name of the school that they attend. We can then use this information 
to locate their questionnaires if they decide that they no longer want to be part of the study. 
Their data will then be destroyed. 
 
No-one at school will see your child’s answers on the questionnaires.  They will be stored at 
Deakin University and only seen by me and my supervisor. They will be disposed of after 6 
years. The final project might be published, but no names will be used in this report so no-one 
will know who the participants were.   
 
Your child does not have to join this project. If participants do not want to continue to 
participate at any stage they can tell you, their teacher or me. If you would like to view the 
questionnaires or have any other questions before making your decision please contact me or 
your schools principal. Sign the Consent Form only after you have had a chance to ask your 
questions and have received satisfactory answers. 
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Before your child makes a decision about whether they would like to participate, a member of 
the research team will be available to answer any questions they have about the research 
project. They can ask for any information that they want.   
 
If you decide to withdraw your child from this project, please notify a member of the research 
team or complete and return the Revocation of Consent Form attached.  
 
Approval has also been obtained from the Department of Education for the study to be 
conducted through schools, and the project has been approved by Deakin University Human 
Research Ethics Committee.  
 
Should you have any concern about the conduct of this research project, please contact the  
Secretary HEAG-H, Dean's Office, Faculty of Health, Medicine, Nursing and Behavioural 
Sciences, 221 Burwood Hwy, Burwood, VIC 3125, Telephone: (03) 9251 7174, Email 
hmnbs-research@deakin.edu.au.  
If you require further information, wish to withdraw your participation or if you have any 
problems concerning this project (for example, any side effects), you can contact the principal 
researcher.  
The researchers responsible for this project are: 
Thane Camwell and Associate Professor David Mellor 
Faculty of Health, Medicine, Nursing and Behavioural Sciences 
221 Burwood Highway, BURWOOD VIC 3125 
Contact David Mellor on: 9244 3742/ david.mellor@deakin.edu.au 
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DEAKIN UNIVERSITY 
 CONSENT FORM 
 
TO:  Parents 
 
 
Third Party Consent Form 
(To be used by parents/guardians of minor children, or carers/guardians consenting on 
behalf of adult participants who do not have the capacity to give informed consent) 
 
Date: 
Full Project Title: Changes in reasoning ability and fears of negative evaluation in children and 
adolescents   
 
 
I have read and I understand the attached Plain Language Statement. 
I give my permission for ……………………………………………………(name of participant) 
to participate in this project according to the conditions in the Plain Language Statement.  
 
I have been given a copy of Plain Language Statement and Consent Form to keep. 
The researcher has agreed not to reveal my identity and personal details, including where information 
about this project is published, or presented in any public form.   
 
 
Participant’s Name (printed) …………………………………………………… 
Name of Person giving Consent (printed) ……………………………………………………   
Relationship to Participant: ……………………………………………………… 
 
Signature ……………………………………………………… Date  ………………………… 
 
 
Deakin University, Faculty of Health, Medicine, Nursing and Behavioural Sciences, Psychology.  
221 Burwood Highway, BURWOOD VIC 3125 
Contact David Mellor on: 9244 3742/ david.mellor@deakin.edu.au 
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PLAIN LANGUAGE STATEMENT AND CONSENT FORM 
 
TO:  Parents 
 
 
Revocation of Consent Form 
(To be used for participants only if they wish to withdraw from the project) 
Date; 
Full Project Title: Changes in reasoning ability and fears of negative evaluation in children and 
adolescents   
 
 
 
 
I hereby wish to WITHDRAW my consent to participate in the above research project and understand 
that such withdrawal WILL NOT jeopardise my relationship with Deakin University  
 
 
 
Participant’s Name (printed) ……………………………………………………. 
 
 
Signature ………………………………………………………………. Date 
…………………… 
 
 
 
Please mail this form to: 
 
Deakin University, Faculty of Health, Medicine, Nursing and Behavioural Sciences, Psychology.  
221 Burwood Highway, BURWOOD VIC 3125 
Contact David Mellor on: 9244 3742/ david.mellor@deakin.edu.au 
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DEAKIN UNIVERSITY 
PLAIN LANGUAGE STATEMENT  
 
Plain Language Statement for Students 
Date: 22.07.10 
Full Project Title: Reasoning ability, social relationships and fears of negative evaluation in 
children and adolescents.   
Principal Researcher: Associate Professor David Mellor  
Student Researcher: Thane Camwell  
 
Dear Student  
 
My name is Thane Camwell and I am studying for a Doctor of Psychology degree at Deakin 
University. For my studies I am doing a research project with Associate Professor David 
Mellor who is also from Deakin University. Your school has been invited to participate in this 
research project. We are hoping that we can recruit two to three hundred students aged 7-15 
from the participating schools, and hope that you choose to participate in this project.  
 
As background, this project seeks to better understand the changes that occur in school 
students reasoning ability as they grow. We know that children your age can consider more 
information and that they become interested in how others think about things. At your age 
some children can also be self-consciousness and worried about how others view them. We 
would like to know more about these issues because they are important for social and 
emotional skill development. 
  
If you decide to participate you will speak to the researcher (Thane Camwell) in a one-on-one 
interview and answer questions related to social stories. These stories encourage you to think 
about situations from multiple perspectives and provide a picture of your perspective-taking 
skills. For example, one story involves considering whether it is fair that a boy (or girl) throw 
a party at their school in order to impress their peers - even though the boy’s (girl’s) family is 
struggling financially. We would also like you to answer some questions about whether you 
are shy in social situations, how confident you are in their social relationships, and whether 
you generally consider the needs and perspectives of others. Questions include: 
 
I get anxious doing things when people are watching   
Never,     Rarely,     Sometimes,     Often,     Regularly 
When I am dancing/playing team games, I wonder what other people think about me.  
Never True          Sometimes True         Often True        Always True  
 
You want to start a game. Asking other kids to play the game is____for you. 
HARD!           hard           easy           or          EASY! 
 
My friends and I have many things in common  
Definitely False           False            True           Definitely True      
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All together this will take you 45 minutes to an hour to complete depending on how old and 
how fast you can read and communicate.    
 
You are not required to write your name on the questionnaire, but we will be asking you and 
your parents to write the first two letters of your first name and last name on the 
questionnaires, and the name of the school that you attend. We can then use this information 
to destroy your questionnaires if you decide that you no longer want to part of the study. 
 
No-one at school will see your answers on the questionnaires.  They will be stored at Deakin 
University and only seen by me and my teacher. They will be disposed of after 6 years. The 
final project might be published, but no names will be used in this report so no-one will know 
who you are.  
 
You do not have to join in this project.  If you don’t want to, you can tell your parents or your 
teacher or me and we will not have a problem with your decision.  But if you decide to join in, 
it is OK to change your mind and choose not to take part any more. You can do this at any 
time. If you do change your mind, you can tell your parents, your teacher or me. I won’t ask 
any questions about why you changed your mind, and there will be no consequences. If you 
decide not to take part, you will continue with your class work as usual. 
 
If you feel worried about the project at any time, or have any questions, you can talk to me, 
your parents or your teacher. You may contact David Mellor on 924 43742 or 
david.mellor@deakin.edu.au. 
 
Thank you for thinking about helping me to find out more about what school and home life is 
like for children.  If you are willing to take part, talk it over with your parents who will also 
have received a letter from me.  Please sign the consent form attached to this letter.   
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DEAKIN UNIVERSITY 
PLAIN LANGUAGE STATEMENT AND CONSENT FORM 
 
TO:  Students 
 
 
Consent Form 
 
Date: 
Full Project Title: Changes in reasoning ability and fears of negative evaluation in children and 
adolescents   
 
 
I have read and I understand the attached Plain Language Statement. 
I freely agree to participate in this project according to the conditions in the Plain Language Statement.  
 
I have been given a copy of Plain Language Statement and Consent Form to keep. 
The researcher has agreed not to reveal my identity and personal details, including where information 
about this project is published, or presented in any public form.   
 
 
Participant’s Name (printed) …………………………………………………… 
 
Signature ……………………………………………………… Date  ………………………… 
 
 
Deakin University, Faculty of Health, Medicine, Nursing and Behavioural Sciences, Psychology.  
221 Burwood Highway, BURWOOD VIC 3125 
Contact David Mellor on: 9244 3742/ david.mellor@deakin.edu.au 
 
 
